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The dynamics of collaborative procurement in the security sector are various and 
complex.  They are affected not only by international politics and the security context, 
but also by the decision-making processes and practices of the procuring organisation.  
Successful collaborative acquisition is rare and existing scholarship often focuses on the 
inefficiencies and problems that beset these processes.  This dissertation takes an 
original approach and attempts to identify positive drivers for successful collaborative 
procurement by focussing the enquiry on the capability that is being procured, 
surveillance, and on the related bureaucratic aspects of the procurement decision-
making. 
 
Multilateral procurement of security capabilities is necessary to meet the demand for 
joint, civil military solutions against transnational threats such as human trafficking, 
terrorism and cross border crime.  Multinational surveillance missions fulfil functions of 
'situational awareness' and monitoring border regions.  With record numbers of migrants 
crossing the Mediterranean, the EU and NATO are increasing their capabilities and 
procurement efforts to acquire surveillance capability.  The procurement of a 
surveillance capability by Western security organisations is part of an international 
security strategy and embedded in Western security culture.   
 
This study analyses the social processes of collaboration in a joint surveillance 
capability in NATO and the EU.  By referring to rational choice, institutional models 
and organisational, this study applies defence procurement approaches to consider 
drivers for multilateral procurement of a 'civil military' surveillance capability.  The 
research question asks: 'Is the multilateral procurement of surveillance capability driven 
by calculus or culture?'  Potential explanations lie in the context of NATO and EU's 
strategic culture, and the interests of actors involved in the procurement processes of 
these security organisations.  Ultimately the study concludes that calculus drivers for 
procurement activity are necessary but not always sufficient to conclude successful 
collaborative acquisition.  Cultural drivers such as multilateralism, the Western 
'community of values' and the civil military security culture, are needed to achieve 
agreement for collaboration and political support.   
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'Collaborative procurement is all about politics.'  This comment from a retired general1 
belies rational, cost efficiency arguments for joint procurement activity.  Politicians and 
academics criticise the lack of European security and defence assets available for 
multilateral missions.2  Here, collaborative procurement would seem to be a potential 
solution.  However, NATO and EU joint acquisition activity remains limited, with few 
successful programmes that can fill European capability gaps.3  What is the key to drive 
more collaboration?  Multilateral procurement poses a number of challenges, and 
compromises are required for successful outcomes.  Member states have differing 
strategic objectives,4 and technical and budgetary agreement is rarely sufficient to drive 
collaborative procurement to a successful conclusion.  This is especially true where 
sovereignty over assets is sacrificed.5  If one includes EU Commission or NATO 
organisation interests, then further complexities are introduced into decision-making.  In 
sum, many agree that additional political and cultural alignment of interests must be 
																																																																		
1. Interview with 011 
2. TRUMP, D. 2017. Remarks by President Trump at NATO Unveiling of the Article 5 and Berlin Wall 
Memorials - Brussels, Belgium. Washington.; VALÁŠEK, T. 2011. Surviving Austerity: The case for a 
new approach to EU military collaboration, Centre for European Reform.; GOURE, D. 2014. NATO's 
Last Chance, Invest Its Scarce Resources Wisely or Accept Strategic Irrelevance. Lexington Institute.; 
PANETTA, L. E. 5 October 2011 2011. RE: Remarks by Secretary Panetta at Carnegie Europe, Brussels, 
Belgium.; 
3. VALÁŠEK, T. 2011. Surviving Austerity: The case for a new approach to EU military collaboration, 
Centre for European Reform.; GOURE, D. 2014. NATO's Last Chance, Invest Its Scarce Resources 
Wisely or Accept Strategic Irrelevance. Lexington Institute. 
4. BAILES, A. 2011. Europe's Security, Attitudes, Achievements and Unsolved Challenges. In: 
CROCKER, C., HAMPSON, F. O. & AALL, P. (eds.) Rewiring Security in a Fragmented World. 
5. GIEGERICH, B. 2010. Budget Crunch: Implications for European Defence. Survival, 52, 87-98. 
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achieved for successful collaborative procurement.6  Cultural contexts are linked to the 
Western security agenda and may vary as the agenda evolves and develops over time.  
Adherence to cultural contexts confers legitimacy, and in some cases prestige, to the 
procurement and this contributes to positive sentiments towards collaboration.  In this 
way, sufficient political will7 is generated to accept the required compromises.  
Organisational and cultural aspects involved in the generation of political will for 
collaborative procurement are not addressed by many studies.  This thesis explores the 
social processes of collaboration.  It considers the chain of decisions in multilateral 
acquisition concerning the requirement validity, funding priorities, choice of vendors 
and contract terms.  It finds that both calculus and cultural explanations are relevant at 
different stages of the NATO and EU procurement processes.  It concludes that cultural 
explanations deserve greater significance than has been attributed to them in past 
research.  It challenges the basic assumption that successful collaboration follows from 
an emphasis on material objectives such as industrial participation (IP) and cost 
efficiency.  It suggests that additional alignment with cultural (political and societal) 




6. Ibid.; VALÁŠEK, T. 2011. Surviving Austerity: The case for a new approach to EU military 
collaboration, Centre for European Reform.; GOURE, D. 2014. NATO's Last Chance, Invest Its Scarce 
Resources Wisely or Accept Strategic Irrelevance. Lexington Institute.; JOANA, J. & SMITH, A. 2006. 
Changing french military procurement policy: The state, industry and ‘Europe’ in the case of the A400M. 
West European Politics, 29, 70-89. 
7. An important theme of this thesis is that 'political will' (or support) is essential for collaborative 
procurement, and that cultural drivers are significant to generate that political will.  This study uses the 
definition of 'political will' as the 'extent of committed support among key decision makers for a particular 
policy solution to a particular problem'.POST, L. A., RAILE, A. N. & RAILE, E. D. 2010. Defining 
political will. Politics & Policy, 38, 653-676. 
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The Western security environment has focussed on its border security for some time.  
This involves both traditional security and human security aspects.  The EU witnessed 
increased levels of border control and surveillance activity because of the migration 
crisis and illegal border movements in transnational areas, such as the Mediterranean.  
This has led to expanded multilateral activity.  There are a number of ongoing Western, 
multilateral surveillance operations and these include NATO's Operation Active 
Endeavour, that monitors the Mediterranean and is based at HQ MARCOM in 
Northwood.  The EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia is based in Rome and monitors 
the Southern Central Mediterranean for human trafficking and migrant smuggling.8  
NATO's Operation Ocean Shield is a counter piracy mission and monitors the Gulf of 
Aden and Horn of Africa.  EUNAVFOR's Operation Atalanta is the EU anti-piracy 
surveillance operation, monitoring the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa.  In the 
context of a renewed focus on how European states provide for their security, this 
research considers the drivers that encourage nations to collaborate to procure 
capabilities to support these and other missions.  Specifically, how Western multilateral 
organisations (NATO and the EU) collaborate to procure surveillance capability.  The 
research examines the drivers for multilateral aspects and the drivers for surveillance 
capability.    
 
Collaborative acquisition is an area of academic interest that deserves attention because 
history is littered with its failed attempts to achieve cost savings and efficiencies.9  It 
																																																																		
8. EU COUNCIL 2017. EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia: mandate extended until 31 December 
2018 (494/17). Brussels. 
9. BRADDON, D. & HARTLEY, K. 2013. More for less? Exploring the Economic dimensions of 
multilateral collaboration in military aerospace projects. Journal of Defense Studies & Resource 
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deserves attention because future joint efforts are likely to continue due to rising costs of 
equipment, reduced defence and security budgets and the requirement for joint missions.  
Much existing literature concentrates on what restrains rational, collaborative 
procurement of defence and security assets, and largely focuses on the military sector.10  
This thesis adopts a fresh approach and identifies positive drivers for member state 
collaboration, via multilateral organisations, in procurement policy and acquisition of 
joint security capabilities.  This research chose two relevant and valid case studies for 
collaboration in a similar Western security context, where the procurement organisation 
also performs the security function, thus introducing positive organisational factors for 
the acquisition of assets.  Alongside rational choice, organisational theory and 
bureaucratic politics, the research broadens the scope of explanations to include 
institutionalism.  Here, the thesis examines the contributions of strategic culture and 
political identity associated with multilateralism, the Western 'community of values' and 
'civil military' security concepts,11 to the social processes of collaboration.  In the 
cultural and social context of procurement decisions, societies shape and define interests 
and capacities of social agents and community organisations.12  The thesis argues that, 
while political support for collaborative procurement is partially achieved via 
bureaucratic politics and compromise, strategic culture and political imperatives relating 
																																																																																																																																																																																																			
Management, 2.2.; HARTLEY, K. 2012. White Elephants: The Political Economy of Multinational 
Defence Projects. Brussels: The Foundation for European Economic Reform. 
10. GIEGERICH, B. 2010. Budget Crunch: Implications for European Defence. Survival, 52, 87-98.; 
GOURE, D. 2014. NATO's Last Chance, Invest Its Scarce Resources Wisely or Accept Strategic 
Irrelevance. Lexington Institute.; VALÁŠEK, T. 2011. Surviving Austerity: The case for a new approach 
to EU military collaboration, Centre for European Reform. 
11. These ideas are expanded in the next section. 
12. BARNETT, M. N. & FINNEMORE, M. 1999. The politics, power, and pathologies of international 
organizations. International organization, 53, 699-732.; ABBOTT, K. W. & SNIDAL, D. 1998. Why 
States Act through Formal International Organizations. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42, 3-32. 
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to Western organisations and security solutions, are essential to overcome constraints in 
the process. 
 
The military intervention in Libya in 2011 led to calls for NATO to increase its 
surveillance assets.13  Yet NATO and the EU were already in the process of procuring 
surveillance infrastructure and capability.  While NATO has had an aerial surveillance 
programme since the 1970s via its AWACs assets,14 it has recently concluded 
negotiations for 13 partner states to acquire five Global Hawks and the related radar 
systems for its Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) project.  The EU Commission has 
also procured surveillance infrastructure via its agency, Frontex.15  The demand for, and 
expense of, the capability is likely to lead to further collaborative procurement of 
surveillance capability in the future.16  The need for surveillance solutions is articulated 
in national security strategies,17 in the security discourse of the EU and NATO,18 and by 
																																																																		
13. GRAND, C. 2012. Smart Defense and the Future of NATO: Can the Alliance Meet the Challenges of 
the Twenty-First Century? Smart Defense:. Chicago, Illinois. 
14. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48904.htm Accessed October 2017 
15. Frontex's full title is the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. The agency was set up in 2004 to 
reinforce and streamline cooperation between national border authorities.  
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/frontex_regulation_en.pdf accessed November 2016 
16. HAYES, B. & VERMEULEN, M. 2012. Borderline: The EU's New Border Surveillance Initiatives: 
Assessing the Costs and Fundamental Rights Implications of EUROSUR and the" Smart Borders" 
Proposals: a Study by the Heinrich Böll Foundation, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung. 
17. THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE 2013. French White Paper, Defence and National Security.; UK 
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 2003. UK Defence White Paper, Delivering Security in a Changing World. 
London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.; GERMAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 2006. 
German White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr. 
18. NATO 2010b. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. Lisbon: NATO.; EU COUNCIL 2010. Internal Security Strategy for the European 
Union: 'Towards a European Security Model'. Brussels: Council of the European Union. 
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industry professionals, such as Northrop Grumman (NG).19  While Western defence 
budgets are shrinking, expenditure in the security sector is growing (although it remains 
low in comparison to defence).20  Transnational threats of terrorism, human trafficking 
and organised crime have intensified the imperative for surveillance capability, even 
though this solution does not address the root cause of the threats.  Further, the EU has 
sponsored extensive research projects in this area via their Seventh Framework and 
Horizon 2020 Programmes.21  The thesis focuses on the procurement of this particular 
capability (surveillance) in the context of civil military applications.  While this limits 
the parameters of enquiry, it allows factors common to the procurement of a particular 
security solution to be identified in two very different case studies.  In turn, parallel 
approaches can be adopted when considering drivers for collaborative procurement of 
other solutions.  Here, cultural factors that compliment calculus rationales may increase 
the political will essential for successful collaboration.  
 
Four aspects suggest that rational explanations are insufficient, and that additional 
drivers are needed, to generate political will for multilateral procurement of security 
capabilities.  First, the sacrifice of sovereignty incurred through joint security functions 
and assets means that collaborative procurement is rarely the preferred option for 
member states.22  Second, a rational premise for collaboration would suggest that all 
required assets would be bought jointly where costs could be saved.  However, only a 
																																																																		
19. TYLER, A. 2015. Tomorrow's Battles: Thinking about effect. Jane's Defence Weekly. 
20. ANDERSON, G. 2014. M&A full-year report 2014. Ibid. 
21. HAYES, B. 2009. NeoConOpticon, the EU Security Industrial Complex. Statewatch.; BIGO, D. & 
JEANDESBOZ, J. 2010. The EU and the European Security Industry, Questioning the 'Public-Private 
Dialogue'. CEPS, IN:EX Policy Brief, No.5. 
22. GIEGERICH, B. 2010. Budget Crunch: Implications for European Defence. Survival, 52, 87-98. 
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few security solutions are successfully jointly procured.  Therefore there are additional 
factors for certain security solutions to be prioritised over others.  Third, diverging 
member state security objectives mean that consent for joint security solutions is 
difficult to obtain on a rational basis, and additional encouragement for political support 
is required.  Fourth, both the EU and NATO, with 21 states overlap in the organisations, 
are pursuing similar procurement strategies and offering similar civil military security 
solutions for border security.23  There are clearly some drivers regarding procurement of 
certain capabilities that encourage irrational duplication. 
 
This research considers these four aspects and identifies positive drivers for 
procurement to answer the research question:  
 
Is multilateral procurement of surveillance capability driven by calculus or culture?   
 
Here, calculus encompasses rational, strategic and self-interested drivers, and culture 
embodies political and symbolic aspects that encourage member states to support 




23. MAULNY, J.-P. 2012. The Franco-British Treaty, The European Union's 'Pooling and sharing' and 
NATO's 'Smart Defence'; How can the different initiatives in terms of pooling capabilities be coordinated. 
Paris: IRIS. 
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Concepts and Definitions 
There are a number of terms and concepts referred to throughout the thesis.  This section 
clarifies the intended meaning of these.  Here, terms used such as 'multilateral' and 
'collaborative' procurement, 'surveillance capability' and 'calculus' and 'culture', and the 
adjectives 'political' and 'bureaucratic' are defined.  First, the concept of strategic culture 
is outlined, and Western 'community of values', 'civil military' and 'multilateral' strategic 
cultures are explained.  
 
'Strategic culture' is 'a number of shared beliefs, norms and ideas within a given society 
that generate specific expectations about the respective community's preferences and 
actions in security and defence policy.'24  In this context, a community's security and 
defence identity, expressed through its preferences and behavioural patterns, derives 
from shared experiences and accepted narratives specific to a particular security 
community.  Adherence to a strategic culture confers legitimacy into decision-making 
activities for collaborative policy and procurement.  Thus multilateral organisations 
connected to a specific strategic culture gain legitimacy and prestige.25  There are three 
strategic cultures that are associated with collaborative procurement of surveillance: the 
Western 'community of values', civil military security solutions and multilateralism. 
 
The Western 'Community of Values' is a strategic culture upheld by both NATO and the 
EU.  These cultural concerns represent the values that the West wants to proactively 
																																																																		
24. BIEHL, H., GIEGERICH, B. & JONAS, A. 2013. Strategic Cultures in Europe, Springer. p.12 
25. ABBOTT, K. W. & SNIDAL, D. 1998. Why States Act through Formal International Organizations. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42, 3-32. 
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uphold26.  They are rooted in Christian ideas of progress, civilisation, compassion and 
humanity27 with an emphasis on human and civil rights.28  Where political and academic 
commentators articulate these values, they inform and influence policy.  The EU links to 
these values with Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty specifically referring to fundamental 
rights: 
 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the 
Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, 
justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.29 
 
NATO also makes reference to these values in its published documents such as its 
Strategic Concept.30  Articulation of the 'community of values' has been in evidence 
during the migration crisis, where commentators are concerned that the fundamental 
rights of migrants have not been addressed in the preferred security solutions.31  Here, 
																																																																		
26. WAGNSSON, C. 2010. Divided power Europe: normative divergences among the EU ‘big three’. 
Journal of European Public Policy, 17, 1089-1105. 
27. MEYER, J. W., BOLI, J. & THOMAS, G. M. 1987. Ontology and Rationalization in the Western 
Cultural Account. In: THOMAS, G. M., MEYER, J. W., RAMIREZ, F. O. & BOLI, J. (eds.) Institutional 
Structure Constituting State, Society and the Individual. Newbury Park: Sage Publications. 
28. PERKOWSKI, N. 2012. A normative assessment of the aims and practices of the European border 
management agency Frontex. Oxford: Refugees Studies Centre. 
29.http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-european-union-and-comments/title-1-
common-provisions/2-article-2.html Accessed April 2018 
30. NATO 2010b. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. Lisbon: NATO. 
31. BIGO, D. & JEANDESBOZ, J. 2010. The EU and the European Security Industry, Questioning the 
'Public-Private Dialogue'. CEPS, IN:EX Policy Brief, No.5.; AAS, K. F. & GUNDHUS, H. O. I. 2015. 
	 18 
there are allegations of militarised security solutions that prioritise political and 
industrial interests, and that overlook the input of NGOs and humanitarian bodies.32  An 
important additional note is that the 'community of values' is related to a political 
identity of Western member states.33  The idea was attributed to the values of democracy 
during the enlargement of both the EU and NATO and explored by academics such as 
Schimmelfennig.34  Thus a sense of belonging and multilateralism is linked to the values 
of the Western community.  EU and NATO represent this community35 and cultural 
procurement drivers can be related to this.   
 
The term 'civil military' refers to both assets and a strategic culture that straddle civil 
security and military functions.  The term is adapted from an ECORYS study on civil 
military synergies36 and is related to the term 'dual use'.  'Dual use' is used in academic 
and defence circles and refers to assets and technologies that are used for both civil and 
																																																																																																																																																																																																			
Policing Humanitarian Borderlands: Frontex, Human Rights and the Precariousness of Life. The British 
Journal of Criminology, 55, 1-18.; MAWDSLEY, J., BAILES, A. & DEPAUW, S. 2012. Towards a 
Merger of the European Defence and Security Markets. Brussels: Flemish Peace Research Institute. p.21 
32. HAYES, B. 2009. NeoConOpticon, the EU Security Industrial Complex. Statewatch.; HAYES, B. & 
VERMEULEN, M. 2012. Borderline: The EU's New Border Surveillance Initiatives: Assessing the Costs 
and Fundamental Rights Implications of EUROSUR and the" Smart Borders" Proposals: a Study by the 
Heinrich Böll Foundation, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung. 
33. CANIVEZ, P. 2010. Review essay: Under consideration: Furio Cerutti and Sonia Lucarelli (eds), The 
search for a European identity: Values, policies and legitimacy of the European Union. Philosophy & 
Social Criticism, 36, 857-870. 
34. SCHIMMELFENNIG, F. 2003. The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe, Cambridge University 
Press. p.67 
35. ABBOTT, K. W. & SNIDAL, D. 1998. Why States Act through Formal International Organizations. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42, 3-32. 
36. ECORYS 2012. Study on Civil Military Synergies in the field of Security. Rotterdam: European 
Commission DG Enterprise and Industry. 
	 19 
military applications.37  Surveillance technology, equipment and capability often support 
both civil security and military functions, such as border security, maritime surveillance 
and infrastructure resource protection.  These 'civil military' surveillance functions and 
capability straddle the 'civil security' and 'defence' categories.  Civil military solutions 
address civil security issues such as terrorism and organised crime but may be 
performed by military actors.  For example, the border control and surveillance is 
traditionally seen as a civil security function, but NATO, a military organisation, now 
articulates this as part of its mission.38  The EU has a remit for border surveillance via its 
agency Frontex, a civil security Agency, but military actors from some member states 
may perform this function.39   
 
Two additional aspects to civil military culture relate separately to the US and to 
European member states.  First, Europe has a strategic culture that favours softer, civil 
security solutions over military or defence solutions.  This is especially true compared to 
the US and is a stance that has been explored by academics.40  Therefore, those making 
security policy often favour civil military solutions to purely defence solutions.41  
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Second, some civil security capabilities, such as surveillance, have been affected by the 
US Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) culture and are linked to a militarised civil 
security culture.42  RMA emerged post Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and refers to an 
evolution of weapons technology43 and operational concepts among advanced powers.  
It focuses on the changes made possible by advanced information technology,44 which is 
used to achieve radically greater levels of efficiency.45  In a military context, RMA 
represents systems that provide 'capability for all weather/night high tempo 'hyperwar' 
operations' of which surveillance is a component.46  Thus, RMA is linked to 'advanced 
powers' and levels of prestige related to sophisticated surveillance equipment which is 
part of 'dominant battle space knowledge'.47  This has implications for the choice of 
surveillance as a security solution, where capability that was originally associated with 
the RMA is adapted for a civil security context.48  It explains technical imperatives for 
the acquisition and use of sophisticated military surveillance assets in civil security 
functions in some circumstances, which could be counted as irrational where less 
sophisticated assets could perform a similar role. 
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'Multilateral' refers to the multinational nature of the contracts where member states 
collaborate in the procurement process via NATO and the EU agency 'Frontex'.  
'Multilateralism' is associated with Western strategic cultures and with NATO and EU 
organisations.  Here, ideas of Western identity and security community are represented 
by these organisations and affect member state behaviour.49  Ruggie considered the 
concept and noted that 'multilateralism in security relations refers to collective security 
or self defense.  Multilateralism coordinates policies on the basis of certain principles of 
ordering relations'.50  Caporaso takes this a step further and considers the demanding 
'multilateral' organisational form where member states renounce temporary advantages, 
and do not make decisions based on exact calculations of costs and benefits in the short 
term.51  Rather they accept a 'diffuse reciprocity' where they expect to benefit in the long 
run, via arrangements such as multilateral procurement.52   
 
In this thesis 'collaborative' procurement generally refers to that joint action required to 
acquire the equipment or capability, rather than develop the capability.  Much literature 
addresses the implications of collaborative development and production among two or 
more states.  These maybe for national use, for example the Eurofighter Typhoon fighter 
aircraft.53  Or for a multinational unit, for example EU member states have jointly 
developed the Galileo system (a global civil satellite navigation system), via the 
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European Space Agency and the EU Commission since 1999.54  This thesis does not 
address the development aspect of collaborative procurement that can add considerable 
emphasis on national participation due to the technical expertise that can be gained from 
the development phase.55  The phenomenon under study here is the multinational 
procurement of a system largely developed.  As such, reference and comparison is made 
to examples of past multinational 'off-the-shelf' procurements such as NATO's AWACs.  
This means that there is less proprietary technical knowledge to be gained in the 
acquisition by member states who are not party to the development aspects of the assets. 
 
This thesis refers to 'surveillance capability' as those functions that relate to the 
gathering of information for risk assessment, including information networks.  NATO 
defines surveillance as 'the systematic observation of aerospace, surface or sub-surface 
areas, places, persons or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other 
means'.56  In the context of NATO and Frontex it is also associated with 'intelligence 
collection': 'The exploitation of sources by collection agencies and the delivery of the 
information obtained to the appropriate processing unit for use in the production of 
intelligence'.57  The Eurosur regulation broadens the scope of surveillance in the context 
of borders as 'including the monitoring, detection, identification, tracking, prevention 
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and interception of unauthorised border crossings'.58  The thesis does not consider the 
'prevention and interception of unauthorised border crossings' but otherwise refers to the 
above definitions and the capability required to perform surveillance under these 
definitions as 'surveillance capability'.   
 
Definitions of 'calculus and culture' reflect the nature of the drivers behind the 
procurement.  Hall and Taylor refer to the term 'calculus' and 'culture' in their seminal 
article 'Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms'.59  'Calculus' entails 
instrumental behaviour where actors make strategic decisions in their material interests: 
'Individuals seek to maximise the attainment of a set of goals given by a specific 
preference function', 'they canvas all possible options to select those conferring 
maximum benefit'.60  This is linked to strategic choice and bureaucratic models where 
actors behave according to their self-interest.  Calculus drivers for procurement can be 
generated via a rational response to a security issue.  However, other less rational, 
calculus drivers exist.  For example, organisation drivers for role expansion may 
encourage procurement for a capability to legitimise expansion or assertion of a security 
role.61  Equally, member state industrial imperatives may provide a calculus driver for 
procurement of certain security solutions that suit an industrial policy rather than a 
security policy.   
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Contrastingly, 'culture' refers to ideas and social factors that affect decision-making 
behaviour via a worldview or organisation environment.62  This thesis refers to Anne 
Swidler's definition that culture 'consists of such symbolic vehicles of meaning, 
including beliefs, ritual practices, art forms, and ceremonies as well as informal cultural 
practices such as language, gossip, stories and rituals of daily life'.  These symbolic 
forms are the means through which these modes of behaviour and outlook within a 
community are socially processed.63  This research considers civil military culture, 
multilateralism, and the demands of the Western 'community of values' as they affect 
preferences for procurement outcomes in multilateral organisations.  Prestige also fits 
with ideas of culture, where a socially constructed idea of status becomes associated 
with technical imperatives for a particular, sophisticated capability, such as methods of 
surveillance and intelligence collection via satellite pictures and unmanned drones.  Eyre 
and Suchman assert that the demand for certain security capability is 'driven and shaped 
by institutionalized normative structures linking [capabilities]64 with modernization and 
social legitimacy'.  'This emphasizes the role of world cultural models that 'press all 
countries towards common objectives, forms and practices'.65  'Cultural' arguments may 
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be used strategically for 'calculus' objectives,66 and these ideas are fully explored in the 
chapters below. 
 
Finally, there are two adjectives used throughout the thesis that deserve clarification: 
'political' and 'bureaucratic'.  The adjective 'political' is used in this thesis to indicate 
where political elites are involved in the decision-making process and act with an 
agenda that relates to a political context, either domestic or international.67  This use of 
'political' must be distinguished from those actions, sometimes referred to as 'political', 
that relate to power and status in a smaller, non-elite, organisation context or from 
disagreements between two non-elite parties. The adjective 'bureaucratic' is used 
throughout the study to simply refer to the organisation characteristics of NATO and 
EU, such as structure, practices and processes.68  It is not used as a negative term and 
does not refer to inefficiencies that are sometimes associated with a bureaucracy.  
 
Literature Review 
This review considers the literature that addresses important themes of the research: 
collaborative procurement, organisation decision-making and strategic culture.  
Collaborative procurement literature frequently analyses procurement decision-making 
through the lens of rational choice, and focuses on the military and defence sector.  The 
review draws in an additional body of literature that considers EU procurement of 
security activities via its exploration of the securitisation of EU surveillance practices 
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and in particular border surveillance.  The review considers this collaborative 
procurement literature and attempts to address the gaps.  First, regarding organisational 
analysis of collaborative procurement policy, and second identifying cultural 
explanations for joint procurement of surveillance.  Then the review outlines literature 
concerned with the bureaucracies of NATO and the EU Commission, as they relate to 
procurement decision-making.  It demonstrates that, while there are some existing 
studies on the different roles of NATO and the EU, there is little comparative research 
on the security bureaucracies of the organisations, particularly with respect to specific 
decision-making activities, such as procurement.  Finally, the review also considers 
literature concerning strategic cultures that influence procurement processes and reflects 
societal expectations generated from the Western 'community of values' and civil 
military culture.  There is little literature that specifically considers multilateralism and 
procurement, the review notes where references are made to this driver in existing 
studies. 
 
Security and Defence Procurement 
A starting point to consider drivers for security procurement is Barry Buzan's The Arms 
Dynamic in World Politics.69  While Buzan focusses on the technological imperative in 
the defence sector, his explanations for the arms dynamic encapsulate a broad range of 
political and organisational drivers that are applicable to procurement in most contexts, 
including collaborative procurement in organisations.   Buzan refers to the 'arms 
dynamic' as the 'sets of pressures that make actors.... Both acquire armed forces and 
change the quantity and quality of the armed forces that they already possess.'70  The 
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'action reaction' model refers to an external threat generating the pressures for 
procurement;71 the 'domestic structure' model refers to pressures originating from within 
the state.  These include organisational pressures that are as applicable in a collaborative 
context as in a general context.  Buzan includes both symbolic and identity drivers that 
relate to culture in his explanations of procurement.72  Importantly for this research he 
refers to Scott's 'open systems' theory, which relates organisations to sets of societal 
rules and cultures, and 'natural systems' theory, which relates to organisational survival 
drivers.  These theories provide an explanation for the links between the macro and 
micro context to organisation decision-making.  However, Buzan concentrates on a 
national, rather than international, context and articulates a very broad approach to 
procurement.  He does not consider the social processes of collaboration in any great 
detail.  This thesis draws upon elements of Buzan's arguments, notably their 
establishment of drivers.  It expands the environment to a multilateral, international 
situation and focuses on how the organisation processes and decision-making reflects 
this context. 
 
The collaborative procurement literature that is relevant to this thesis may be divided 
into two subsets: first, collaborative defence literature; and second, that literature that 
considers the, predominantly EU, industrial relationships, securitisation and purchase of 
border security and surveillance capability.  The defence and civil military sectors are 
generally treated differently in the literature.  NATO is associated with the defence 
sector that is often analysed through a realist lens.  The EU Commission is associated 
with civil security and often analysed via a cultural approach.  This thesis aims to bridge 
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these two approaches when considering the organisations' bureaucratic decision-making, 
drawing attention to parallel cultural drivers for the procurement of a particular 
capability, surveillance. 
  
The subset of 'collaborative' defence procurement literature often approaches 
procurement through a realist lens.73  This approach emphasises the rational aspects of 
collaboration.  The literature also tends to focus on policy level decisions for 
procurement, rather than decision-making within organisations.  These works refer to 
rational and strategic (calculus) drivers for collaborative procurement such as cost 
efficiency drivers, the primary, strategic reason for most initiatives.  National defence 
industries are jealously guarded and participation in multinational projects is 
traditionally seen as a source of business and technological transfer for national defence 
industry:  'Governments in Europe are concerned about the economic as well as the 
military, impact of defence spending'.74  Hartley and Braddon consider a broad overview 
of collaborative defence acquisition.75    Hartley notes that nations join collaborative 
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programmes if economic and non-economic benefits are superior to a nationally 
independent programme.76  His study considers inefficiencies in procurement processes, 
and asks why governments continue with collaborative programmes.  His conclusions 
include bureaucratic drivers for procurement, that, 'once started, collaborative 
programmes are difficult to stop'.77  This is due to the formation of interest groups that 
include 'bureaucracies, politicians, scientists, armed forces and producer industries'.78  
These interest groups generate the 'industrial imperative' driver, also known as juste 
retour or the military industrial complex.79  Marc DeVore considers collaboration for 
aerospace procurement and also considers the subject from an economic perspective.80  
He seeks explanations for the lack of economic benefits and cost savings from 
collaboration in the defence aerospace sector, and looks to principal agent and 
collaborative action theories for answers.  His article 'Who's in the Cockpit'81 also 
tackles collaboration for aerospace procurement from a economic approach, using the 
'varieties of capitalism' theory.  This literature does not consider the social processes of 
collaborative procurement and additional societal input into the decisions during the 
procurement process. 
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The collaborative procurement literature carries over its rational and economic 
perspective when it considers organisation influences on procurement.  This is true of 
existing studies of NATO and EU procurement activity.82  Both Matthew Uttley and 
Marc DeVore consider historic developments in defence procurement organisations.83  
Uttley's article considers the potential for cooperation in Europe and notes the 
difficulties that cooperation faces given member state demands for collaborative 
procurement efficiency versus returns for their industries.  DeVore's comprehensive 
overview of the history of armaments cooperation organisations examines how the 
structure of collaborative procurement organisations has evolved over time.84  He 
concludes that organisation focus has moved from functionalism (and officials with 
expertise) to a political emphasis (involving defence ministers) to aid decision-making.  
This means that external influences become more important as a political stance 
includes societal input.  DeVore finishes his organisation analysis by considering the EU 
Commission and the EDA as procurement organisations.  He notes the power that these 
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supranational organisations have, as they focussed not on who was representing member 
states, but how they could achieve their objectives.85  
 
Arnold Tessmer's Politics of Compromise: NATO and AWACs86 gives an insight into the 
political workings of NATO procurement and the processes of US persuasion tactics 
with NATO member states.  This is a fascinating story of the bargaining processes 
behind NATO's procurement of a surveillance capability.  This work is relevant in that it 
concerns member state behavioural processes of procurement, but it does not consider 
NATO's influence as an organisation actor.  NATO is mentioned as an honest broker, 
but there are no implications or analysis beyond this.  Jack Nelson's 2014 thesis Alliance 
Ground Surveillance and the Future of NATO's Smart Defence,87 was written under the 
supervision of David Yost, a renowned NATO scholar.  This thesis considers the history 
of the multilateral AGS Programme from the perspective of Smart Defence and NATO's 
strategic imperatives.  Nelson suggests that the Programme has been acquired in part 
'out of loyalty and deference to the United States'88 and NATO rather than for rational 
motives such as access to useful equipment.  Nelson concludes that the AGS acquisition 
programme can be viewed as a measured success alongside its symbolic relevance for 
political cohesion,89 but doesn't consider NATO bureaucratic structures or strategic 
cultural influences in his analysis.   
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Academic literature does note that, alongside efficiency objectives, political willingness 
is an essential aspect of collaborative defence procurement.  Giegerich considers 
different methods of collaboration in both defence and security capabilities, such as EU 
satellite operations based in Spain.90  He does not explore the specific bureaucratic 
processes but provides a general overview of options, such as pooling and sharing, and 
the benefits and the costs of collaboration.  He mentions political incentives for defence 
procurement collaboration such as political cohesion and common outlook on security 
policy, and notes that these are often outweighed by the required sacrifice of national 
autonomy.  Giegerich focuses on the inefficiencies of programmes such as the A400M 
aircraft and NH90 Helicopters, pointing to reasons such as juste retour and multi-
principal, complex decision-making.  His approach is largely rational and strategic and 
at a policy level rather than considering specific contracts.  His coedited volume 
Strategic Cultures in Europe also acknowledges that strategic culture can affect 
collaborative procurement efforts, but there is little exploration of how this might 
manifest in practice.91  He also notes that the diversity in strategic culture might hinder 
cooperation.  Valášek also notes ideational components of joint acquisition such as 
strategic culture, trust and solidarity.92  He does not look to how this is realised within 
organisations, but merely comments that lack of these aspects hinders collaborative 
procurement efficiency.  Jean Pierre Maulny93 compares different, multilateral 
procurement initiatives, including those of the EU and NATO, and notes the overlap 
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between the programmes and the lack of political coordination.  He cautions that the 
procurement initiatives will not be successful unless there is political will to cede 
sovereignty agreed on an international basis.  Goure also analyses NATO initiatives and 
also points to an inability of European member states to agree to common threats and to 
cede any sovereignty over assets.94  He notes a lack of political trust and strategic 
divergence within NATO member states over sharing defence assets.  Amongst his 
general criticisms of European member states defence capabilities, Goure particularly 
comments on the lack of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
capabilities.95  He asserts that political will needs to come from societal endorsement 
and a strategic culture for additional defence procurement.  However, his analysis 
remains on the political and broad based policy level, and he does not analyse NATO 
bureaucracy for explanations of how the political support may be generated or realised.  
Goure concludes that European military strategic culture is ambivalent towards defence 
spending and that future investment strategies need to be political.96  This reference to 
strategic culture is made in passing and is not explored in any great detail.    
 
In general, these studies relate to a military context, and do not consider cultural 
influences on procurement, such as the Western community of values or a 'civil military' 
strategic culture.  Although they acknowledge the importance of political will, they do 
not explore how this may be generated.  They do not consider how cultural influences 
are reflected in the bureaucracies of NATO and the EU and their procurement policies 
and processes.  Katzenstein addresses cultural aspects of security, and the 'cultural-
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institutional' context of state behaviour.97  He, and others, note that international cultural 
environments not only include international organisations, but also that a world political 
discourse affects security policy.98  In Katzenstein's edited volume, Eyre and Suchman 
consider normative, cultural influences on weapons procurement in developing countries 
for prestige weapons in determining their modern state identity.99  This approach 
demonstrates motives for procurement that do not relate to rational requirement for the 
assets, but that are socially generated in relation to norms of a strategic culture.  Joana 
and Smith also study collaborative procurement partially through a cultural lens, and 
conclude that politics and strategic culture play an important part in procurement of the 
A400M.100  Their study focuses on the 'social representations of reality' as they affect 
procurement policies.  They note that, in the context of military procurement, the need 
for the A400M was defined via 'a politicised commitment to European co-operation' as 
well as industrial imperatives in the arms sector.  They consider how European states 
construct their preferences for the A400M action.  Here, actors' actions are constrained 
by sets of roles, rules and expectations in an 'ideational framework that is cognitive, 
normative and symbolic', and the need for a successful European joint venture was 
prioritised over industrial and operational goals.101  This thesis takes the cultural premise 
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and links it to European adherence to civil military security norms in their procurement 
practices.  These may relate to a European emphasis on civil security over defence.  The 
research finds that there is a gap in the literature with regard to linking collaborative 
defence and security procurement to this context.  Further, many works focus on the 
military and defence sector rather than the civil military sector.   
 
The second core body of literature relevant to the thesis considers the securitisation of 
EU border surveillance.  Here the scholarship often includes the procurement activities 
associated with the securitisation.  In the main these relate to the procurement of the 
EU's research programmes as there has not been much joint procurement of surveillance 
capability until the Frontex contracts in this study.  Mark Akkerman has also 
commented on NATO activity in the Mediterranean, alleging that the Alliance's push 
back policy regarding migrants violates human rights.102  This literature is different to 
the collaborative defence literature in that it makes specific reference to the cultural 
input of industrial and government actors.  It is generated from the 'community of 
values' culture that prioritises human rights over securitised responses and criticises civil 
military, border security solutions as being related to industrial imperatives.  The 
literature is significant as it criticises institutional behaviour and alters attitudes and 
behaviour in procurement activity.  Here societal, cultural empathy with the criticism 
means that the literature generates political pressure.103  The literature tends to be critical 
of the EU's approach, in particular, to the functions of border surveillance in the context 
of the migration crisis.  Didier Bigo and Julian Jeandesboz criticise the EU's approach to 
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its FP7 research programme, and allege that it prioritised industry input into security 
solutions, at the expense of input from NGO and other humanitarian bodies.104  This 
analysis is based on research programme contracts, rather than procurement activity for 
actual functions, but is relevant to EU interaction with industrial actors.   
 
Ben Hayes is highly critical of the surveillance culture.  He examines the relationship 
between industry actors and EU policy makers.105  His work is concerned with the civil 
liberty implications of a security industrial complex.  Hayes specifically refers to the 
militarising influence of the US RMA, NATO, and the concept of homeland security on 
border security measures.106  He is critical of industrial influence, but provides little 
evidence of this in actual procurement practices relating to current border surveillance 
practices.  Hayes' study considers the behaviour of the Commission regarding the FP7 
research programme and explicitly links industrial figures, and military influences such 
as NATO, with policy formation and the procurement of research projects.  Mark 
Akkerman also alleges that industrial involvement with policy making and the 
procurement of research programmes is prioritised over migrants’ human rights.107  He 
makes just one reference to Frontex contracts and does not follow up with any detailed 
analysis of bureaucratic decision-making, or come to any conclusions as to the 
procurement outcomes.  This approach to border security affects organisation and 
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procurement activity even when it does not directly concern contracting.  Sarah 
Léonard's article regarding the securitisation of Frontex border surveillance practices 
describes the criticisms of human rights activists and NGO's.108  This article does not 
address procurement concerns but reflects the 'community of values' approach to 
Frontex activities.  She notes that although migration is framed as a humanitarian issue 
in EU institutions, the practices of Frontex convert the issue to one of security.  This is 
achieved by deploying measures that would be used for a security problem, and by 
framing the migration crisis as an 'exceptional' situation and therefore generating a crisis 
response.  She notes that Frontex has also developed relationships with private sector 
companies that provide security solutions, in order to provide solutions for the migration 
crisis.  It is also involved with policy-making bodies regarding future research and 
development concerning border surveillance.  Thus it is indirectly implicated with 
research into surveillance solutions chosen and developed by the EU research 
programmes. 
 
This thesis considers this body of literature important for EU and NATO decision-
making for procurement of joint activities.  Most criticism regarding suppression of civil 
rights is related to the activities of the EU.   This is partly because there is more 
information about the EU that is easier to access, but also because of the EU's 
Parliamentary tradition of upholding human rights.109  Criticism of NATO procurement 
practices is referred to in the collaborative procurement section above.  As indicated, it 
tends to be related to realist, functionalist and economic approaches.  It also focuses on 
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industrial imperatives, but relates these to the inefficiency of the Alliance's procurement 
practices.110  This approach is less emotive, does not relate to societal culture and carries 
less political weight.  In summary, the two bodies of literature (collaborative 
procurement and securitisation of border surveillance practices) warn of close contacts 
between industry, member states and the organisations involved in security 
procurement.  However, they are associated with differing levels of political weight.  
Thus in the case of the EU oriented criticism, this affects attitudes and approaches to 
procurement practices.  In contrast, the dry economic approaches and criticism of 
NATO do not resonate in the same way with societal imperatives or carry sufficient 
political weight to affect discipline for rational drivers within procurement processes.  
 
While the scholarship above is focussed on joint procurement, two further bodies of 
literature considered below also inform the thesis: Multilateral organisation bureaucracy 
and culture literature; and Strategic culture literature.  These are now considered for 
their contribution to the analysis of organisation decision-making for the joint 
procurement of surveillance. 
 
Organisation Bureaucracy and Culture 
An important theme for the research is organisational influence on procurement.  
Allison's well-known, bureaucratic decision-making models111 are often referred to in 
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explanations of procurement,112 but few studies address the complexities of multilateral 
bureaucracy and organisational decision-making.  The literature considered here studies 
bureaucratic decision-making rather than procurement specifically.  It demonstrates how 
organisational staff and structure affect decision-making, distracting from member state 
objectives, and enhances other influences such as organisation role expansion, industrial 
imperatives or cultural influences.  The role of NATO and EU bureaucracy is considered 
in Sebastian Mayer's Embedded Politics, Growing Informalisation? How NATO and the 
EU Transform the Provision of External Security.113  Mayer introduces the concept of 
'embedded security politics' where fragmented responsibilities and pressure for 
consensus alter preferences towards organisational arrangements.  He asserts that 
organisations have taken on a greater role in security via 'internationalisation', a process 
that takes place in multilateral bureaucracies.114  Mayer considers how bureaucracies 
affect member state decision-making, and offers examples of 'multi-nationalisation' of 
forces and asset pooling as evidence of internationalisation.  He continues this line of 
enquiry in his edited volume, NATO's Post Cold War Politics - The Changing Provision 
of Security.115  This considers various perspectives of the NATO organisation, from 
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Gade's chapter on the changing nature of NATO's Military Staff working practices,116 to 
Michel's study of NATO's decision-making.117  Gade suggests that after NATO reforms, 
there is more civilian input into NATO processes via the civilian International Staff.118  
Michel suggests that NATO's laborious formal decision-making processes means that 
alternative informal decision-making routes allow for other additional, external input, 
thus diluting military influence.  Generally, the volume explores how influences on 
decision-making have evolved as working practices in NATO have changed.   
 
Reinalda and Verbeek's Decision-making in International Organisations119 considers 
the delivery of cultural dynamics by bringing together bureaucratic politics and 
constructivist explanations.  Here they assert that international organisations' structure 
and bureaucracy form opportunities for cultural influences to enter decision-making 
processes.120  In this volume, Trondal emphasises the concept of supranational loyalties 
versus intergovernmental loyalties in decision-making.121  He comments on the multiple 
roles and identities within the EU, especially on supranational identities.  Trondal and 
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Marcussen et al update and expand this line of enquiry and consider how 
intergovernmental dynamics are 'transcended or supplanted by supranational, 
departmental or epistemic dynamics'.122  While the focus on decision-making is general, 
rather than security oriented or procurement specific, the dynamics may be transferred 
to a procurement context and expanded to include NATO alongside the EU.   
 
The review will now consider analysis of two strategic cultures, the Western community 
of values, and civil military security.  It further notes that these cultures have influenced 
a body of critical literature regarding the EU, and to a lesser extent, NATO.   
 
Strategic Culture  
The Western 'community of values' is a cultural influence well documented in the 
literature.  The thesis refers to this literature for its impact on procurement decisions.  
After the expansion of the EU and NATO in the early 2000's, a number of studies 
considered how the organisations represented and promulgated norms of democracy and 
human rights.123  Schimmelfennig's study of the expansion of membership of the EU 
and NATO considers cultural arguments of conformity to 'community rules'.  He 
concludes that cultural explanations can be used for the high level decisions for 
enlargement, but that egoistic preferences and strategic action also affected decision-
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making.124  Benjamin Zyla considers the strategic culture of NATO and the EU and 
concludes that the two organisations have a cultural overlap in representing 'values like 
freedom, liberty, human rights and the rule of law'.125  He does not apply this to 
bureaucratic practices, but his work is useful in terms of outlining the strategic culture 
that guides these organisations' policy decision-making.  He uses constructivist 
explanations for norms, values and beliefs influence on organisation behaviour.126  Zyla 
asserts that elites 'hold the expertise' to aggregate norms and then 'process' and 'translate' 
them for society by means of publicly accessible language.   
 
The Western 'community of values' calls for humanitarian border surveillance to 
monitor activity and aid safety measures for migrants as they make the dangerous 
journey to Europe.127  Heller and Pezzani's 'Left to die Boat,'128 was a particularly 
influential report which represents this culture.  It criticised the lack of collective 
responsibility towards vulnerable migrants.  It described the plight of a boat of migrants, 
all of whom died after leaving Libya for Europe, and reported on the activities of 
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international security bodies who were monitoring the Mediterranean at the time.  This 
included NATO, Frontex, and Maltese and Italian coastguards.  It presented the 
information surrounding the deaths of the migrants, and affected subsequent policy 
making within the European Commission and NATO.129  Nina Perkowski's 'Normative 
Assessment of the Aims and Practices of the European Border Agency, Frontex'130 
considers the 'community of values' in this context.  She traces the origins of the 
'community of values' and shows evidence for these in the Lisbon treaty and Frontex 
founding regulation.131  She considers the impact of this strategic culture in the creation 
of Frontex and notes the contradiction of the humanitarian culture with the heightened 
security tensions around migration and border surveillance.   She also considers the 
concept of 'solidarity' that was invoked regarding joint operations of border control.  
Here, instead of the positive connotations of multilateralism and mutual support, 
solidarity is portrayed as a negative sentiment, where Western identity is invoked 
against vulnerable migrants.  Perkowski considers evidence of the 'community of values' 
in relation to Frontex's operations, but does not analyse the influence of this upon 
Frontex's bureaucratic practices and procurement decision-making.   
 
The 'civil military' culture, defined above, refers to security practices that straddle the 
security and defence sector.  Two aspects are relevant to this theme and relate to 
procurement practices.  First, that civil military solutions are more acceptable to 
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European member states due to their soft security (rather than military) bias.132   Second, 
the civil military culture is related to the US Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).  
This generates a driver for solutions based on civil security functions of surveillance and 
information gathering.  Mawdsley explores the concept of 'civil military' and her reports 
are a useful source of information on the civil military sector.133  She refers to the 
Western preference for civil military or 'security' capabilities in its strategic culture.134  
Here, 'security is a more politically acceptable way of describing what was traditionally 
defence'.135  She considers if the defence and security market have merged, in the 
context of expanding EU competency in the 'civil military' sphere.  She notes that the 
EU frames its activities as 'security', deliberately blurring them with defence, in order to 
legitimately expand its role in the defence sector.136  Her report on the EU Commission's 
policy activism contemplates the tensions between EU civil rights emphasis and 
perceived security requirements.  Mawdsley asserts that a humanitarian agenda in 
European security policy means that non-military actors are involved in the input of a 
cultural agenda into policy.137  Hoijtink's, 'Capitalising on Emergence: The new civil 
security marketing in Europe',138 relates military discourse concerning RMA and 
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network centric warfare to the European civil military security sector.139  Hoijtink 
believes that the civil military industry evolution is linked with the EU defence demand 
and a strategic culture.  He identifies evidence for this in the EU Research Seventh 
Framework Programme (FP7),140 within which the EU invested €1.4bn for research and 
development of security technology.  The thrust of the article is the emergence of a civil 
military market, and he explicitly refers to the contracts for EUROSUR border 
surveillance systems.141   
 
Contribution to the Literature 
The Literature Review considered academic works concerning collaborative 
procurement, the securitisation of border surveillance, organisation decision-making, 
multilateralism and the strategic cultures of Western 'community of values' and civil 
military surveillance.  The thesis draws upon the literature referred to above to consider 
collaborative procurement decision-making.  It addresses the findings and gaps and 
intends to make several contributions to the collaborative procurement literature.  
 
First, the thesis acknowledges cultural influences in the generation of political support 
that is required for successful, collaborative security policy and the related procurement.  
Existing collaborative defence literature refers to the necessity of 'political will', but 
offers insufficient insights into cultural factors affecting security policy and procurement 
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behaviour.  While some studies acknowledge cultural factors, this thesis specifically 
addresses this aspect in the context of multilateral surveillance security solutions. 
 
Second, the thesis expands analysis of collaborative procurement by considering the 
effects of organisational bureaucracy on procurement activities.  Existing literature 
omits to consider how multilateral bureaucratic structure, procurement practices and 
organisation culture may affect procurement outcomes.  This thesis considers drivers for 
procurement as they filter through NATO and the EU bureaucracy.  It encompasses 
ideas considered in the literature regarding organisations as policy entrepreneurs and 
'honest brokers', but expands the analysis of behaviour using organisational theory.  It 
analyses different strategic and cultural factors, including scrutiny and criticism that 
affect procurement decision-making.    
 
Third, the thesis contributes to collaborative procurement literature by linking civil 
military procurement activities to traditional, collaborative defence procurement 
analysis.  While the literature above acknowledges that civil military and defence 
industrial dynamics are different, there is not much analysis of the implications for 
procurement processes, nor any attempt to bridge the gap.  Analysis of the drivers within 
the decision-making processes for civil military capabilities provides interesting and 





The thesis is divided into five chapters.  The first chapter describes the theory and 
methodology employed to explain the drivers for multilateral procurement of 
surveillance capabilities.  Three theoretical approaches are used.  First, rational drivers 
such as cost efficiency and the need for joint surveillance missions are identified.  The 
thesis concludes that they are insufficient to fully explain and encourage successful 
multilateral procurement.  Second, organisation theory and bureaucratic politics are 
considered as explanations for organisational interests, and for the delivery of other 
actor (member state and industrial actors) interests into the decision-making.  Finally, 
sociological institutionalism provides explanations for cultural drivers for the 
procurement of surveillance, such as the Western 'community of values', civil military 
solutions, and multilateralism.  Thus organisation theory is used to operationalise142 
calculus and cultural agendas.   
 
The second chapter describes and analyses the macro context of member state 
requirements for transnational surveillance functionality and joint procurement.  Here, 
divergence in member states' strategic outlook and calculus drivers, such as industrial 
imperatives, distract from efficient procurement activities.  However, common cultural 
themes are shown to generate the essential political will to drive successful procurement 
policy and process.  The third chapter considers the micro context of multilateral 
bureaucracies.  This is important in that it analyses bureaucratic structure, procurement 
processes and organisation culture and identifies how the drivers for procurement are 
delivered.   
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The thesis then considers two relevant case studies of multinational procurement of 
largely 'off-the-shelf' systems.143  The first case study is NATO's procurement of its 
Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) capability, where fifteen member states are 
procuring five Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).  The second case 
study looks at two contracts by the EU Commission and Frontex.  First, the policy and 
procurement for the Eurosur Communication Network, and second Frontex's 
procurement of Aerial Surveillance Services.  The thesis outlines the findings and 
analysis regarding the case studies.  In particular it considers the drivers behind three 
aspects: agreement to the surveillance missions that require the procurement; how 
political support was generated for the policy and procurement; drivers behind the 
specification of the final solution.  Finally, the conclusion details the key findings of the 
research regarding the impact of cultural drivers on procurement practices in 
international organisations.  It considers how the findings may be applied to future 




143. NATO's AGS and Frontex Aerial Surveillance services are largely off-the-shelf.  Eurosur 
Communication Network is a bespoke system, but of low technical specification. 
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Chapter 1: Theory and Methodology 
Introduction 
The theory and methods used to analyse security and defence procurement in this thesis 
need to encompass political motives and context, as well as issues of efficiency and 
process more closely associated with economics.  This chapter introduces the theoretical 
framework and methodological approach employed to address the phenomenon under 
study: multilateral, collaborative procurement of a security capability, where the 
multilateral organisation is performing the function associated with the capability.  
Theory and method provide a structured approach to answer the research question: Is 
multilateral procurement of surveillance capability driven by calculus or culture?  This 
question encompasses two parts, why 'multilateral' procurement and why 'surveillance'?  
The tool box of theoretical framework and methodological approach must be able to 
address these two facets of the research question.  Once these parts have been 
considered, a third aspect of the question requires deeper exploration as to whether the 
motives for the procurement represent calculus or culture.   
 
The research objective of this study is to discern the extent of cultural influences on 
policy and decisions for multilateral procurement of surveillance solutions.  This thesis 
proposes that causal enquiry should refer to three overarching approaches: the influence 
of security strategy; societal, ideational influence; and the influence of organisation 
dynamics.  These relate to three theoretical schools of thought, Strategic Choice, 
Institutionalism and Organisation Theory.  The thesis demonstrates that the Strategic 
Choice theory provides insufficient explanations for the collaborative procurement, and 
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that the inclusion of Institutionalist approach provides helpful analysis of how cultural 
drivers encourage the joint acquisition.  Organisation theory then helps to explain and 
operationalise the cultural agenda.  The chapter first justifies the theoretical framework 
chosen to explain procurement decision-making in multilateral organisations.  Then it 
provides a detailed overview of the major schools of thought referred to in the research.  
Finally, it makes the case for adopting a qualitative methodology to gather data 
regarding participants, organisations and ideational context of EU and NATO 
procurement.  It describes how the methodology structures and aids analysis of this data 
to enable the research question to be answered.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
Multilateral procurement is a complex process and requires a theoretical framework that 
can accommodate all the significant aspects.  'Defining a need for new equipment is not 
a simple exercise to determine gaps in capability, even if it is portrayed in this way.  A 
quest for best equipment is not the only possibility.  There is often rivalry and conflict 
between decision-making actors around the question of what to procure.'144  The 
theoretical framework has to accommodate behavioural analysis of all the significant 
actors involved in multilateral procurement; these include member state representatives, 
organisation staff and private sector professionals.  It has to provide explanations for 
decisions taken at different stages in the process.  For example those decisions regarding 
the surveillance requirement’s validity; its priority for funding; the organisation 
procurement strategy; choice of supplier or contractor; contract format and terms; and 
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support arrangements.  This necessitates an understanding of the procurement context 
and includes analysis of the environment at both micro and macro levels.  Moreover the 
framework has to address the research question that makes the distinction between 
calculus (realist) drivers and cultural (constructivist) drivers.  It includes of both schools 
of thought at different stages of the procurement decision-making chain.  This section 
refers to precedents for this in other studies, and justifies the framework. 
 
The thesis builds upon existing procurement studies via an adaption of the 'arms 
dynamic'.  The 'arms dynamic' is understood as 'the sets of pressures that make 
actors.....both acquire armed forces and change the quantity and quality of the armed 
forces that they already possess'.145  Although surveillance is a security capability and 
not strictly 'arms', it is treated as part of a defence and security strategy and which 
justifies this foundation.  The thesis covers new ground in analysis of civil military 
security procurement rather than purely defence procurement, as referred to in the 
definitions section of the Introduction above.  The theoretical framework builds upon 
the 'arms dynamic' framework to expand the reference point from state behaviour to 
multilateral organisations.  It builds on Buzan's and other academic procurement 
models.146  Buzan's models are 'action-reaction', 'domestic structure' and 'symbols'.  
Other academics also include 'realist', 'technological imperative', 'bureaucratic politics', 
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and 'economic' drivers.147  The thesis adapts these models to describe five appropriate 
drivers for multilateral acquisition of a security capability: strategic rationale, technical 
imperative, industrial imperative, role expansion and symbolic drivers.  These drivers 
offer explanations for two facets of the research question, the multilateral nature of the 
procurement, and the choice for a surveillance capability as a security solution.  The 
theoretical framework is outlined and justified below, beginning with a description of 
the drivers. 
 
Strategic rationale driver explains collaborative procurement of a security capability via 
a multilateral organisation as part of a rational calculation for cost efficiency.  It also 
explains the choice of surveillance capability as a rational security strategy against a 
specific threat.  The technical imperative driver is an adaption of the action-reaction 
model where a capability is strategically procured with reference to an external rivalry 
such as the US and the EU.  The industrial imperative driver explains the involvement of 
interest groups, such as politicians and industrial professionals leading to irrational 
influences on the procurement process.  Symbolic drivers relate the procurement to 
norms related to the Western 'community of values', civil military security solutions and 
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ideas of identity and multilateralism.  Finally, the role expansion driver explains 
procurement as evidence of organisations seeking to consolidate or expand their 
missions.  These drivers may not be mutually exclusive, a combination of the 
explanations is usually in operation,148 but the research brings a fresh approach by 
emphasising cultural, symbolic aspects that are operationalised during the bureaucratic 
procurement process.   
 
Three mainstream schools of thought are used to consider the five drivers for 
procurement outlined above: strategic choice, sociological institutionalism and 
organisation theory.  The different schools of thought address the origins of the motives, 
whether it is a rational argument, the influence of an ideational, macro environment or 
an organisation impetus. Strategic choice addresses strategic rationale, technical 
imperative and industrial imperative drivers; sociological institutionalism considers 
symbolic drivers related to strategic culture; and organisation theory addresses the role 
expansion driver: 
Schools of Thought Surveillance Procurement Drivers  
Strategic Choice Strategic rationale, technical imperative, industrial 
imperative 
Soc. Institutionalism  Symbolic driver  
Organisation Theory Role expansion 
Figure 1. Theoretical Framework 
																																																																		
148. SPEAR, J. & COOPER, N. 2010. The Defence Trade. In: COLLINS, A. (ed.) Contemporary 
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Strategic choice theory149 addresses procurement from a rational (realist) aspect.  Here 
member states consider the calculus, strategic rationale for multilateral procurement of a 
capability via their perception of security threats, cost benefit analysis, and technical and 
industrial imperatives.  Strategic rationale will almost always be the overt justification 
for procurement but may not be sufficient to drive a complex, joint acquisition process 
to its conclusion.  The research will acknowledge this rationale but considers additional 
motives within the procurement process that are critical to the completion of the 
acquisition.   
 
Sociological institutionalism (SI) addresses environmental, cultural influences on 
organisation decision-making from a constructivist aspect.  SI can explain the influence 
of ideas and symbols generated at the societal level, such as modernity (and the Western 
'community of values'), security norms (related to civil military solutions), and 
multilateralism and identity.  These ideas affect procurement processes, and the 
surveillance solution chosen, at different stages of the decision-making chain.  SI is 
predominantly a cultural approach but the ideas and symbols may be used strategically.  
Therefore the element of calculus cannot be overlooked in this model of explanation.   
 
Finally, organisation theory is used to look inside the black box of the organisations of 
NATO and the EU and address 'multi actor', self-interested, calculus decision-making.  
It explains organisation role expansion and survival drivers where NATO and the EU 
derive additional roles and benefit from the procurement.  Organisation theory also 
operationalises the delivery of procurement drivers, and the calculus and cultural 
agendas.   
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This theoretical framework is a complex combination of approaches, but the subject 
matter of multilateral procurement contains many aspects that need to be examined.  The 
final choice of framework was made after careful consideration and referral to other 
procurement and organisational studies that also combine multiple schools of thought.150  
Further, the framework supports the distinction between calculus and cultural drivers 
made in the research question.  The dichotomy is justified as it reduces the complexity 
of the framework, by distilling and distinguishing the findings regarding calculus, self-
interested incentives (related to realism and organisation theory) and cultural, ideational 
incentives (related to constructivism).   
 
However, the thesis acknowledges the limitations of this framework.  First, the 
distinction between calculus and culture is not often clear-cut.  The combination of 
calculus (realist) and cultural (constructivist) explanations for the procurement is a 
limitation that social constructivists could take issue with, arguing that even the calculus 
drivers have cultural, ideational origins.151  The inclusion of both calculus and culture 
reflects previous assertions that constructivism seizes the 'middle ground' and exists at 
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the intersection of idealism and materialism.152  Thus the thesis takes a pragmatic 
approach regarding the relationship between calculus and culture, it asserts that 
references to the ideas and norms can be goal oriented and this is supported by the 
literature.153 
 
Second, social constructivism and institutionalism embrace a broad church of 
approaches.154  Criticisms of this framework could generate from these different schools 
of thought within institutionalism.  Various approaches include: systemic approaches 
that focus on state identity constituted by social interaction;155 holistic constructivism 
that is concerned with the dynamics of international change;156 the Copenhagen School 
which links constructivism to securitisation;157 cultural-institutional explanations of 
security policy;158 explanations of organisation internal dynamics through cultural 
references;159 and international organisational behaviour, where organisations seek 
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foundations. International Organization, 46, 599-632.; 
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155. WENDT, A. 1996. Identity and structural change in international politics. In: LAPID, Y. & 
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legitimacy and exercise limited autonomy.160  This thesis limits its approach and refers 
to these last two social constructivist approaches that refer to organisations and how 
they reflect macro international security policy and micro bureaucratic influences.  It 
therefore could be criticised by other social constructivists in that it does not offer 
explanations for the origins of the discourse and norms, the securitisation of migration, 
or of the nature of the border surveillance function being performed.  Rather it looks to 
the causal effects of 'collective expectations'161 and how these are realised in the 
bureaucratic, procurement decision-making chain.  This takes place within the 
bureaucracies, and relates to the generation of capability for that security function.  The 
thesis does not set aside social constructivism, but rather employs specific aspects of this 
school of thought to explain the collegiate dynamics in multinational procurement. 
 
Finally, those writing about international organisations have adopted the complex 
approach.162  Here, observations are made that international bureaucracies are 
multidimensional rather than uni-dimensional 'as suggested by realist and neo-liberalist 
theoretical orthodoxy'.163  Here, 'they are not merely neutral tools used by member 
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162. MARCUSSEN, M., TRONDAL, J., VEGGELAND, F. & LARSSON, T. 2010. Unpacking 
International Organisations: The dynamics of compound bureaucracies, Manchester, Manchester 
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governments to fulfil predetermined [calculus]164 preferences; they are also Weberian 
rule-driven bureaucracies, epistemic communities of professional experts, and 
socialising institutions that transform nationally oriented officials into community-
minded [cultural]165 supranational officials'.166  Thus the calculus and culture 
distinction acknowledges the multidimensional aspects of NATO and the EU 
bureaucracies. 
 
In sum, the analysis of collaborative procurement requires multi faceted approach to 
capture all the aspects of the Western security and bureaucratic environment.  The 
theoretical framework should achieve this by referencing three major schools of thought, 
strategic choice, sociological institutionalism and organisation theory.  These in turn 
support explanations of the potential drivers for collaboration: strategic rationale, 
industrial and technical imperatives; symbolic drivers and organisation role expansion.  
The thesis proposes that distinction between calculus and culture is a useful tool to distil 
this complex combination.  Further, it captures the multidimensional complexity of the 
organisations themselves.  The next section describes the three major theoretical 
approaches in detail and notes their appropriateness for this study of the social processes 
of collaborative procurement.   
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Strategic Choice Theory 
Strategic Choice (SC) is an approach that explains and predicts rational behaviour and 
can aid analysis of decision-making by strategic actors.  Rational behaviour is defined as 
purposeful, goal directed behaviour exhibited when an actor 'uses the best information 
available and chooses from the possible responses likely to maximise his goals'.167  It is 
a useful approach in this thesis as it covers self-interested incentives to procure 
surveillance and provides explanations for rational behaviour concerning the multilateral 
nature of the procurement, including industrial and technical imperatives.  National 
Security Strategies are a useful source of evidence of strategic choice.  Here states 
outline and justify their security strategy according to their 'rationally' perceived threats 
and may even propose solutions, though these are not usually specific.168  For example 
France and the US both emphasise terrorism, trafficking, cross border crime and 
consequences of failed states as threats in their security strategies.169  They emphasise 
the need for pre-emption and a strategy of 'knowledge and anticipation’ that suggest that 




167. VERBA, S. 1961. Assumptions of rationality and non-rationality in models of the international 
system. World Politics, 14, 93-117. 
168. This research looks at the evidence of National Security Strategies to rationally justify the 
procurement of surveillance in Chapter Two. 
169. THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE 2013. French White Paper, Defence and National Security.; THE 
WHITE HOUSE 2015. United States National Security Strategy. Washington.; JOINT CHIEFS OF 
STAFF 2015. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America. In: OFFICE OF THE 
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ed.). Washington. 
170. THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE 2013. French White Paper, Defence and National Security. p.103 
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Background of Strategic Choice 
Strategic Choice explains decision-making that is guided by 'careful definition of 
situations, weighing of goals, consideration of all alternatives and the selection of 
options that are most likely to achieve the highest goals.'171  It is related to economics in 
that it is concerned with the efficiency of solutions.172  It is also related to the 'meta' 
theory of Realism that assumes that self-interest is primary and therefore actions can be 
predicted and explained easily.173  The theory considers the international environment as 
an anarchic society of states, as described by Hedley Bull and Barry Buzan.174  This 
environment has many dimensions that must be considered holistically before actors 
make decisions about how to deal with the future.175  Strategic or rational actor theories 
are often used as 'base-case' explanations176 against which other theories are tested.177  
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Strategic Choice proposes a set of assumptions that guide analysis of procurement 
decision-making for a strategic rationale.178  The first assumption concerns the definition 
of strategy.  Strategy has many definitions but this thesis considers it as the rational 'art 
or science of shaping means so as to promote ends in any field of conflict'.179  In the 
context of this thesis, the 'means' to be shaped are the equipment and personnel 
performing the surveillance functions, this includes a combination of private sector 
personnel, military forces and organisation personnel.  The 'field of conflict' is the 
security context, here border surveillance, and the 'ends' are the political objectives of 
member states.180  These objectives flow from actors' interests and factors in the 
strategic environment.  The second assumption is that the political actor, here the 
member state, is central, and analysis is concerned only with the choices available to this 
actor.  Further assumptions are that, third, the wider strategic environment influences 
actors' interests, this includes information from the environment and inferences taken 
from the actions of others; fourth, the actor will behave rationally in pursuit of their aims 
after a careful cost-benefit calculation and after identifying and discarding various 
alternative solutions;181 and fifth, that actors exist in a world where everyone is pursuing 
their own interests and objectives.182 
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Strategic choice explains the procurement drivers of strategic rationale, industrial 
imperative and technical imperative.  This proposes that the procurement of surveillance 
capability is simply the best response to a perceived threat, such as monitoring borders 
or battlegrounds, or in the best interests of the member state regarding industry support 
or technical skills.  
 
Limits of Strategic Choice 
While SC is useful for identifying strategic decisions, the use of actor self-interest as the 
single attribute for decision-making, and the onerous information gathering process does 
not often reflect reality.183  Most decision-making only approximates rational choice and 
'bounded' rationality is more common, where actor capacity for choosing the best option 
is constrained by human and organisational obstacles.184  These obstacles include 
'cognitive dissonance' where actors ignore information that does not contribute to a 
favoured solution.  Another limit of the theory is that all actors are defined as unitary, 
there are no explanations for different goals or a differentiated decision-making 
structure.185  This is especially limiting in a multilateral context.  However, this thesis 
considers SC as appropriate for a base case strategy and essential to include, as strategic 
rationale will be the overt justification for any procurement.  Further, whilst the 
limitations referred to above may be encountered in short term decision-making, time 
frames for procurement tend to be part of long term plans that encourage the inclusion 
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of rational elements.  The centrality of state actors is not strictly relevant to this study 
that includes non-state actors.  However this aspect is caught by the inclusion of 
organisation studies below.   
 
The three drivers are now outlined below, Strategic Rationale, Technical imperative and 
Industrial imperative 
 
Strategic Rationale Driver for procurement: 
Strategic rationale relates to two aspects of the procurement, first the declared member 
state, security requirement for the surveillance equipment and capability,186 and second 
the use of a multilateral organisation as the instrument to procure that capability.  Here 
member states are the central actors and the rational objectives are regional security and 
efficient procurement.  If the capability is acquired jointly for purely strategic or 
economic reasons then this fulfils a rational, strategic theory of procurement.   
 
First, surveillance capability may demonstrate strategic purpose if it can demonstrate 
three characteristics: if it carries out a necessary mission (i.e. one has to assess if roles 
such as surveillance of the Mediterranean region are a strategic necessity); if the 
equipment or contract is capable of carrying out its mission; and if it is the most cost 
effective, efficient equipment or contract to carry out the mission.187  If the equipment or 
contractor capability does not fulfil these requirements then it can be concluded that the 
equipment was bought for other non-rational reasons.  This research here refers to 
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European national and regional security strategy documents that outline perceived 
threats and strategies employed to address these threats.  It is assumed they are written 
with a 'rational' stance.  The study also refers to literature and interviews with member 
state, industry and organisation representatives for evidence concerning the efficiency of 
surveillance solutions procured.   
 
Second, strategic choice theory asserts that member states use multilateral organisations 
to enhance efficiency.188  However, organisations may be used to further state interests 
as part of a state security strategy.  As such strategic rationale drives the multilateral 
nature of the procurement.  The research considers evidence of strategic, political 
rationale behind member state choice for multilateral procurement, which is separate 
from the economic motive. This relates to Farrell's international political purpose 
model.189  Here the choice for procurement may reflect rational, political motives such 
as political allegiance within an alliance. 
 
Technical Imperative: 
The Technical Imperative driver for procurement is related to the concept of the 'arms 
race'190 and 'action-reaction' models of procurement decisions.191  It is derived from a 
perceived technical superiority of an adversary or rival.  Politicians and organisation 
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actors with strategic concerns drive this imperative.192  In the 1960's the US developed 
their intercontinental ballistic missiles with reference to reported technical advances by 
the USSR.193  This was later proved to be a misperception, but it is an example of the 
technical imperative.  In a contemporary Western context, factions on either side of the 
Atlantic have ambitions for technical expertise in the security and surveillance industry.  
US security and defence industrial policy has been linked to its Revolution in Military 
Affairs (RMA) doctrine.194  The EU aspires to compete with the US for its technical 
capabilities and to support EU technical industry.195  In previous eras, military 
technology would have spin off effects for civil technology.  These days it is civil 
technology that provides 'spin-on's that can be used for defence and security purposes.196  
The presence of technical imperatives will be ascertained via the level of priority of 
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Industrial Imperative:   
Multilateral organisations provide forums for those who are concerned to support 
member states' economic and technical bases.197  Member state representatives may 
support surveillance procurement if the provision of the capability has economic 
benefits in their constituencies / countries.  This is linked to the concept of a 'military-
industrial-political-complex’ that comprises (in this context): organisation staff, industry 
actors and member state representatives 'with an interest in defence spending in their 
constituencies [countries]'.198  This driver offers the explanation of juste retour199 as a 
driver for procurement.  Collaborative defence procurement is well known for juste 
retour.  Here participating member states make procurement decisions that benefit their 
country's industrial interests, rather than for security or cost efficiency reasons.  
Collaborative procurement often cannot conclude unless these industrial interests are 
fulfilled.  For example, the US is the largest participant in NATO's AGS programme, 
and the prime contractor for the AGS project is US based Northrop Grumman. 
 
Industrial actors are often present as advisors and in lobbying capacities with member 
states and in organisation forums.  For example the EU's 'European Security Research 
and Advisory board' (ESRAB)200 and Group of Personalities,201 who advised the EU 
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Commission on security technology research in 2004, included many industrial figures.  
Security industry actors are likely to advocate the procurement of surveillance capability 
where there is the possibility of a contract to be gained.  The research considers whether 
the surveillance capability being acquired serves member states' core interests 
concerning provision of equipment or contracting.  It also attempts to ascertain if any 
inefficient acquisition practices are evident due to non-state actor influence.  The 
objectives in this driver are material in nature and may therefore be placed at the 
calculus end of a continuum.   
 
Sociological Institutionalism 
Institutionalism considers the influence of the environment on decision-making 
processes.  Sociological Institutionalism (SI) provides explanations of socially 
constructed influences on organisational behaviour.  Outcomes are explained through 
the cohesion and adherence of actors to societal, cultural expectations and as such, can 
explain collaboration.  Causal effects are seen through behaviour and strategies of action 
that are persistently employed.  Cultural components, such as symbolic references, that 
are used to construct strategies of action are evidence of causal effect.  SI considers the 
social processes through which decisions are made with reference to an overarching 
idea, or 'institution'.  Institutions are defined as 'social phenomena that can create stable 
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patterns of collective and individual behaviour'.202  In this research, symbolic, cultural 
components from the macro environment may be absorbed by member states and 
multilateral organisations and then manifested in the procurement decisions made.  The 
research identifies institutions relevant to surveillance capability, such as civil military 
cultures, modernity and the Western 'community of values', and multilateralism.  It 
considers whether evidence of these ideas are present and influential in the procurement 
process. 
 
In the SI approach, institutions, such as multilateralism, take on a rule like status in 
social thought and action, and provide moral or cognitive templates for interpretation 
and action.203  Institutions are symbolic systems, individuals and organisations 
reproduce the symbolic systems with both instrumental and ritual content.204  For 
example, the institution of modernity, linked to notions of technical prestige and 
progress, can be represented by sophisticated security equipment or capabilities, such as 
Eyre and Suchman's findings related to developing nations' acquisition of fighter 
planes.205  The Western 'community of values' represents humane attitude towards those 
in need, including illegal migrants, which stimulates decisions for surveillance of EU 
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borders for safety as much as security.  Organisations reproduce these symbolic systems 
and diffuse the ideas.  Thus symbolism can be a theory for multilateral procurement. 
 
Background of SI  
SI is related to the meta theory of Constructivism and shares similar premises: 
structuralism, socially constructed values, norm based interests and logics of 
appropriateness.206  'Logics of appropriateness' govern action in 'determining what the 
situation is, what role is being fulfilled, and what the obligations of that role in that 
situation are'.207  Alternative courses of action are judged by conformity to institutional 
roles and symbolic systems rather than the cost benefit analysis.  Constructivism holds 
that ideas are the most fundamental 'building blocks' of social phenomenon,208 and the 
primary cause for behaviour.  SI provides a social structure for these ideational building 
blocks.  Its analysis starts from the social structure, social structure's rules and values 
create all the actors that are relevant in international politics, 'including states, firms, 
organisations and even individuals'.209    
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The SI view of 'world polity' is grounded in the seminal works of Meyer, Boli and 
Thomas, and Bergesen.210   These academics argue that the world is governed by 
cultural rules based on Western notions of rationality, articulating symbolic goals of 
progress, common values and justice.  These notions have their roots in Christianity and 
the links drawn in Western culture between the moral and natural world.211  The rules 
define the rational institutions by which the goals (of progress and modernity) such as 
bureaucracy and markets are achieved.  SI contends that behaviour is bounded by a 
worldview and not fully strategic, it does not deny rational behaviour, but emphasises 
the extent to which the cultural environment is structured by collective schemata and 
rules.212  Academics such as Finnemore, Eyre and Suchman further developed SI in the 




210. MEYER, J. W., BOLI, J. & THOMAS, G. M. 1987. Ontology and Rationalization in the Western 
Cultural Account. In: THOMAS, G. M., MEYER, J. W., RAMIREZ, F. O. & BOLI, J. (eds.) Institutional 
Structure Constituting State, Society and the Individual. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.; MEYER, J. 
W. 1980. The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State. In: BERGESEN, A. (ed.) Studies of the 
Modern World System. New York: Academic Press.; BERGESEN, A. Ibid.From Utilitarianism to 
Globology: The Shift from the Individual to the World as a Whole as the Primordial Unit of Analysis. 
211. MEYER, J. W., BOLI, J. & THOMAS, G. M. 1987. Ontology and Rationalization in the Western 
Cultural Account. In: THOMAS, G. M., MEYER, J. W., RAMIREZ, F. O. & BOLI, J. (eds.) Institutional 
Structure Constituting State, Society and the Individual. Newbury Park: Sage Publications. 
212. HALL, P. A. & TAYLOR, R. C. R. 1996. Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. 
Political Studies, 44, 936-957. 
213. FINNEMORE, M. 1996b. Norms, culture, and world politics: insights from sociology's 
institutionalism. International organization, 50, 325-347.; FINNEMORE, M. 1996a. National Interests in 
International Society, Ithaca, Cornell University.; EYRE, D. P. & SUCHMAN, M. C. 1996. Status, 
norms, and the proliferation of conventional weapons: An institutional theory approach. In: 
KATZENSTEIN, P. J. (ed.) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. 
	 71 
Powell and DiMaggio also articulated arguments examining bureaucratic forms and 
procedures as culturally specific practices.214  This theory explains the persistence of 
practices via collective processes of interpretation and social legitimacy.215  For example 
surveillance activity may be justified by culturally acceptable Western 'community of 
values', emphasising safety and humane concerns, or by its civil military functions.  
Other writers such as Scott, propose causal mechanisms by which the world polity is 
diffused via organisations.216  His book 'Organisations, Rational Natural and Open 
Systems' provides useful explanations for the bridge between ideational influences and 
organisations. 'Open' systems are where organisations are 'deeply embedded in, and 
constituted by, the environments in which they operate...'  From this perspective, 
organisations are not structured to function efficiently or to accommodate interest 
networks, rather they are 'manifestations of powerful institutional rules which function 
as highly rationalised myths that are binding.'217 
 
Later writers use institutional explanations of procurement decisions218 but this literature 
concentrates on nation states as procurement actors and has not examined the 
procurement by multilateral organisations.  Finally, the SI approach has also been used 
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in explanations of the dysfunction of multilateral organisations and the expansion of 
NATO and the EU in the early 21st century.219  However, none of these studies address 
an international security culture that influences organisation security roles and internal 
processes.  This research intends to fill these identified gaps. 
 
Criticisms of SI  
SI has been criticised for the concept of world polity and is also linked with general 
problems of norm and institutional approaches.  First, SI collates elements of Western 
culture, such as the rational means of bureaucracy and markets leading to progress 
(wealth accumulation) and equality (justice).220  The theory assumes that these ideas are 
compatible, however, there are tensions between the ideas of 'progress and justice' with 
ideas of 'redistribution' and there are often trade-offs made in the real world between 
these two policies.221  Surveillance capability may represent progress to those concerned 
with security, but it may impinge on civil liberties.  Further, markets and bureaucracies, 
the means to justice and progress, may be in tension where market arrangements do not 
lead to equality.  Second, SI's vision of world polity envisages just one direction 
towards progress and modernity.  Finnemore notes that cultural feedback is not 
explained in the unidirectional SI model.222  However, this research is not examining 
institutional change, but rather looking for evidence and explanations of organisation 
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decision-making.  Another major criticism of SI is that the approach lacks a single 
theory of agency, or has too many empirically questionable theories of agency.223  This 
research's focus on state and non-state agents intends to address concerns over agency.  
It will also address concerns that SI 'seems bloodless' and too focused on the macro 
process, missing the extent of competing interests within organisations by the inclusion 
of BP in the analysis.224  Institutionalism is used to consider the Symbolic theory for 
procurement. 
 
Symbolic drivers:  
Symbolic aspects such as multilateralism and political unity may influence the 
collaborative procurement of a surveillance capability.225  However, surveillance 
capability itself is associated with many symbolic systems.  The practice may represent 
delineation of identity;226 it may represent a symbol of intent, reflecting a projection of 
power and acting as a deterrent;227 and it can manifest the Western 'community of 
values' culture which prioritises humane actions and the safety of those it monitors.  The 
assets may also be associated with prestige symbols (where an organisation or nation 
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aspires to have a sophisticated security capability).228  Finally, the procurement of 
surveillance solutions can represent the Western civil military security culture.229  These 
symbolic systems are shared by EU and NATO organisations where they have similar 
Western member states that serve similar societal constituencies. 
 
First, multilateral collaboration in procuring equipment or capability may be linked to 
political aims. Here the procurement becomes a symbol of solidarity within an 
organisation.  Joana and Smith demonstrated that the requirement for A400M 
transporter was the object of evaluations and interpretations that went beyond technical 
merits or weaknesses of options.230  The initial definition of the A400m project 
encompassed both stated and unstated multilateral aims of European cooperation i.e. 
political aims.  This thesis assesses the importance of the political symbolism in the 
procurement process. 
 
Surveillance capability may act as a symbol of the Western identity of 'we', with those 
being monitored as 'they'.231  This relates to Post Modern ideas that threats are not 
objective, and foreign policy is all about manufacturing an 'other' against which an 
imaginary political identity can be forged.  Thus by acquiring a surveillance capability: 
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'borders, identities and difference are inscribed'.232  This symbolic system may be linked 
to ideas that surveillance serves as a symbol of intent and power over those being 
monitored.  For example representatives of Northrop Grumman recently argued that 
surveillance has the effect of a deterrent against security threats of cross border crime or 
human trafficking.233  This attitude has been picked up and criticised in the literature 
above.  A contrasting symbolic interpretation is that the surveillance represents the 
Western 'community of values' strategic culture, where there is a concern for the safety 
of those crossing transnational borders via dangerous illegal routes. 
 
Surveillance assets and capability can be symbolic of prestige and status especially 
where it is associated with RMA and the latest technology such as unmanned drones and 
satellite pictures.234  Building on this explanation, SI can explain that surveillance 
capability is acquired, not because of a match between technical functions and security 
needs, but because of the prestigious symbolic nature of the equipment or capability.235  
Finally, surveillance capability may be prioritised as a security solution because of civil 
military, 'soft' security preferences of European member states.  These ideas are 
developed further in the thesis. 
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Organisation Theory 
Organisation theory covers a variety of methodologies used to consider organisational 
practices at the micro level.  This thesis considers organisation theory from three aspects 
to explain the delivery of drivers for procurement through self interested decision-
making dynamics, organisation culture and also organisation role expansion.   
 
Bureaucratic Politics (BP) is a well-known and frequently invoked set of explanations 
for decision-making dynamics in organisations.  BP provides accounts of pluralistic 
environments and explains compromised outcomes through conflicting actor preferences 
and the 'pulling and hauling' processes of bureaucratic decision-making.  Here 
bureaucracies of multilateral organisations are envisaged not as a single entity, but as a 
forum of competing factions each trying to attain the best material outcome for 
themselves.  The theory proposes that organisation decisions for surveillance solutions 
do not reflect a single set of consistent calculations about international security interests.  
A useful description of BP refers to government bureaucracies (in this thesis multilateral 
organisations) as:  
 'congeries of organisations with their own traditions and routines which 
affect policy and implementation.  Decisions emerge not from reflection, but 
from argument and conflict within and between organisations, partly over who 
shall do what (organisational survival), and partly because of different 
perceptions of the problems and the means to deal with them.  Any particular 
decision will be taken not so much on the merits of the case but as the result of 
	 77 
conflicting views and interests of a variety of organisations on this and many 
other questions as well.'236  
Multilateral organisation procurement decision-making offers opportunity for 
involvement and actions of subordinate actors such as organisation and industry staff.  
These actors have different stakes and objectives in procurement processes.237  
Organisation personnel may want a greater role, industry actors may want a larger 
contract, and member state representatives may want access to technical knowledge.  
Decisions taken may therefore reflect compromise away from rational member state 
objectives so that coherence is achieved, or 'to hedge against dire predictions of 
participants'.238  For example, the technical imperatives encourage procurement as a 
strategic response with reference to an external rivalry, such as that generated by the 
disparity in EU / US surveillance ability.  Industrial imperative encourage procurement 
to satisfy member state economic benefits. 
 
BP, as a subset of Organisation Theory explains the material interest and 'calculus' 
approach of actors, however broader organisation theories can also provide explanation 
for cultural influence at the micro level.239  Academics such as Halperin, March and 
																																																																		
236. CORNFORD, J. P. 1974. The Illusion of Decision. British Journal of Political Science, 4, 231-243. 
237. AUSTIN SMITH, R. 1973. TFX: The $7-billion Contract That Changed the Rules. In: HALPERIN, 
M. H. & KANTER, A. (eds.) Readings in American Foreign Policy: A bureaucratic perspective. Boston: 
Little Brown & Co. 
238. ALLISON, G. T. & HALPERIN, M. H. 1972. Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy 
Implications. World Politics, 24, 40-79. 
239. HALPERIN, M. H. 1974. Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings 
Institution, 1974). Washington DC: The Brookings Institution.;  KIER, E. 1999. Imagining war: French 
and British military doctrine between the wars, Princeton University Press Princeton.; WILSON, J. Q. 
1989. Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it, Basic Books. 
	 78 
Olsen, Scott, and Wilson use Organisation Theory to explain organisational culture.240  
Halperin calls it the 'essence' of an organisation and refers to organisational roles and 
mission definition in terms of the 'essence' and culture rather than material interest.  
Organisational culture may affect procurement processes where a specific solution is 
adopted due to adherence to a culture, such as the civil military culture, that originates 
from staff expectations or organisational structures.  Here 'logics of appropriateness' 
may constrain bureaucratic behaviour with reference to routines and standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) related to organisational culture.241   
 
Bureaucratic Politics (BP) 
In the 1970's Graham Allison articulated BP to explain and analyse US foreign policy 
decision-making in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Allison's 'The Essence of Decision, 
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis' proposed that national, bureaucratic decision-
making processes were not unified and strategic but fractured where actors had 
diverging views and material agendas.242  Further, the model contended that 
organisational aspects of bureaucracies empowered (or constrained) actors through the 
control of (or lack of access to) knowledge and alternative options for action.  There are 
three main propositions to the theory: First, actors' preferences are affected by their 
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roles, i.e. by the interests of their organisations or departments; Second, that decisions 
are made via a process of pulling and hauling this may divert actors away from strategic 
objectives towards a dominating faction within the organisation or towards a 
compromise that appeases all collaborating factions.; Third, that compromised solutions 
are found ('resultants').243  
 
BP has also been used for explanations of procurement of equipment and security 
contractors244 although rarely in a multilateral context.  The BP framework is 
appropriate for considering multilateral procurement where actors are making decisions 
in a bureaucracy according to diverging agendas.  This may be where member states are 
acting according to interests of technical aspirations and industrial interests, or where 
the organisational bureaucracy is acting according to role expansion interests.  Although 
few recent authors have related BP to multilateral organisations, Allison asserts that 
'applied to relations between nations, the bureaucratic politics model directs attention to 
intra-national games, the overlap of which constitutes international relations'.245  
However this line of thought is not developed to consider BP at an international level or 
within an organisation in Allison's work.   
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This research will consider the roles played by, and the influence of, three different 
constituencies within the organisation: member states, organisation staff and industry 
personnel.  BP can be applied to intergovernmental behaviour where the assumption 
holds that certain organisations can be treated as single actors.  Organisations are 
counted as single actors when: first, those organisations have expressed a single 
preference and values (seen from official papers issued by that organisation); second, 
aligned goals mean that actions of the head, or representative, of that organisation can be 
treated as actions of that organisation; and third, the behaviour of organisation members 
is part of a single strategy.246  
 
Criticisms of Bureaucratic Politics 
There has been considerable criticism of BP and these criticisms need to be addressed 
where they are relevant to this thesis.  An initial criticism is that BP is too oriented 
towards the US.247  However there are studies that have used BP in other contexts such 
as the UK.248  The original proponents of BP intended that the model be applied to 
governmental actions in most industrial nations.249  As a general criticism, Welch faults 
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the paradigm for being event centric and for providing too many explanations for 
bureaucratic influence over decisions, meaning that they cannot be generalised.  He 
provides a menu of assumptions and concepts from past studies and suggests that these 
need refining and clarifying to produce a coherent model that can be used for a positivist 
study.250  Likewise, other studies criticise the surfeit of information provided by the 
theory that can complicate rather than simplify explanations of decisions.251  This thesis 
focuses on the activity of procurement that has multiple inputs for decision-making. It 
therefore is suited to BP as an approach that can accommodate analysis of these multiple 
inputs.  However, the analysis will acknowledge certain limitation of the conclusions 
drawn, due to the many variables being assessed. Further it focuses on three 
explanations of technical and industrial imperatives and role expansion, which limits the 
scope of reasoning. 
 
BP has also been criticised for lack of casual mechanism between role and preference.252  
Bureaucratic role may certainly impact preference, but personal belief and world views 
are independent of 'bureaucratic role' influences.  BP is criticised for having too many 
variables to explain actor preference253 thereby losing any parsimony of theory and 
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diluting the explanatory powers of the theory.  This thesis agrees with Lakoff and 
Bruvold who contend that BP is a 'realist' approach to understanding bureaucratic 
structure, where bureaucracy is 'conceived as a pluralistic enterprise resembling the 
quasi-anarchical structure that prevails in international relations'.254  This neatly includes 
a rational preference that is taken as a basic stance, and addresses in some part the 
problem of actors 'standing where they sit'.  It makes the assumption that actors 
represent the rational interests of their organisations and their careers in that 
organisation.  A final criticism of BP is that the aggregation of actor preferences into 
decisions, the process of 'pulling and hauling' cannot predict any outcome.255  Whilst 
this may be true, this thesis considers 'pulling and hauling' an apt description of 
bargaining processes that explains how the procurement decisions are driven, and is a 
behavioural indicator that BP is present.  
 
BP explains the decision-making dynamics of actors that include member state 
representatives, organisation staff and industry personnel.  Organisation staff may 
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Role Expansion Driver:   
The Role expansion driver considers the internal pressures on organisations to innovate 
and consolidate security mandates via the acquisition of a capability.  The central actors 
in this theory are organisation staff whose objectives are organisational role expansion.  
NATO and EU secretariats may state the need for surveillance capability as a method of 
role expansion and existential justifications for their respective organisations / agencies.  
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has adapted its role to fit the changing security 
concerns of its transatlantic constituency.256  The EU is also expanding its security role 
and developing capabilities to secure its borders via Frontex.257  The thesis seeks to 
ascertain if there is evidence of the influence of organisation staff behaviour that 
supports the theory of Role Expansion.  It considers if the procurement contracts 
demonstrate expansion or consolidation of security functions provided by the 
organisation and who were the decision makers behind the contracts.  This driver can 
represent organisation calculus, where organisational survival may depend upon 
expansion of role.   
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Methodology 
The study collected and analysed data for the primary research objective of discerning 
cultural and organisation factors that generated political support for collaborative 
procurement of a surveillance capability.  Thus to better explain decision-making in 
multilateral procurement.  This section outlines the methodology for gathering data 
within the case studies, for evaluating the findings, and concludes with a brief 
consideration of the case selection.  Data collection focuses on three main areas.  First, 
the participants of the procurement process; the preferences of those participants, and 
evidence of which participants' preferences dominate.  Second, the nature of the 
organisation: how the procurement processes and goals and procedures of the 
organisation affect the surveillance solutions considered.  Third, data is gathered that 
relates to the ideational context of the procurement and identifies where these ideas are 
reflected in the organisation and the preferences of participants. 
 
There are few case studies to choose regarding multilateral procurement of a security 
capability where the organisation is involved in the security role.  The study has selected 
two relevant case studies.  The small 'n' case study means that the methodology used for 
the research is qualitative, as there is simply not enough data for a large 'n' quantitative 
analysis.  Process tracing has been chosen as the appropriate qualitative method to be 
employed within the case studies.  Here evidence is gathered via primary and secondary 
literature as well as interviews.  For the evaluation of the findings the four tests of 
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Process Tracing is a method whereby 'the researcher examines histories, archival 
documents, interview transcripts and other sources to see whether the causal process a 
theory hypothesises or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of 
the intervening variables in that case'.259  This qualitative methodology was appropriate 
to reconstruct the multilateral procurement of surveillance capability in the EU and 
NATO bureaucracies and is carried out in two stages.  The first stage was data collection 
from primary and secondary literature.  Approximately 200 secondary articles and books 
are referred to in this research, the most important of which were referred in the 
Literature Review.  Primary sources include member state security strategies, 
organisation work plans, policy papers, procurement plans and documents such as 
tender dossiers that directly relate to the procurement contracts.  Secondary sources 
include literature and academic studies concerning NATO, the EU security roles, 
collaborative procurement and Western security cultures.   
 
At the second stage, semi-structured, in-depth interviews were conducted with actors in 
the EU and NATO procurement processes and experts in the procurement and 
surveillance fields.  The data gathered at stage one informed stage two and enabled a 
constructive process of tracing the drivers for the procurement.  Interviews were 
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Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press. p.6 
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conducted for three purposes in process tracing: First, to gain additional information 
about the drivers for multilateral surveillance procurement; second, to assess the 
thinking of decision makers and to look for evidence of ideational influences in their 
discourse; and third, to corroborate and triangulate data gathered from primary and 
secondary literature.   
 
The process tracing method attempts to identify the sequential, causal chain and causal 
mechanism between the dependent variable, here the choice for multilateral 
procurement of surveillance capability, and the independent variables,260 which are the 
five drivers for procurement outlined in the Theoretical Framework above (Strategic 
Rationale, Technical Imperative, Industrial Imperative, Role Expansion and Symbolic 
drivers).  The process tracing will identify the balance and nature of the drivers behind 
procurement decisions at specific stages in the acquisition, as such indicating if the 
drivers represent calculus or culture.  For example there is often a calculus, strategic 
rationale behind the initial policy for acquisition of security equipment, but symbolic 
drivers (such as the Western 'community of values') may be necessary to actually gain 
the political will to conclude the process and make the final decisions. 
 
Interviews 
Semi-structured, in-depth interviews have been carried out with participants in the 
procurement case studies.  The interviews lasted around one hour, and were recorded, 
where possible, with the consent of the interviewee.  Actors were selected for interviews 
via 'non probability', purposive sampling where they fulfil criteria relating to position, 
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reputation and significance in the procurement process.261  This is integral to process 
tracing which aims to reconstruct events; here the inclusion of specific, relevant and 
important actors in the process is essential.  The disadvantage of the purposive sampling 
is that there is a danger of selection bias.  The widest selection of interviewees possible 
are employed to address this possibility.  Some chain referral or snowball sampling 
followed from the initial purposive sampling, which further widens the net to ensure a 
broad sample of actors.  Selection bias in the study was further restrained by primary 
and secondary literature analysis, which helped to identify any subjectivity of the 
interviewee.       
 
The study included approximately 40 interviews, and a list of interviewees is contained 
in the Annexes.  These included both the elite personnel, high-level military and 
political diplomats, such as Lord Robertson, former NATO Secretary General and 
Robert Bell.  Interviewees were selected from NATO, from the NATO's Conference of 
National Armaments Directors (CNAD) as well as the NATO Alliance Ground 
Surveillance Management Agency (NAGMSA) team, such as Jim Edge (current General 
Manager).  From the EU, officers from the Directorate General Migration and Home 
Affairs were approached and also from the Frontex agency, in particular the Finance and 
Procurement team, the ICT team and the Research and Development Unit.  Finally, 
industry personnel from Northrop Grumman and the subcontractors from the NATO 
AGS contract, and personnel from GMV and other Eurosur contractors were also 
interviewed.   
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The interviewees selected provided data regarding the different stages in the 
procurement decision-making chain.  Thus the high level diplomats and elite interviews 
gave insight into the political process behind the policy making for the procurement.  
Interviews with functional bureaucrats within NATO and the EU enabled data collection 
regarding the decision-making within the procurement implementation.  The intention of 
the interviews was to elicit evidence that corroborated and enhanced information from 
other primary sources, and that identified the presence and influence of the different 
drivers for the procurement (as described in the theoretical framework above). 
 
Some problems were encountered in interview data gathered due to the political nature 
of procurement.  There were sensitivities about member state debates during the 
procurement process, for example those that concerned aspects of financing and 
specification of the capability.  This led to wariness regarding the level of information 
that could be disclosed, and meant that in some interviews, expectations for the data 
required were not always met.  First, interviewees were concerned regarding explicit 
references to debates between particular member state officials and/or organisation staff 
and often would not speak on the record.  This limited some evidence, and inhibited 
nuanced analysis of the dynamics behind the decisions.  In these instances the study 
tried to supplement with evidence from other primary sources, such as Wikileaks cables, 
press releases and policy documents.  Second, there was sensitivity as to the commercial 
information regarding the contracts.  The study gained what public information was 
available, but details of specific profit levels or commercial arrangements within the 
surveillance capability contracts were not disclosed.  This limited analysis of the 
procurement outcomes to the publicly available information, and anecdotal observations 
(such as the sacrifice of profit margins by industry partners).  However the thesis could 
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make some useful conclusions from the available information, noted where anecdotal 
evidence was the only source, and tried to get corroborating multiple anecdotal evidence 
where this was the case. 
 
In general the expectations of data generation from the interviews were met and in some 
cases exceeded.  Some of the more useful interviewees consented to second interviews 
where more information was sought after the initial data processing.   
 
Data Processing and Analysis 
Once data and evidence regarding the procurement processes is gathered via the 
methodologies outlined above, it is analysed and processed.  The procurement decisions 
are reconstructed and data is coded with reference to the theoretical framework (which 
generated explanations for the drivers of strategic rationale, industrial and technical 
imperatives, role expansion and symbolism).  Tests for causation are then conducted to 
assess the presence or absence and nature (cultural or calculus) of the five drivers at 
significant decision-making stages of the procurement.  The four tests for causation 
outlined in Andrew Bennett's Process Tracing and Causal Inference262 are used.  These 
are first, 'straw in the wind' where evidence may be relevant for the procurement theory 
but not sufficient to prove it, no evidence is not sufficient to fail the theory; second, the 
'hoop' test where evidence demonstrates that the procurement theory is necessary but not 
sufficient for successful procurement; third, the 'smoking gun' where evidence suggests 
that the procurement theory is not necessary but sufficient for successful procurement; 
and finally fourth the 'doubly decisive' test where evidence confirms the theory for 
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procurement and lack of it eliminates the theory.  From these tests of the evidence in the 
reconstruction it is possible to conclude whether explanations via one of the five drivers 
is dominant.  Conclusions are then drawn as to which combination of drivers is able to 
explain the procurement outcomes and as to whether they represent culture or calculus. 
 
Case Study Selection 
The research addresses two case studies that are relevant and valid to answer the 
research question: is multilateral procurement of surveillance capability driven by 
culture or calculus?  The underlying research interest is in cultural and organisation 
influences on collaborative procurement and these case studies seemed to provide 
excellent material for the discourse analysis.  Surveillance is a capability that is 
particularly emphasised in the current security context, thus it is easy to find data on the 
cultural discourse on the various requirements for collaborative procurement.   
 
Both the EU and NATO are in the process of acquiring surveillance capability, NATO's 
AGS system is to be used across its operations and the EU's agency Frontex is acquiring 
surveillance equipment and capability to monitor the EU borders.  These case studies are 
examples of collaborative, multinational procurement of surveillance capability that has 
already been developed.  Furthermore, they both represent procurement for a 
surveillance capability that could potentially fulfil similar civil military requirements 
(although the technical specification of the NATO AGS Programme fits high grade 
military requirements and is far more sophisticated than the EU surveillance capability). 
 
Other aspects of the chosen case studies made them appealing.  First, the case studies 
contain similar elements of member state, organisation and industry calculus and culture 
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that generate data for analysis.  Although the procurement processes in the case studies 
are considerably different regarding scale and format, there are enough commonalities in 
the political, security and organisation context to justify their consideration in the same 
research project.  Second, public speeches, policy statements, diplomatic cables and 
secondary sources provide material concerning the discourse surrounding the 
collaborative procurement that can be analysed.  Third, both organisations are 
responsible for managing the capability that is being procured, which provides further 
comparison for role expansion incentives.  Finally, procurement contracts are ideal for 
case study analysis in that they have a beginning and an end so that initial procurement 
policy and contract outcomes can be clearly identified.  Further, these contracts are 
relatively recent and so it was easy to gather participants' recollection of events and to 
find information about the contracts through contemporary online sources. 
 
Other capital investment programmes that involved contracting, and that could have 
been used as case studies, include joint procurement of 'off-the-shelf' satellite 
capabilities.  For example the EDA's SatCom263 programme could have been compared 
to NATO's satellite procurement activities.264  NATO has a long-standing infrastructure 
programme, and NATO’s Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) presides 
over NATO's communication infrastructure programmes.265  It procures much of the 
organisation's satellite capacity and also its recently developed Air Command and 
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Control System (ACCs).266  Finally, the EU Commission and the EU Space Agency run 
the EU's Galileo programme.267  These examples all entail collaborative procurement 
contracts for surveillance capability.  The thesis did not include these case studies and 
this is justified below. 
 
First regarding practical aspects, the broadening of the study to include these case 
studies would have increased the workload of the thesis substantially.  The inclusion 
would also have necessitated some loss of detail on the existing case study analysis.  
These case studies could have provided additional support for the conclusions 
concerning the strength of civil security culture, the emphasis on Western 'community of 
values' missions and the role of multilateralism in the balance of the drivers for 
collaboration.  Second, the nature of the ACCs procurement and the Galileo programme, 
given that product development is involved, generates sensitivities over data gathering 
that would have made research quite difficult.  These case studies would also not be a 
strict comparison given the development aspects of the procurement versus the two 'off-
the-shelf' case studies that were chosen (although some development is involved in the 
Eurosur communication network).   
 
NATO's AGS Programme 
NATO's AGS programme has been in the process of acquisition for the last 20 years, 
and should come into operation in 2018.268  The capability consists of five Global 
Hawks and the related ground stations.  Although NATO is primarily a military 
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organisation, the future AGS missions are sometimes presented as civil military.269  US 
prime contractor Northrop Grumman is providing the capability.  As well as strategic 
rationale, the case suggests procurement drivers of NATO role expansion, technical 
imperatives for sophisticated assets, industrial imperatives exhibited via juste retour 
dynamics.  There is also evidence of cultural, civil military solution preferences and the 




The EU Agency, Frontex has procured a networked surveillance capability to produce a 
situational picture of the EU borders under its Eurosur regulation.  It has also leased 
aerial surveillance services for monitoring of the EU's transnational borders.  It is 
anticipated that further surveillance equipment will be bought as the agency expands its 
mandate.270  The procurement policy and processes demonstrated drivers of strategic 
rationale, EU role expansion, and strategic cultures of Western 'community of values' 




269. See the Northrup Grumman page demonstrating the AGS capability: 
http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/NATOAGS/Documents/pageDocuments/NATO_AGS_B
rochure.pdf Accessed November 2017 
270. http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-the-european-border-and-coast-guard-agency-after-one-year-
OB6UIM Accessed November 2017 
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Conclusion 
Collaborative procurement takes place in complex political, security and organisation 
environments.  This chapter outlined the theoretical frameworks and methodological 
approach that will be used to analyse the international security and organisation context 
of multilateral procurement of a surveillance capability.  It described the different 
theoretical frameworks and justified the combination of theories that are used.  It notes 
that similar frameworks have been used by academics to study both procurement and 
NATO and EU behaviour.  This research combines institutional approaches with 
organisation studies to address the gaps in the literature, namely cultural influences on 
collaborative procurement of a security capability.  These theoretical frameworks extend 
the scope of previous procurement studies to consider organisation and other non-state 
actors.  They expand the analysis to include the strategic cultures associated with 
surveillance capabilities and their effects upon procurement processes.   
 
Specifically, the chapter examined the theoretical approaches of Strategic Choice, 
Institutionalism and Organisation Theory.  For each approach it outlined the background 
of the theory, noted criticisms of the theory, described how the thesis addresses those 
criticisms and uses the theory to address the research question.  The chapter 
demonstrated that the theoretical frameworks would provide the ability to consider 
evidence of calculus or culture in NATO and EU procurement processes.  Finally the 
chapter explained the choice of case studies and the qualitative methods used to analyse 
the case studies.  These theoretical frameworks and methodology provide a 
comprehensive toolbox to enable the research question to be answered.   
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The next two chapters consider the context within which the procurement decisions are 
taken.  Chapter Two examines the Western security context for the procurement of 
surveillance and its associated networks and platforms.  Chapter Three considers the 





Chapter 2: Western Security Context 
and Culture affecting the Procurement of 
Surveillance Capability 
Introduction  
The Western European security environment provides explanations of the driving forces 
behind joint procurement of surveillance capabilities.  This chapter considers these 
drivers, the range of surveillance missions and surveillance solutions.  Macro context 
factors feed down from member states into procurement activities at the organisational 
level.  In seeking to answer whether multilateral procurement is driven by calculus or 
culture, three aspects are considered.  First, Western and member state271 security 
strategies and their strategic cultures may motivate procurement for surveillance security 
solutions.  Second, technical and industrial imperatives may generate military industrial 
complex dynamics, these drive procurement for technical and economic gains.  Third, 
cost efficiency motives may encourage 'collaborative' or 'multilateral' procurement.  
This is relevant in an era of austerity and where equipment is expensive.  Realist 
academics assert that cooperative acquisitions occur where assets are expensive, as with 
the former NATO cases of AWACS and C-17 Transporter Aircraft, and where militaries 
stand to gain additional technical expertise.272   
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The research recognises joint acquisition involves a chain of decision-making, regarding 
aspects such as the validity of the capability requirement, funding priority, procurement 
strategy and contract terms.  At each stage different drivers may exert a greater 
influence on the process. Thus calculus drivers may be necessary to initiate the 
acquisition policy but are not always sufficient to obtain the final political support for 
the implementation of a joint procurement.  The research therefore will also consider 
cultural drivers for collaborative procurement in the macro environment, where 
consensus is achieved through adherence to societal, symbolic systems such as the 
Western 'community of values', acceptable civil military security solutions, and 
symbolic security alliances. Here member states and their organisations, NATO and the 
EU, refer to their constituencies' expectations for the provision of security.  Such 
cultural drivers here combine with calculus incentives to yield multiple member state 
political support for collaborative procurement. 
 
Collaborative procurement is problematic for a number of reasons.  It is politically risky 
where a shared capability involves loss of control and technical expertise.  Particularly if 
that capability is owned and operated by the acquiring organisation.273  It is time 
consuming where multiple member states cannot agree to the security policy underlying 
the procurement due to differing opinions.274  Varying requirements for the specification 
of equipment from different member states also introduce complexities.275  Further, it 
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	 98 
becomes inefficient when member states require work share for their national 
industries,276 and juste retour dynamics lead to suboptimal production solutions.  
Finally, rivalry between companies collaborating to provide the solution may also incur 
inefficiencies.277  There are many such examples of inefficient or unsuccessful joint 
aerospace projects due to these reasons.  Two examples are NATO's Lightweight Strike 
and Reconnaissance Aircraft in 1954, where some member states refused either to buy 
the aircraft or to participate in the collaboration because of industrial concerns.278  
Further, inefficient development and procurement of the Eurofighter Typhoon was also 
blamed on work share considerations.279  This research considers 'off-the-shelf' 
acquisitions, where development is less of a consideration.  An example of an 'off-the-
shelf' successful collaboration, covered in this chapter, is NATO's AWACs280 (Airborne 
Early Warning and Control System) procurement, bought from a US contractor in the 
1970s. 
 
What then are factors that can make 'joint' (collaborative and multilateral) procurement 
of security equipment and capability palatable to NATO and EU member states?  First, 
the chapter identifies member states' security priorities that generate a requirement for a 
joint surveillance capability.  Security strategies during this period reflect a post 9/11 
security agenda and reveal a focus on threats to citizen safety and other trafficking 
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crimes that require civil military solutions.281  Surveys show that terrorism, cross-border 
crime and immigration were also high on the public agenda at this time.282  This section 
of the chapter also considers cultural demands for surveillance capability.  These include 
societal expectations to save migrants' lives rather than merely monitoring and 
controlling borders for transnational crime.  The study argues that this ideational 
incentive for the procurement of surveillance derives from the West's projection of a 
'community of values'.   
 
Second, the chapter considers member state attitudes to the supply of border 
surveillance capability.  It considers industrial imperatives, and outlines different 
surveillance solutions offered by industry and their implications for procurement 
processes.  The chapter then considers the importance of European security and defence 
industry to member states, and whether procurement specification decisions are likely to 
be affected by sponsorship and juste retour dynamics.  Two cultural explanations for the 
increasing demand and supply of surveillance solutions are considered: the culture 
related to the US Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is linked to procurement of 
sophisticated surveillance solutions; and the civil military security culture emphasising 
civil security over defence.   
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Last, the 'collaborative' aspects of the procurement processes are examined.  This has 
cultural implications where the multilateral nature of the organisation drives member 
state agreement to the procurement policy and process for political reasons.  The 
research also explores rational, calculus objectives for joint procurement such as joint 
functionality and cost savings.  
 
Do threats or cultural imperatives encourage collaborative 
procurement of a surveillance capability? 
The research begins by identifying strategic drivers for Western member states to 
procure a transnational surveillance capability for both military and civil military 
requirements.  NATO's AWACs procurement in the 1970s was partly in response to the 
direct military threat of Soviet fighter jets.  NATO's existing Air Defence Ground 
Environment radar chain provided insufficient warning capacity so an Airborne Early 
Warning (AEW) capability was needed.283  After the end of the Cold War these military 
threats receded and the definition of security broadened and deepened to include non-
military threats, and the security of individuals as well as the state itself.284  Military 
requirements for joint surveillance capabilities, such as targeting and reconnaissance, 
were widely used in expeditionary warfare and crisis management in the Gulf and the 
Balkan campaigns.285  This research suggests that, at a societal level, contemporary 
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requirements for the procurement of joint security surveillance capability have 
broadened from traditional military and defence functions to include civil military and 
security functions: first, where member state security strategies identify human security 
threats of terrorism, cross border crime or trafficking that can be tracked back to illegal 
transnational movement over European borders; and second, where the Western 
'community of values' generates a concern for migrant safety which requires border 
surveillance solutions.  It must be noted that these requirements entail different 
surveillance requirements and solutions from the traditional defence specifications.  The 
driving forces for joint surveillance requirements are articulated by political elites, and 
reflect societal concerns and priorities.  Data such as national security strategies, recent 
public surveys and other contemporary expressions of security concerns were analysed 
to provide evidence.   
  
Security Strategies and Public Opinion regarding Security 
Member state and regional security strategies lead directly to the approval of security 
and defence budgets and subsequently to procurement plans.  These data are important 
for discerning the origins of policy and subsequent requirements and procurement of 
surveillance capability.  Security strategies generate rational solutions to protect the 
interests of the state or region, and are classified as calculus for the purposes of this 
study.  Recent security strategies are concerned traditional threats that require military 
surveillance solutions, but also identify threats that are linked to illegal transnational 
movements of people.  These lead to civil military surveillance policies and security 
solutions to monitor these movements. 
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Western member states have diverging attitudes to joint defence and security functions 
such as surveillance.  The 'West' is often referred to as a 'security community', within 
which member states do not present a military threat to each other.286  Western security 
policies may be viewed as coherent and actor driven, via member states, NATO or the 
EU.  But the reality is that opinions and security requirements are fragmented within the 
security community.287  This means that it is difficult to gain political will for joint 
action.  The literature considers diverging attitudes to threats within the West and its 
organisations such as NATO.288  Member states can be grouped by their attitude towards 
threats such as those who are concerned about crisis management in failed states, or 
those that still fear Russia.  These can be divided into 'older' European States, such as 
France and Germany, and 'new' European States, such as Estonia, Lithuania or Romania, 
who have a greater need for support from collaborative security measures.  Attitudes to 
border security are also divided.  For example, the vague wording about standardising 
European Border Controls in the concluding statement of the Laeken European Council 
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in 2001 reflected member state disagreements.289  Diverging attitudes to the migration 
crisis makes joint policy and procurement difficult and leads to compromised solutions.  
The table below has attempted to group member state attitudes towards the threat of 
transnational movement of people according to their security objectives. 
 
This research examined the security strategy documents of those member states who 
have collaboratively procured surveillance capability through NATO or the EU.  
Security strategies are published on a regular basis, every five to ten years.  The 
strategies become dated as the security situation evolves, for example the escalation in 
terrorist attacks and increased migrant flows.  The research seeks to supplement analysis 
of national security strategy documents with recent surveys from Transatlantic Trends 
and the Eurobarometer.290  These surveys give a different perspective of the general 
public as opposed to political elites, and also inform policy and procurement decisions.  
Society input into defence and security policy is documented in the literature291 and this 
study demonstrates how this input translates into organisational procurement processes.    
 
European member states concerned with procuring a joint surveillance capability 
include France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Greece and the smaller states, which include 
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Norway, Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Bulgaria.292  The US is the major 
contributor to NATO's Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) capability and for this 
reason its security strategy is included.  Member states are grouped in the table below in 
three categories with differing characteristics:  First, industrial powers, for example 
Germany, France and the US whose military and security and defence industries are 
nationally important and who often actively partake in joint military action such as those 
campaigns in Iraq, the Balkans and Libya;  second, EU member states such as Italy, 
Greece and Spain with significant shoreline and illegal migration concerns that require 
civil security and civil military solutions; and third, 'new' Eastern member states that 
may include Bulgaria, Slovenia and Romania.  These second two groups contribute to 
joint military missions but have less of a military culture.  Multilateral security strategies 
from the EU and NATO are also considered as well as the surveys of Eurobarometer 
and Transatlantic Trends.  The information on the security strategies are summarised 
here but may be found in greater detail in the attached Annex. 
  
																																																																		




Political Elite Dominant threats relevant 
to joint surveillance 
solutions 
Solutions considered 
Industrial Powers: France293; 
US294; and Germany295  
Terrorism, trafficking and 
cross border crime, 
consequences of failed 




Emphasis on the need for pre-
emption and a strategy of 
'knowledge and anticipation'; 
France indicates that Frontex is 
part of the solution296 to 
trafficking; France and 
Germany mention surveillance 
in a military context; 
'Border' EU States: Italy,297 
Greece,298 Spain299  
Terrorism and trafficking.  
Italy and Spain show 
heightened concerns with 
organised crime; 
Support of joint crisis 
management efforts of 
NATO and ESDP; 
 Spain mentions the private 
sector regarding security 
solutions and migrant 
management; Italy crisis 
management involving civil 
sector; 
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Political Elite Dominant threats relevant 
to joint surveillance 
solutions 
Solutions considered 
'New' Eastern States: 
Bulgaria,300 Slovenia and 
Roumania301 
Proliferation and 
development of terrorist 
networks, transnational 
organized crime, illegal 
trafficking in people, drugs, 
arms and ammunition, 
strategic and radioactive 
materials; clandestine 
migration and the 
emergence of some massive 
flows of refugees;  
Focus on cooperative solutions; 
Security solutions written very 
much in relation to multilateral 
agencies of NATO and the EU 
 
Multilateral security 
strategies: EU agencies302 
Terrorism, Organised 
Crime, Cyber Crime 
International cooperation; 




illegal activities, instability 
beyond NATO borders 
Collective defence, Counter 




300. BULGARIAN DURZHAVEN VESTNIK 2011. National Security Stategy of Bulgaria. National 
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301. MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE 2014. Romania's National Security Strategy. 
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Security Model'. Brussels: Council of the European Union.; EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2015a. The 
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for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Lisbon: NATO. 
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Financial crises, poverty 
and corruption; also external 
factors including terrorism, 
organised crime and 
irregular migration. 
Only 32% of respondents 
consider that EU institutions 






Issues of mobility, 
migration, and integration 
connect with foreign, 
security, economic, and 
social policy.   
The West still consider that 
NATO is essential as an 
institution and support NATO 
carrying territorial defense as a 
mission. 
Figure 2.  Macro level member state threat perception 
 
While awareness of international crisis management obligations (which could require 
military applications of surveillance) are present in the security strategies, four threats 
relevant to civil military surveillance are identified in this summary: terrorism, 
organised crime, human trafficking or clandestine migration, and failed states in EU 
neighbourhood regions.  Terrorism and organised crime represent direct threats to 
member state citizens.  Human trafficking and illegal immigration represent indirect 
threats of migrant integration and assimilation costs, political upheaval, citizen unrest 
and physical threats as crime rises through increased population numbers in poverty.307  
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All of the threats are manifest in illegal transnational movements of people.  Here, 
prevention and anticipation of the threat is preferable, and a joint border surveillance 
capability enables this.308   
 
Surveillance aids measures to address the threats identified by member states in their 
security strategies.  It has grown in importance in recent security solutions.  Some 
academics link this to the US RMA culture where information gathering is given the 
same priority as kinetic activity.309  It fulfils requirements for reconnaissance and 
targeting in military missions, it fulfils requirements for 'situational awareness’ that is 
important in civil military missions to prevent illegal, transnational movements of 
people.  It does not stop illegal movements, but informs and alerts security officials 
about the location and nature of the movements.  Countries with EU borders, such as 
France, Spain, Greece and Italy, have direct security interests in border surveillance that 
monitors illegal transnational movements.  The US does not share direct European 
border threats, so has other motivations to contribute to NATO's joint surveillance 
programmes.  Other non-border countries, such as Estonia and Lithuania also contribute 
to surveillance capabilities in both the EU and NATO and do not face the direct threat of 
transnational movements from neighbouring countries.  For the US and these non-border 
member states additional calculus or cultural explanations for the joint procurement is 
needed, such as industrial motivation, multilateral motivation, or simply cost efficiency 
motivation.  These are explored in the following paragraphs.  
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Cultural Demands for Surveillance 
Western member states identify themselves as a 'community of values'.310  These values 
include democracy, peace and human rights.  Member states use international 
organisations, such as the UN, NATO and the EU to uphold these values.311  This 
research considers the literature that articulates the 'community of values'.312  This 
section considers whether these views inform policy for the procurement of multilateral 
surveillance capability.   
 
The Western cultural context can affect policy for the procurement of surveillance 
capabilities, where the 'community of values' informs strategic culture.313  Strategic 
culture is 'a number of shared beliefs, norms and ideas within a given society that 
generate specific expectations about the respective community's preferences and actions 
in security and defence policy.'314  In this context, a community's security and defence 
identity, expressed through its preferences and behavioural patterns, derives from shared 
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experiences and accepted narratives specific to a particular security community.  
Strategic culture is an attribute of the whole international system, where political elites 
share experiences and beliefs on security, stability and peace.315  National and 
international diplomatic services, epistemic communities and political elites are the 
agents of the formation and diffusion of strategic culture.316  This culture shapes 
preference for certain security solutions such as border surveillance.317   
 
The West has a shared sense of values and history.  The EU is particularly linked to 
these values with Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty specifically referring to fundamental 
rights: 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the 
Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, 
justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.318 
These cultural concerns represent values that the West wants to uphold319 proactively 
and are rooted in Christian ideas of progress and civilisation.  They encompass ideals of 
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progress, compassion and humanity.320  Where these values are articulated and 
propagated by academic, intellectual and liberal commentators they inform and 
influence policy.  This cultural impetus, in relation to immigration, initially appeared in 
the literature through commentary on the militarisation of border surveillance,321 and 
latterly through observations on the treatment of migrants, as they make their journey to 
Europe.322  Previous studies have explored the promotion of community values as part 
of member state, NATO and EU discourse,323 but none have examined the implications 
on the policy for joint procurement of a security capability.  Member state political elites 
identify strategic demands for border surveillance via security strategies under the 
influence of this culture.  While this study does not examine the origins of the culture, it 
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is concerned to see how these ideas drive multilateral procurement of a surveillance 
capability used to monitor transnational borders.   
 
Cultural discourse enters procurement processes in three ways.  First, via a body of 
literature that comments on the activities of border surveillance and the practice of 
surveillance in a security context.  These commentators encourage political leaders to 
take additional measures that prioritise migrants' fundamental rights and their humane 
treatment.324  Second, organisations, such as NATO and the EU, adopt these cultural 
concerns in their security policy and organisation documents.  For example the 2015 
'European Agenda on Security' lists the principles to which security practices should 
refer.325  These include value-based principles of full compliance with 'fundamental 
rights'.  Third, member state representatives use may cultural arguments to gain 
approval for the procurement of surveillance capability in their national forums.326  
Evidence for these arguments is presented in the case studies in Chapter Four and 
Chapter Five.  It must be noted that, with respect to these last two points, the use of 
cultural arguments are often utilitarian and mask other drivers of policy and 
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procurement.  As Nicholas Wheeler observes, references to a legitimising, humanitarian 
context to justify action does not mean that the actors (here NATO or EU staff, member 
state representatives and industry actors) believe in the context, rather it reflects that a 
prevalent 'norm' obliges action in this frame of reference.327  Thus these actors refer to 
the humanitarian values of their community as a means of achieving their security 
objectives for accurate situational pictures and intelligence regarding the location of 
migrant boats.  
 
This section has outlined elements in the Western macro context that are responsible in 
part for driving the procurement of a surveillance capability.  These included strategic 
drivers of military mission requirements and the civil military requirements for the 
monitoring of illegal transnational movements of people, related to terrorism, human 
trafficking and organised crime.  It also considered cultural drivers for joint surveillance 
through a projection of the 'community of values’ that demands protection of 
endangered migrants' lives and fundamental rights.  The section noted that member 
states have diverging perceptions of threats that make agreement for joint surveillance 
policy difficult.  It observed that not all member states identified direct threats that 
justified joint procurement of surveillance in their security strategies.  Further, 
surveillance is not a counter measure against identified threats; it merely informs 
counter measures taken.  It acknowledged however, that the strategic culture of the West 
could unify member state objectives and drive procurement decisions for joint 
surveillance capabilities.  While this section has considered the threats that generate 
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joint surveillance requirements, the next section considers industrial and technical 
imperatives that also encourage joint procurement of surveillance assets.    
 
Member State Industrial and Technical Imperatives for the 
Procurement of Surveillance  
Technical imperatives drive member states to procure joint surveillance capability in 
order to gain domestic expertise.  Industrial imperatives mean that member states 
support their national industries' participation in multilateral procurement to benefit 
from the related economic growth and skills preservation or creation.  As the current 
General Manager of the AGS Programme states:  
'....The key premises of any multinational programme..., lets say there are two 
key premises, one is industrial participation, which means work share. What it is 
in it for my country's industry?  The second one and very close to that is 
technology transfer.'328   
Both imperatives are manifested in work share demands in the contract, often in the 
guise of juste retour. 
 
Contemporary surveillance solutions vary with respect to scale and technology.  These 
factors influence the likelihood of a technical imperative for member states to procure 
the solution and / or to support an industry tender.  Surveillance solutions differ in 
requirements from the most sophisticated military specifications, used in reconnaissance 
and targeting functions, to simpler civil security applications used for border 
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surveillance and other monitoring functions.  The few companies who own the relevant 
intellectual property provide specialist military radar solutions.  A wider range of 
companies provides civil military surveillance solutions, as barriers to entry are much 
lower for less sophisticated surveillance equipment. 
 
This section describes the evolution of optical, radar and infrared surveillance 
equipment.  It tracks the innovations in surveillance assets that were initially led by 
military requirements and then the evolution of the private sector and commercial, civil 
security requirements.  It concludes that industry, rather than government, now leads 
innovation in this field.  Then it considers the nature and relative strengths of 
corporations in the defence sector versus the security sector in relation to technical and 
industrial imperative drivers within the procurement process.  The section also explores 
cultural attitudes to the defence and security industries and surveillance solutions.  First, 
in relation to the US RMA where there is rivalry, or aspiration to acquire technical 
skills, with reference to the military capabilities of the US.329  Second in relation to 
Western 'community of values', the European preference for soft power, and attitudes to 
dual use, civil military surveillance solutions supplied by the civil security industry.330  
It considers if cultural attitudes to industry and surveillance solutions drive member state 
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Surveillance Solutions 
Aerial surveillance makes use of optical, radar and infrared capabilities to build a picture 
of what is happening on the ground or in the air.  Data analysis is critically important in 
the process.331  This is achieved using digital processing, communication networks and 
highly trained intelligence analysts.  This thesis does not require a deep understanding of 
technical aspects, but seeks to describe the evolution of a surveillance capability from 
military to private-sector led innovation, its military and civil military applications, and 
its monetary value insofar as these factors could affect joint procurement processes. 
 
Aerial surveillance has had military functions since World War 1(WW1) and the early 
days of the RAF.  Optical methods were used during WW1 when surveillance balloons 
gathered intelligence.332  In the 1920s, RAF's 45 Squadron flew over Northern Iraq to 
monitor Kurdish resistance.333  These early efforts used basic optical capability such as 
pilot vision, binoculars, telescopes and, to some extent, cameras.  Cameras were very 
bulky in the first quarter of the 20th century.  Sophisticated lens development evolved 
during the 1930's when Japanese companies such as Minolta, Fuji Photo Film and 
Konishiroku began to produce aerial cameras.334  Balloons were used for aerial 
surveillance into the 1950's.  For example, Project GENETRIX collected photographic 
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images of the Soviet Union for the Americans.335  However, by the 1960's, airplanes 
became the primary vehicles for surveillance with US U2 aircraft carrying sophisticated 
photographic equipment.  Space travel and the potential for satellite surveillance also 
date from this period.  The US SAMOS space reconnaissance project included 
technology related to high magnification image readout and film recovery.336   
 
Radar ('radio detection and ranging')337 was invented in the early 20th century and 
adapted for both navigation and intelligence generation for early warning systems 
during World War 2 (WW2).338  Radar converts electromagnetic surveillance radio 
waves to electronic impulses that power radar displays, generating 'X-ray like grayscale 
images'.339  After WW2 the technology developed to include advanced airborne 
surveillance systems.  These worked with satellites340 that had the advantage of 
extending low range radar coverage and reducing the effects of radar terrain masking.341  
Advanced airborne systems were developed by industry and used in military 
applications of early warning systems, such as the E-3 AWACs aircraft.342  Industry 
continued to innovate and in the 1990's sophisticated radars were developed for ground 
surveillance, with Ground Moving Target Indicators (GMTI) and Synthetic Aperture 
Radar (SAR) applications.  Radar is often used in conjunction with other optical assets 
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such as cameras and satellite images.  SAR is able to translate returns into three-
dimensional images of specific areas, known as 'swathes'.343  The high resolution of 
images can be seen in the slide below where SAR images are combined with GMTI 
information (NB the images are not of the same area).344 
 
 
Figure 3. HORVATH, B. 2013. Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) A Transformational 
Capability for NATO; 'Five Elements: Freedom - Information - Security 
  
These surveillance capabilities were used for military target acquisition by US JSTAR 
aircraft,345 the UK ASTOR capability,346 now known as the Raytheon Sentinel, and 
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helicopter surveillance assets such as Italian CRESO347 and French HORIZON348 assets.  
Aerial surveillance also has civilian applications monitoring weather, environmental 
hazards and disasters such as oil spills.349   
 
Surveillance imaging is costly where images are long range and complex requiring 
computer processing.350  The expense means that access to the capability is often 
through large corporations or international programmes such as the European 
Copernicus satellite programme.351  The expense reflects the value attached to the 
intellectual property and development of radar technology.  This adds a technical 
imperative for developing a radar, or acquiring one where there is access to the 
technology. 
 
Infrared sensors are used to detect natural infrared radiation (as opposed to the synthetic 
radio waves interpreted by radar).  They detect 'hot' objects and are used for seeing in 
the dark or through visual impediments such as low light or haze.352  As with radar, 
developments in early infrared surveillance technology occurred during and after 
WW2.353  In the 1960's the US developed MIDAS,354 an infrared sensor designed to 
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detect hot gases from missile launches.355  By the 1980's, with the invention of UAVs, 
infrared sensors began to be more widely used in military surveillance and for 
monitoring civilian disasters such as earthquakes.356  It became an essential element of 
aerial surveillance, with the sensors giving the ability to map and monitor the earth from 
space and the upper atmosphere.357  Most piloted and unpiloted surveillance aircraft 
carry infrared and electro-optical sensors to enhance the resolution of imaging. 
 
Governments largely developed initial aerial surveillance capabilities with their related 
military and scientific interests.  However, in the 1990s the private sector became 
interested in satellite and surveillance images, giving additional impetus to the 
development of sophisticated aerial photography and resolution.  Commercial satellites 
were launched and, while governments remained the largest customers of these 
commercial operations, the incentives to develop surveillance technology now came 
from industry.358   
 
Contemporary aerial surveillance is categorised under the technology domain of 
'Integrated Platforms'.  It is a combination of aircraft, manned or unmanned, that uses 
radar, cameras and infrared sensors to capture images on the ground, often with 
surveillance and navigation satellites.359  Images are transmitted either via line-of-sight 
radio datalinks or to satellites which then beam the information to operation consoles.  
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The datalinks also vary in sophistication and cost.  Radar generates large amounts of 
data that consume bandwidth and prove difficult to transmit via low-level data links.360  
Data analysis at operation consoles takes place in ground stations, aircraft, and 
moveable truck stations or on ships.361  The information is then downloaded onto a 
central communication network where the information can be distributed to member 
states.  The range of requirements differs significantly from military specifications that 
require highly accurate, real time images, to simpler civil applications such as border 
monitoring.  These have lower camera specifications and fewer infrared and radar 
sensors that affect the cost of the solution, and technical drivers of the collaborative 
decision-making. 
 
At the sophisticated, military end of the market, aerial surveillance may employ UAV 
technology, such as Global Hawks or Sentinel aircraft.  UAVs are expensive to develop 
and acquire - they are often justified as being cheap in the context of risk to soldiers' 
lives362 - but in reality operational costs are higher than equivalent manned options.363  
UAVs have three advantages for missions such as border surveillance: first, they can 
spend considerable amounts of time in the air before refuelling and therefore are able to 
cover greater distances compared to other aircraft or border guards on foot;364 second, 
personnel need not to be deployed on the ground or sea which reduces costs and risk to 
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life; and third, UAVs can provide information directly to border guards.365  Three 
disadvantages of UAVs are: first, the risk of accidents where the UAVs are flying over 
domestic airspace;366 second, many UAVs have difficulties operating in bad weather and 
SAR radar technology for imagery in bad conditions is expensive; and third, the cost of 
operating / supporting UAVs is high, particularly the training costs.367  Thus while 
UAVs are rationally acceptable for the role of surveillance in some respects, there are 
some disadvantages that mean that objective reasoning may not always support the 
choice of this surveillance solution.   
 
The private sector contributes significantly to the provision of aerial surveillance 
solutions.  Some solutions may have a lower technical specification where the 
requirements are for a civil security function, rather than military requirements such as 
target acquisition.  Thus, surveillance asset capability ranges from specialist radar 
solutions (provided by a small number of suppliers with proprietary technology such as 
Northrop Grumman(NG)) to low level, 'fee for service' aerial surveillance contracting 
(offered by multiple low-end contractors).  Contractor services are provided by large 
defence firms such as Lockheed Martin, BAE Systems, Thales and Booz Allen 
Hamilton, or smaller tech and intelligence focused firms such as Diamond Executive 
Aviation, EASP Air in Europe, or Intrepid Solutions and TransVoyant LLC in the 
US.368  This low-end, 'fee-for-service' aerial surveillance provides a cost effective 
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capability.  Contractors include image analysts to process data,369 as well as operators 
for civil military surveillance operations.  It allows customers, both military and civilian, 
to have access to the latest technology without the capital investment and upgrade 
costs.370  A primary market for these surveillance services is for border security.371  
Contractors provide further procurement advantages for their customers: first, decision-
making is simpler where the capability is not actually acquired; and second, capital 
investment and training costs are lower.372  This solution is flexible and efficient, and 
can be scaled down for low-level requirements. 
 
Little has been written about procurement of aerospace assets and infrastructure relating 
to the civil military industry, despite the current growth of the civil military security 
market.373  A study for the EU (excluding UAVs), estimates the global civil security 
sector to be worth around €100bn;374 the airborne surveillance market is currently 
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estimated to be worth over $20 billion and to grow to $43 billion by 2020.375  This is 
still small when compared to a global defence industry that is worth around $1.8 
trillion.376  However, the current picture is in flux as the powerful defence industry 
moves into the high growth security sector via acquisition and product development.377  
Some academics assert that both defence and security corporations have a considerable 
influence in border surveillance solutions,378 but the procurement outcomes of this 
research suggest that civil military / security firms have less influence than their defence 
counterparts.   
 
The range of sophistication and the cost of aerial surveillance solutions and their affect 
on the balance of technical and industrial imperatives in joint procurement decision-
making are explored next.   
 
Technical and Industrial Imperatives 
Technical and industrial imperatives are linked to the 'Military Industrial Complex' 
where member state governments support their domestic industries and maintain close 
relations with industrial actors.  Three aspects of these imperatives that affect 
collaborative procurement are explored below: juste retour dynamics; EU attempts to 
counter national protectionism; and the nature of the civil military market compared to 
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the defence market.  Two further characteristics of the surveillance capability may 
enhance technical and industrial imperatives in procurement policy and process.  First, 
the size and nature of the surveillance contract influences the importance of the 
procurement to a member state regarding economic benefits and technical skills.  
Second, the relative strength of the firm providing the surveillance solution is 
significant.  In the fragmented, civil military security sector, small contractors fulfil 
simple surveillance requirements such as EASP Air or Diamond Executive Air.  These 
firms are weaker than the defence sector companies such as Lockheed Martin or NG 
who develop and fulfil highly technical surveillance requirements.  This affects their 
lobbying power with member state governments and their influence on policy and 
procurement processes.  
 
Member state governments may support national tenders for joint defence contracts, so 
that their domestic industries might gain technical expertise and other economic 
benefits.  In collaborative procurement, this technical imperative is often exhibited via 
the principle of juste retour and the related demand for workshare.379  For example, the 
jointly developed Eurofighter Typhoon is assembled in four different factories 
throughout Europe.380  Also the joint project to develop the EURO MALE was criticised 
because officials warned that unless the three countries involved allowed the workload 
to "clearly" spread beyond their own national supply chains, they would not have much 
of a market.381  While these examples of juste retour refer to projects where there is 
joint product development and production, the dynamic is also found in 'off-the-shelf' 
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procurement such as NATO's AWACs requirement in the late 1970's.  Here member 
states demanded 'offsets'382 in proportion to their level of participation in the acquisition 
of the capability.383  'Off-the-shelf' solutions do not usually need product development 
and this reduces member state industry gains in technical skills and jobs, giving fewer 
incentives for juste retour. 
 
Member state sponsorship of their domestic industries is routinely experienced in 
collaborative defence contracts, especially where there is requirement for joint 
development,384 but there seems to be a different dynamic when it comes to 
collaborative, civil military requirements.  This leads to more cohesive decision-making 
where member states are not competing against each other.  Member state support of the 
security sector is weaker than that given to the defence industry for three reasons: first, 
where there is a EU civil security requirement, member state sponsorship of their 
national industries can be challenged under EU regulations; second, the low value, 
fragmented nature of the security sector means that it has a weaker lobbying voice 
compared to the defence sector; and third, the fragmented nature of the customer base 
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for civil military solutions means that contracts are of lower value leading to less 
collaborative procurement activity.   
 
To address the first point, the EU has tried to combat national protectionism in the 
security sector with legislation and the creation of specialist procurement agencies.  
Article 346 of the Lisbon Treaty exempts defence equipment from single market 
competition legislation,385 but this but this exemption does not extend to security 
equipment:  
'with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such 
measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the internal 
market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military 
purposes.'386   
For example, the ruling for Augusta helicopters (Case 337/05) clarified that dual use or 
equipment supplied to militaries for civilian use was not exempt from single market 
legislation.387  Similarly, surveillance assets often have civilian applications that are not 
limited to military missions and therefore do not qualify under Article 346.  Other 
regulations to counter member state protectionism include the EU Directive on Security 
and Defence procurement (2009);388 the Directive on Intra Community Transfers, 
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(2009);389 and the Interpretative Communication on Art 296 TEC, (2006);390 although it 
is admitted that in practice these Directives have limited application.391  Significantly for 
this research, the directives do not apply to multilateral procurement contracts.392  
Therefore, while security services procurement does not qualify for Article 346 
exemption, multilateral procurement is exempt from EU directives aiming to counter 
protectionism.  In principle, member states may still legally insist on a nationally 
sourced capability in collaborative procurement processes.  An example of an EU 
specialist procurement agency is OCCAR.393  This procurement organisation tries to 
emphasise avoidance of member state juste retour, as seen in the procurement of the 
A400M transport aircraft.394   
 
Second, the civil security market differs from the defence market.  This is partially to do 
with the sophistication of the solutions offered.  Defence firms often have IP interests in 
products such as sophisticated radars.  Few firms are able to offer the high levels of 
technical expertise required for military solutions.  The levels of capital required to 
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develop these products have led to consolidation in the industry and thus the defence 
industry is characterised by large corporations such as Lockheed Martin, BAE Systems 
and NG.  These corporations have a reputation for lobbying national governments and 
reinforcing the technical imperative.395  In contrast, the security market has lower 
barriers to entry and is currently fragmented with smaller firms having less lobbying 
power and weaker influence in procurement,396 although observers have asserted that 
industrial figures have been integral to the development of European border surveillance 
policy.397  Thus there is less potential for the encouragement of a technical or industrial 
imperative from these weaker firms. 
 
Third, while national defence markets are largely a monopsony, i.e. with a single, 
powerful, government customer, the demand side for security equipment and services 
remains fragmented and dispersed.398  Further, customers are diverse, such as military 
armed forces or civilian border agencies, and have different approaches to acquisition.  
This makes collaborative procurement difficult, because there are fewer large contracts 
and less opportunity for the technical and industrial imperatives to be exhibited.399   
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In sum, technical and industrial imperatives are generated where there is opportunity for 
technology transfer or economic benefits.  High value, defence firms are protected by 
member state interests to a greater extent than the smaller, fragmented security industry.  
This support gives defence firms lobbying and negotiating power.  Defence companies 
fulfilling sophisticated, military requirements also have more lobbying power due to the 
size and nature of the collaborative contracts, and because there are fewer suppliers.  
Smaller, high growth security firms are consolidating but remain fragmented, which 
gives them less commercial weight.400  These companies tend to fulfil low value, 
contractor surveillance requirements.  Here, contractors have low levels of negotiating 
power, where there is greater competition and less member state support.  These 
characteristics are found to affect industrial input into policy, and more specifically into 
the procurement process.  The case studies will show the varying weights of industrial 
influence.  However, this section also notes evidence of the markets conflating their 
civil military and defence solutions because of Western demand, with increasing overlap 
in discourse from both these industry sectors.  
 
Cultural Imperatives for Surveillance Solutions 
Cultural factors such as symbolic prestige and a preference for civil military solutions 
also influence the choice of surveillance solutions.401  Such as a certain solution being 
associated with prestige, becoming a symbol of power projection.402  In the 1970's Eyre 
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and Suchman concluded that developing countries procured fighter jets as they were 
aspiring to national modernity.403  A similar case may be true for sophisticated 
surveillance capability driven by an aspiration to emulate US intelligence supremacy.404  
Industrial imperatives for surveillance are affected by two contrasting cultural factors.  
First, the US RMA culture that emphasises requirements for sophisticated surveillance 
assets.405  Second, European security culture preferences have driven the recent growth 
of the civil military security market, and their orientation towards softer civil security 
requirements, such as border surveillance, rather than military and defence 
requirements, such as armaments.406  These ideas support definitions of acceptable 
surveillance solutions, where civil security functions are more acceptable to European 
budgets and procurement. 
 
Marek Thee asserts that doctrine influences procurement407 and here, US strategic RMA 
culture may affect surveillance requirements for assets such as sophisticated UAVs.  
Some argue that Europe is a norm taker from the US when it comes to strategic 
culture.408  Where European member states perceive threats of transnational movements, 
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US doctrines have been natural references for security solutions.409  Previous studies 
have considered the technical Spanish SIVE maritime surveillance system and their 
requirements that integrate AIS410 systems with radar sensors and cameras.411  Observers 
allege that the RMA approach to warfare has been adopted in EU civil military 
responses and used in border control.412  The literature asserts that high levels of 
investment into surveillance research and development via the EU's FP7413 and Horizon 
2020 programmes414 were linked to an aspiration for sophisticated, RMA levels of 
surveillance.  The case studies in Chapter Four and Five consider evidence for this 
driver.  
 
The second cultural influence on the procurement of surveillance capability is the 
European preference for civil military security requirements over military requirements.  
The recent growth of the civil security market has been observed in academic studies 
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and reports,415 driven by demand for surveillance capacity.  In contrast, demand for 
defence equipment has been static in the West,416 with defence budgets falling by 8.3% 
in real terms between 2005 and 2014 according to SIPRI.417  Now military technology is 
being rapidly repurposed to meet rising demands for civil security.418  In its 2013 annual 
report, Italy's Finmeccanica claimed that rising demand for border security and 
surveillance has been offsetting losses in traditional military orders.419  Observers 
forecast growth in the aerial surveillance market coming from civil security operations 
generated by the current migrant crisis.420  For example, the 2015 DSEI conference421 
witnessed an emphasis on 'soft' surveillance for 'sovereignty operations and border 
security applications' demonstrating capability such as air and ground based radars.422  
One conference observer noted (of Thales and Finmeccanica): 'it is not that they didn't 
have weapons systems, but you could see the change in focus'.423  Some see little 
difference between defence and security, Tim Robinson of Thales has been quoted as 
seeing:  'a shift in emphasis and an increasing balance between what we see as defence 
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and security.  'Security' is a more politically acceptable way of describing what was 
traditionally defence'.424  This evidence suggests that civil security functions and the 
'security' industry are currently more acceptable to member states, compared to the 
'defence' industry.  The case studies that follow will show how discourse surrounding 
procurement aligns with this civil military preference to gain member state approval for 
surveillance procurement policies and requirements.  
 
This section considered the technical and industrial imperatives for the procurement of a 
surveillance capability in the macro context.  A member state may support the 
procurement or tender in order to gain economic benefits and improve national 
expertise.  'Off-the-shelf' or contractor-driven procurement removes development 
aspects and technical gains, diminishing member states' involvement and the push for 
juste retour.  Research data indicate that the defence and security sectors have 
significant and growing overlap, particularly in border surveillance requirements.  The 
powerful defence industry is consolidated with fewer players fulfilling sophisticated, 
military surveillance requirements.  In contrast, the civil military market has lower 
barriers to entry as it fulfils simpler surveillance requirements and there is a proliferation 
of smaller, weaker firms.  Further, the fragmented nature of the security market 
customer base, and the fragmented supply side, lead to smaller contracts.  This reduces 
the power of civil military sector firms and strengthens the bargaining power of 
procuring organisations.  The calculus for member state support of the security sector is 
therefore weaker.   
																																																																		





The research considered cultural motives where the current emphasis on the civil 
military industry may reflect the US RMA or a preference for European soft power.  
While the self-interest of calculus tends to divide interests in collaborative procurement, 
cultural influences are adhered to by member states across the Western security 
community.  They engender a coherent approach and unity of purpose for surveillance 
policy and procurement.  Interested parties, such as organisation staff and industry, also 
use cultural references to further policy and procurement for NATO or EU joint border 
surveillance functions. 
 
Joint procurement of Surveillance 
The last aspect of the macro context for joint procurement of aerial surveillance is its 
'collaborative' nature.    Three aspects of collaborative acquisition have driven 
procurement in the past: first, the rational necessity for a joint function may drive 
multilateral procurement of a surveillance capability (this was explored in the first 
section of this chapter); second, the rational cost benefits of collaboration are 
considered, given the expense of surveillance assets.425  Here the research considers if 
multinational surveillance systems are more cost effective than a series of national 
systems, and asks if this is a sufficient driver for the collaborative procurement.  It 
explores how the form of transaction, and the extent of development involved affect the 
collaborative process.  Finally, the cultural, multilateral security aspirations of member 
states are considered. 
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Economic benefits gained from collaboration can motivate collaborative procurement.  
These include cost benefits from economies of scale, which are affected by the form and 
extent of the collaborative transaction.  Member states usually seek cost savings from 
collaborative procurement, and this justifies the joint acquisition, however savings are 
not always achieved.426  There is a comprehensive body of literature analysing the costs 
and benefits of collaborative procurement in the aerospace sector, much of it concerned 
with the efficiency of development and production.427  Sophisticated surveillance assets 
are very expensive: for example Global Hawk UAVs cost over $230 million for each 
aircraft.428  This level is prohibitive for smaller EU and NATO member state national 
systems, and inhibiting for those larger states to procure large scale capability.  
However, where the costs are shared, and there is a multinational surveillance system, 
such as AWACs or AGS, there is inevitably a saving compared to procurement of a 
system on a national, standalone basis.429  Multinational surveillance systems not only 
reduce costs by sharing the initial investment, but also by centralising manpower and 
coordinating the gathering of information compared to national systems that duplicate 
functions.  Ambitions for cost savings in European defence and security spending were 
especially significant in the periods of 2008 - 2015, after the 2008 global finance crisis 
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increased austerity drives and cuts to defence spending.430  Defence budgets fell by 
8.3% in real terms from 2005-2014 according to SIPRI.431  Therefore this calculus 
driver is significant to joint procurement. 
 
The 'form' of collaborative transaction affects the benefits (costs and technical 
knowledge) received from the procurement.  Collaboration may range from a full scale, 
development programme (for example the Eurofighter Typhoon) to a simple leasing 
contract (for example the Frontex aerial surveillance contracts) where no acquisition of 
assets takes place.  There is a risk reward relationship linked to the form of transaction 
where the greater the development aspects and technical skills received from this, the 
more complex the collaboration negotiations.  Simpler transactions ease the difficulties 
of collaboration and may encourage the process.  For example where 'off-the-shelf' 
equipment is acquired, little or no product development reduces complicated and 
extended negotiations between member states.  In 'fee for service' outsourcing, little 
investment is required by member states and therefore the transaction becomes easier, as 
seen in the collaborative SatCom contracts held by the EDA.432  While transaction form 
does not drive procurement, it is a crucial feature that can facilitate the procurement and 
help overcome the myriad of other obstacles.  Hartley defines four forms of defence or 
security procurement on a continuum from national production via collaboration to 
complete 'off-the-shelf' solutions: National Project (no collaboration and complete 
																																																																		
430. BRADDON, D. & HARTLEY, K. 2013. More for less? Exploring the Economic dimensions of 
multilateral collaboration in military aerospace projects. Journal of Defense Studies & Resource 
Management, 2.2. 
431. SIPRI; PROCTOR, K. 2015. Europe's Migrant Crisis: Defense Contractors are poised to win big. 
Fortune Magazine. 
432. PARSONS, D. 2012. Companies Seek Profits in Fee-For -Service Surveillance Aircraft. NDA.; 
https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/eu-satcom-market Accessed July 2017 
	 138 
independence of production); International Collaboration (sharing development and 
production work); Licensed Production (where equipment is produced under a foreign 
licence, and can also be co-production); and Imported Equipment (purchase of foreign 
developed and produced equipment).433  This thesis considers a further, fifth policy 
option: Outsourcing to a contractor for services.  This is collaborative outsourcing and is 
the lowest risk and most flexible provision of a capability.  It changes the commitment 
required from member states and has been employed extensively for private security 
services.434  The table below lists the five policy options together with their cost 
implications and ease of process for member states. 
Type of Contract Cost* Relative Ease of Process* 
National contract High Easy 
International Collaboration Medium Difficult 
Multilateral Production under 
licence 
Medium Medium 
Import Medium Medium 
Outsource to Contractor Low Easy 
*Cost and Relative Ease of Process added by Author 
Figure 4. Table adapted from of Hartley’s typology of defence procurement435 
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Hartley's contract typology has different cost and process implications for member 
states.  The case studies in this research consider 'International Collaboration', 'Import' 
and 'Outsource to a contractor' solutions.  An example of a multilateral import 
transaction was NATO's AWACs procurement, which attracted participation via offsets.  
Although here, as in NATO's C17 procurement, the member states retain ownership of 
the assets.436  Additional cost benefits are gained in import deals where offset deals are 
negotiated.  Outsourcing to a contractor for the capability requires low levels of 
investment.  There are few examples of collaborative contracting for contractor services, 
but successful contracts include the EDA's EU SatCom project, where Airbus Defence 
and Space provide services under a Framework Contract.437  This solution is the lowest 
cost and risk but has the lowest levels of member state industry benefits, but an urgently 
needed capability is acquired easily and quickly.  This may be compared to the complex 
and lengthy processes of international collaboration. 
 
Where there are complex negotiations and cost benefits are not totally realised, 
additional motivations may explain the joint nature of the collaborative procurement.  
This research is concerned with the 'multilateral' effects of EU and NATO organisations 
on the procurement process.  This involves member state attitude to multilateralism and 
the levels of multilateralism associated with the organisation.  Thus, the terms 
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'multilateral' and 'collaborative' need to be distinguished.  'Multilateral' describes the 
nature of the organisation procuring the capability, and reflects functional and political 
aspects that affect and drive the procurement process.  This study adopts Caporaso's 
institutional definition of 'multilateral' as 'collective beliefs, presumptive habits and 
shared values'.438  It represents the cultural aspect of 'joint'.  'Collaborative' describes the 
multinational procurement contract and represents the calculus 'joint' aspect. 
 
The 'multilateral' aspects that drive procurement include political expediency for 
member states to participate in the collaborative procurement as part of an alliance.  
Member states may gain political capital by participating in a multilateral procurement.  
Cooperation over procurement of a security capability demonstrates cohesion and a 
common outlook on security policy.  Shared meanings play a part, as identified in Joana 
and Smith's study on the procurement of the A400M, where the symbolism of political 
cooperation was key in the 'joint' procurement policy.439  Thus, multilateral, cultural 
drivers can drive requirement for the capability.  For example, NATO's AWACs 
acquisition did not just fulfil the necessary joint role of airborne early warning, but also 
represented a joint security response by a political alliance.440  In a similar way, NATO's 
AGS programme and the EU's Eurosur initiative represent multilateral, joint security 
responses to security threats.  It can make strategic sense for countries to support 
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multilateral programmes in order to enlist the approval of the dominant member states, 
such as the US within NATO.441  
 
This section outlined the factors driving the 'joint' nature of multilateral procurement.  
There are both calculus and cultural aspects that drive member states to agree to share 
the performance of security functions.  Calculus drivers, such as the aspiration for cost 
savings and benefits, may encourage member states to look to their self-interest and 
therefore to diverge from joint action.  Previous studies have shown that individual 
member state interests may interrupt negotiations and prevent delivery of those benefits.  
Cultural aspects of 'joint' - the solidarity and multilateral drivers of a political alliance - 
are cohesive in collaborative procurement.       
 
Conclusion 
This chapter described the macro environment within which decisions for the 
collaborative procurement of surveillance capabilities is made.  It argued that although 
previous studies have focussed on calculus drivers for collaborative procurement, 
cultural, ideational aspects of multilateral acquisition often encourage political support 
for joint action.  The chapter considered calculus and cultural explanations for the 
security mission of transnational border surveillance, member state attitude towards and 
support of the industrial base that provides surveillance solutions, the 'joint' nature of 
collaborative procurement.  It explored member states' strategic drivers for a 
surveillance capability to support counter measures against threats such as illegal 
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migration and cross border crime.  Previous studies and other data indicated that 
member states have differing security outlooks and that rational demand for 
transnational border surveillance is not a sufficient explanation for procurement for all 
Western member states.   
 
However, evidence concerning West's coherent 'community of values' suggested that 
this cultural driver could encourage multilateral border surveillance policy.  The chapter 
also noted the recent growth in the civil security industry and linked this to the European 
culture of acceptable 'softer' security solutions.  It linked this with positive attitudes 
towards the procurement of surveillance as opposed to 'harder' kinetic capabilities.     
 
Previous studies also suggested that juste retour principle and the US RMA could 
generate industrial and technical imperatives for procurement of surveillance 
capabilities.  However, the chapter considered different surveillance solutions and 
observed that different solutions generated varying levels of these imperatives.  Thus the 
procurement of an 'off-the-shelf' or an outsourced 'fee for service' surveillance capability 
is unlikely to generate high levels of technical and industrial imperatives. 
 
The chapter also examined cost efficiency drivers for 'joint' procurement and considered 
examples of multilateral and collaborative acquisition such as NATO's AWACs, 
Eurofighter Typhoon and the A400M.  Here previous studies proved that cost savings 
are not always achieved in collaborative procurement.  Additional logics were therefore 
required for joint acquisition such as political benefits and cultural factors related to 
multilateralism.     
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The next chapter considers the micro organisational context for the procurement of a 
surveillance capability.  Here drivers for procurement include organisational role 
expansion.  The chapter also considers how bureaucratic structure and culture influences 
and facilitates the procurement processes and effect delivery of the different drivers 
from the macro environment.  While this chapter has considered drivers for the 
procurement from the perspective of member states, the next chapter examines how 





Chapter 3: The politics and process of 
collaborative procurement in NATO and 
the EU bureaucracies 
Introduction 
Keohane said that organisations 'do not merely reflect the preferences and powers of the 
units constituting them; the institutions themselves shape those preferences and 
power'.442  This chapter considers the micro, organisation context of NATO and EU 
Commission (the 'Commission') bureaucracies, for explanations of multilateral 
procurement of surveillance capability.  It considers if and how these organisations 
shape preferences for policy and procurement.  There are two significant aspects for the 
research in this context.  First, examination of this environment is important to find 
evidence of organisation role expansion driving procurement.  Second, it opens the 
black box of NATO and the Commission to reveal how decision-making processes, 
bureaucratic structure and organisation culture facilitate and deliver procurement 
drivers: strategic rationale, symbolic culture, technical imperatives, industrial 
imperatives, and role expansion.  Organisation bureaucracy affects member state debate 
and industrial actor influence; organisations are influenced by external scrutiny and 
internal culture.  Here, the research builds on Scott's ideas of 'open organisations' to link 
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the macro and micro contexts.443  It finds that NATO and EU bureaucracies shape and 
influence the drivers for procurement via their objectives for role expansion, and their 
influence over the delivery of other drivers. 
 
NATO and the EU offer differing models of security provision with varied cultures, 
functions, instruments and underlying institutional logics.444  However both have 
expanded their non-kinetic, civil military functions, such as border surveillance.  
Procurement of security assets and capability may support these broadened activities.  
The first part of the chapter considers recent functional expansion by the two 
organisations, identifying the strategies, intentions, and incentives for any expansion 
that may drive procurement activity.   
 
First, documents relating to security strategy, maritime security policy and procurement 
policy are considered as evidence of NATO and EU intentions.  Here the organisations 
align themselves with member states' rational and cultural expectations for the provision 
of security, to justify their roles and to legitimise any role expansion.  Second, the 
chapter presents evidence of NATO and EU role expansion.  Current security functions 
include coordination of military and civil military missions, defence and security 
research, cyber security and procurement.  These roles have led to procurement of 
satellite and surveillance capabilities by both organisations.  NATO is a regional 
military alliance with a mandate for collective defence; its civil military roles are limited 
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but evolving.445  The EU's security expertise is generally accepted as civil security446 
(such as border control and policing) and is performed via the Commission's DG 
Migration and Home Affairs (DG MHA) whose security role is also expanding.  The 
chapter refers to military missions coordinated by the EDA, but the thesis focus on civil 
military missions leads to a closer examination of the Commission's bureaucracy.  
Third, collaborative procurement is viewed as a security role for both NATO and the 
EU.447  However, critics note the low levels of joint acquisition via these 
organisations.448  The chapter describes these three aspects with reference to potential 
rivalry between NATO and the EU.  Here, where there is overlap regarding security or 
procurement roles, competition provides an incentive for role expansion and the related 
procurement of assets and capability.449  
 
The second part of the chapter considers the effects of NATO and EU bureaucracies 
upon drivers for procurement.  Bureaucratic aspects such as forums and conferences, 
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funding structures and levels of scrutiny enable different calculus and cultural drivers to 
enter the procurement process.  Little is written on the bureaucratic nature of NATO and 
comparisons between the security-oriented bureaucracies of EU and NATO are rare.450  
This study builds upon the few works that consider the inner workings of security 
bureaucracies.451  Realists contend that multilateral organisations are created by member 
states to serve their interests, to reduce transaction costs, to gain efficiencies via 
centralisation, or to legitimise their objectives pursued through an independent 
organisation.452  Here member states decide procurement policy, set parameters for 
contract negotiations, and intergovernmental politics generate tension in the 
procurement process.  In contrast, institutionalists assert that organisations have 
influence and power over activities such as formation of security policy and the related 
procurement, through control of process and information.453  This is truer for the 
Commission than NATO, which has ‘far less institutional latitude’, compared to 
Commission counterparts.454  The study finds that member state strategic and industrial 
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imperatives are delivered via NATO's 'intergovernmental'455 bureaucracy.  In contrast, 
the Commission's 'supranational'456 bureaucracy enables organisation role expansion 
imperatives to encourage procurement processes.   
 
Next, organisation culture is considered.457  Organisation culture is generated by the 
structure of organisations, as well as the character and behaviour of the staff within it.458  
It is a 'persistent patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of, and human 
relationships within, an organisation.  Importantly, it provides 'shared interpretations of 
the world and shapes the way officials communicate with one another and how they 
perform the tasks entrusted to them.'459  Where there is a strong organisation culture, 
such as in the Commission, decision-making is more efficient.  Where the culture is 
weak, as in NATO, diverging objectives and behaviour may distract decision-making, 
leading to inefficient procurement processes.  Moreover, where it is aligned with the 
relevant security cultures then the decision-making processes are also easier.  Finally, 
the chapter describes generic, multilateral procurement practices.  Here bureaucratic 
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politics theory aids explanations of decision-making by member state representatives, 
organisation staff and industry personnel.     
 
NATO and EU Role Expansion 
The security roles of NATO and the Commission have expanded and adjusted as 
member state security requirements have changed, and as organisational interests for 
broader security functions have been realised.  As noted in the introduction, three 
aspects of organisation role expansion are considered in this section: NATO and EU 
security and procurement policies; NATO and EU role expansion into the security 
space; and NATO and EU procurement roles.  The potential for organisation rivalry is 
considered for all of these aspects as incentives and a driver for procurement. 
 
NATO and EU Policy leading to Expanded Security and Procurement Roles? 
Both NATO and the EU developed and adjusted their security roles in the aftermath of 
the Cold War.  This was reflected in their public policy documents.  The references to 
recent NATO and EU strategic concepts, maritime strategy papers and procurement 
policies below, demonstrate how both organisations aligned themselves with member 
state security concerns and moved into the civil military security sphere where 
surveillance is an important capability.  They indicate organisation intentions regarding 
security roles, particularly where authored by organisation staff.  They also provide 
evidence of any ambition overlap that could generate rivalry and drive procurement 
activities.   
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Strategic concepts are intrinsically linked to NATO's Post Cold War role, the first one 
was written in 1991.460  After the Cold War NATO needed to adjust its policy and 
related role to the requirements of the current security context and member state 
requirements.  There was a concern for NATO's continued relevance and some 
European governments worried that the US commitment to European security might be 
weakened.461  The 1991 'New Strategic Concept' sought to address these concerns and 
realign NATO's tasks to the new security context.462  Further realignment followed in 
NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept, which referred to the Western European Union (WEU) 
joint defence effort, the Petersburg Tasks,463 and the potential for expeditionary forces 
via crisis management in the Balkans.464  NATO's most recent, 2010 Strategic Concept, 
adjusts its role still further.465  It aligns with member state concerns and stresses 
contemporary threats of terrorism, cross border crime and illegal trafficking.  It proposes 
that these could be addressed by using an array of instruments including non-military 
responses and civil military measures.466  The Military Committee, a member state 
																																																																		
460. NATO. 1991. The Alliance's New Strategic Concept [Online]. Brussels. Available: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm [Accessed April 2017]. 
461. MEARSHEIMER, J. J. 1990. Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War. 
International Security, 15, 5-56. 
462. NATO. 1991. The Alliance's New Strategic Concept [Online]. Brussels. Available: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm [Accessed April 2017]. 
463. These included humanitarian and rescue tasks; conflict prevention and peace keeping; peace making; 
and post conflict stabilisation. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/petersberg_tasks.html 
Accessed October 2018 
464. NATO 1999a. The Alliance's Strategic Concept. Washington D.C. 
465. NATO 2010b. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. Lisbon: NATO. 
466. Ibid. 
	 151 
body, had led on previous drafting of Strategic Concepts.467  However, the 2010 
Strategic Concept was written by Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, and 
therefore represents an expression of IS objectives.468  The language contrasts with 
primarily military solutions in previous Strategic Concepts.469  Here NATO places itself 
in the Western cultural community, stating that 'the Alliance remains an unparalleled 
community of freedom, peace, security and shared values'.470     
 
The EU developed its security policy in the Maastricht Treaty471 as a logical step from 
its economic and foreign policy.  There are two strands of security policy.  In 1992, The 
Commission created its civil security role via the 'Third Pillar'472 cooperation in via the 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), and evolved its military role via the Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP).  The CSDP incorporated previous security policies of the 
Western European Union (WEU)473 that included the Petersburg Declaration.474  The 
Petersburg tasks defined the military action that the EU could undertake in crisis 
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operations.  It denoted that military units could be deployed for humanitarian and rescue 
tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and could provide combat forces in crisis management.475  
Thus the EU moved into the civil military sphere.  This historically gave cause for 
potential functional overlap and rivalry with NATO.  The CSDP oversaw the European 
Security Strategy (ESS) document, adopted in 2003 and updated in 2008.476  This called 
for combined military and civilian responses.  The Political and Security Committee 
(PSC) drafted the ESS.  It is the highest-ranking intergovernmental body of the CSDP477 
and represents member state interests.  The document makes reference to human and 
humanitarian rights alongside European values of peace, order and good governance, 
thus articulating the Western 'community of values'.   
 
In 2005, the Council adopted a 'Strategy for External Dimension of JHA',478 which also 
identifies threats such as terrorism, organised crime, migration and state failure.  The 
document largely refers to security solutions external to the EU, but includes 
cooperation of the Commission's agencies, 'Europol, Eurojust, The European Police 
College, and the Borders Agency'.479  Finally, the EU's Internal Security Strategy (ISS) 
of 2010 identifies similar threats and solutions.480  These papers, written by the 
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Commission, demonstrate organisation preferences and aim to reflect member state 
security requirements.   
 
Thus NATO and EU Security Strategy documents identify similar threats and civil 
military solutions, aligning with the civil military and Western 'community of values' 
culture.  Both organisation staff and member state representatives express these 
intentions in policy papers reflecting a consensus in expanded civil military security 
roles such as disaster relief or border control, both of which use surveillance capability.  
NATO and EU do not overtly identify with each other's roles apart from the emphasis 
on a similar rules based, cooperative approach to security.  Given the 21 member states 
that are members of both organisations there is a potential overlap in mandate that could 
generate rivalry. 
 
Maritime security strategies are based on a practical security approach and overtly 
acknowledge NATO and EU functional overlaps.  These strategies are particularly 
relevant to this research as they are often associated with transnational surveillance 
functions.   NATO's 2011 Alliance Maritime strategy481 stresses the importance of a 
civil security approach alongside a military approach, and the need for coordination with 
the UN and the EU.  An additional report from NATO Parliamentary Assembly notes: 
NATO and EU are progressively moving closer in the type of tasks and activities 
that they seek to undertake. With EUNAVFOR, the EU has demonstrated its 
ability to conduct a maritime operation far away from its borders. Meanwhile 
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NATO is considering a more active role in law enforcement maritime security 
operations, as well as maritime security sector reform and capacity building482 
This acknowledges potential rivalry.  The Commission first published an Integrated 
Maritime Policy in 2007,483 but this focused on the economic benefits of a maritime 
strategy.  The 2014 'European Union Maritime Security Strategy'484 focussed on security 
aspects, and stressed that civilian and military measures should be used in an integrated, 
rules based approach. It was co-authored by the Council, the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) and the Commission.485  It emphasised the EU's role in providing such 
security, as well as the importance of coordination with other bodies such as NATO.  
These documents exhibit an awareness of agency overlap that could generate 
competition and incentive for role expansion. 
 
Analysis of NATO and EU procurement policy also provides data regarding role 
assertion.  Neither NATO nor the EU are specialist procurement agencies.  Both have 
political and strategic purposes that predate and transcend procurement activities, and 
thus procurement often supports these other aims.486  However, the collaborative 
procurement roles of NATO and EU are strategically important to member states, and 
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contribute to a contemporary rationale for the organisations.  Therefore expansion of 
this function is in the organisations' interests and may incentivise procurement of 
surveillance capabilities.  NATO and EU procurement policies have been driven, in part, 
by failure of European member states to invest in security and defence assets since the 
end of the Cold War.487  In contrast the US has invested huge sums in security and 
defence.  In 2013, European defence spending was 60% of the US, and the US provided 
70% of NATO's ISR assets.488  European member state capability gaps include strategic 
lift assets, precision strike munitions and C4ISR capability.489  NATO and EU 
procurement policies overtly seek to address these gaps to address security objectives 
but also political objectives.490 
 
Historically, NATO procurement policies have proved unpopular with member states.  
The Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI),491 evolved after the Bosnian campaign,492 
proved too wide-ranging, and was criticised by member states for being a 'shopping 
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list'.493  It required increased defence spending and generated little action.494  In 2002, 
NATO launched the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC).  It extracted specific 
procurement undertakings from member states, and required them to report on the 
implementation of these undertakings.495   However, the PCC also did not generate 
much procurement, especially after the 2008 financial crisis.  Therefore in 2011, NATO 
adopted a renewed procurement policy: Smart Defence.496  It is associated with 
capabilities such as surveillance, strategic airlift and refuelling.497  Smart Defence 
focuses on procurement via multinational 'coalitions of the willing' (rather than 
'common funding' which involves all member states) and aims to make procurement 
ambitions more achievable.498  However it has been charged with being an ineffectual 
policy.499   
 
EU procurement policy in the defence and security sector is recent given its new role in 
these areas.  The Ghent Initiative500 was established in 2010 and is an inventory of 
capabilities to be pooled. These include functions such as maritime surveillance 
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networking (MARSUR), European Satellite Procurement Cell (ESCP), air-to-air 
refuelling and intelligence surveillance reconnaissance.501  However, there has been a 
slow member state response to this.502  Low value procurement policy is controlled via 
general legislation at Commission and Agency level and security research programmes 
such as Horizon 2020.503  The procurement policies show an intention for greater role 
expansion than actually fulfilled.  This is explored below. 
 
The strategy papers above showed NATO and EU alignment with member state rational 
and cultural requirements for additional efficient, civil military solutions and 
procurement.  They express organisation intention for an expanded security role.  Here, 
NATO is adjusting to civil military requirements of the post-Cold War and 9/11 security 
context, and the Commission is establishing a new security role within its Schengen 
remit.  The following section considers the implementation of these policies for 
evidence of role expansion, assessing if these policies expand procurement activity. 
 
Security Roles 
This section considers the evolution and expansion of NATO and EU security and 
defence activities that could justify and lead to collaborative procurement.  During the 
Cold War, NATO security missions were limited to air surveillance and policing, 
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maritime deterrence and patrols, as well as diplomacy and exercises.504  From 1990, 
NATO's role has evolved to suit the post-Cold War and 9/11 security environment to 
ensure the organisation's survival.  The post-Cold War security context and subsequent 
expansion of NATO to new member states enhanced the sense and ability for 
multilateral efforts.505  Thus NATO evolved its security roles, engaging in expeditionary 
combat missions, starting in the Balkans in 1995, and followed by operations in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya.506  It also developed civil security initiatives of 
humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and police training.507  NATO's aerial 
surveillance capability was initially a military function via its air to air AWACs 
capability, and more recently via its air to ground role, provided by US national 
contributions, as in the Kosovo conflict and the Libyan intervention in 2011.508  The 
function of aerial surveillance is also performed in an expanded maritime, civil military 
context,509 as discussed at NATO's 2010 Parliamentary Assembly: 
.... during the Cold War, NATO's contribution to maritime security was 
understood mainly in the context of collective defence, the changing security 
environment has led the Alliance to take on a broader array of tasks in the 
maritime domain, ranging from confidence -building and partnership to higher-
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end maritime interdiction, counterterrorism and counter-piracy operations. For 
this, NATO can rely on a number of existing assets and structures.510 
This excerpt refers to 'existing assets and structures' linking the new civil roles with the 
equipment needed.  While sophisticated, military assets are an expensive way of 
providing a civil security solution.  The dual use aspect is an argument used with 
European member states when advocating procurement of surveillance capabilities.511   
 
The EU is establishing its role in civil military operations and other roles, such as 
research into security solutions and procurement of security capabilities.  Although it 
has performed limited military missions, the EU is considered to be a civil security 
power.512  Member states, such as the UK, restrain the EU from developing military 
capability, preferring military focus to remain with NATO.513  The 1999 Helsinki 
Council conclusions reflect an awareness of this, explicitly denying the creation of a 
European Army.514  However, the organisation has pressed ahead with developing 
security capabilities and studies have found evidence of proactive security role 
expansion.515   
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EU security objectives were formalised with the creation of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) in 1993 and the CDSP in the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.516  The first 
EU military missions were launched in 2003.517  Since then there have been 20 missions, 
including those to Kosovo and Afghanistan.  Operation Atalanta,518 the EU's anti piracy 
mission off the coast of Somalia, fulfils surveillance functions and here again studies 
have found evidence of proactive role expansion.519  Other EU civil military 
surveillance operations include Operation MARSUR,520 surveillance of the 
Mediterranean coordinated by the EDA, and recently Operation Sophia,521 which aims 
to disrupt Central and Southern Mediterranean migration and smuggling routes.  Thus 
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recent missions show expanded surveillance activities, driven by member state security 
requirements and EU role expansion efforts.522   
 
The EU Commission's JHA mandate was formalised in 1999 when the DG JHA was 
established.  Its operational focus has been on civil security functions such as migration 
management and counter-terrorism.523  These often straddle military and civil security 
capabilities, where operations enlist civil security forces of police alongside military 
capability.  For example Frontex's Operation Triton,524 which monitored the Italian coast 
for distressed vehicles, involved national military and civilian agencies.  Other civil 
military security roles are fulfilled by EU agencies such as the Satellite Centre,525 which 
provides security surveillance services to Frontex, the EEAS, and EU Missions under 
the CDSP.  Further EU Research projects under FP7 and Horizon 2020, such as 
Operation CloseEye,526 can be seen as proto operations, where the related procurement 
sets a precedent of EU security competence.  These provide opportunities for 
organisation procurement.   
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There is a small body of literature that considers NATO and EU cooperation, provides 
evidence of functional overlap, the potential for organisation rivalry, and incentives for 
role assertion and related procurement.527  Instances of EU and NATO running parallel 
operations give opportunities for competitive dynamics to arise, for example anti piracy 
operations off the Coast of Somalia in 2008.528  Here, member states chose to operate 
with either Operation Atalanta (under EU Command), or via NATO's Operation Ocean 
Shield529 (under national command).  Evidence of organisation competition was found 
in this scenario, particularly at political levels.530  However studies find no evidence of 
competition regarding examples of practical co-operation between the EU and NATO, 
one noting that 'the outcome is neither cooperation or competition but dysfunction'.531  
Structures and procedures are in place but they rarely translate into action due to the 
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lack of a grand bargain between the two organisations.532  Further examples of parallel 
missions include NATO's Operation Active Endeavour, which aims to disrupt terrorist 
activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, and is separate to the EU's MARSUR and 
Frontex's Eurosur operations in the central Mediterranean.533  Den Hertog and Carrera 
also comment on potential rivalries regarding information sharing operations in the 
Mediterranean.534    
 
In sum, the security context encourages role expansion in civil military functions 
through member state demands or from organisational survival and expansion interests.  
Studies have shown that organisation preferences exist for this expansion, and that 
functional overlap provides incentives for role expansion generated by rivalry and 




Procurement roles are important for NATO and the EU as a contribution to the provision 
of security capability, and to fulfil member state requirements for cost efficiency and 
increased capacity.  However, NATO and the EU have historically seemed impotent to 
increase joint procurement activity for big-ticket items.  For example the procurement of 
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NATO's Air Command and Control System (ACCS)535 has taken years to conclude.536  
The EDA is nominally responsible for collaborative defence procurement and initiatives 
such as 'Pooling and Sharing', but there has been limited procurement activity within the 
Agency.537   
 
Three factors contribute to the lack of joint procurement activity in both organisations.  
First, acquiring and operating joint capabilities is costly in terms of political autonomy, 
so occurrences, such as NATO's AWACs capability and C17 strategic airlift capability 
procurement,538 are rare.539  The Commission's past ambitions to 'purchase, own and 
operate' security and defence assets, revealing role expansion ambitions, were restricted 
by the UK.540  Second, an overlap in procurement policies relating to functional 
priorities generates dissatisfaction on political and economic levels.  Here member states 
find that they are being offered competing procurement programmes.541  For example, 
strategic airlift, air to air refuelling and surveillance capabilities are prioritised in both 
NATO and EU policies.  Analysts also observe competitive tensions between the 
security capability ambitions of EU polity (which includes the EDA) and the 
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Commission, concerning defence industrial cooperation and procurement.542  Third, 
there is a lack of political will for defence investment by many European states, 
compared to military oriented states such as the US, UK and France.543  Here political 
preference for civil security investment and other domestic expenditure often prevails.     
 
However organisations have more leeway to increase procurement activity for low value 
contracts that procure uncontroversial, non-kinetic assets such as satellite 
communication, space and surveillance assets.544  Ease of funding plays an important 
part.  Where organisations have committed funding for joint procurement, they are able 
to assert their roles in this area.  This is seen in EU and NATO satellite arrangements,545 
and the funded research projects under the FP7 and Horizon 2020 Programmes.   
 
To conclude, there has been little growth in NATO and EU procurement roles regarding 
high value defence items due to sovereignty concerns and member state control of 
funding.546  Joint defence procurement occurs under ad hoc coalitions or agencies such 
as OCCAR, which was responsible for the procurement of the A400M transport 
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aircraft.547  NATO and EU procurement policies do not generate much collaborative 
acquisition, and therefore have not provided opportunities for role assertion or 
expansion.  However, when it comes to small scale, less contentious roles such as 
surveillance, organisations have more control over budgets and are able to generate 
procurement decisions.  This leads to increased security roles, as seen in NATO and EU 
co-financed satellite programmes and research and development projects.  This may 
increase in the future with the recent EU Defence Action Plan with its associated 
research projects announced in 2016.548 
 
The second part of the chapter considers bureaucratic aspects of NATO and the EU.  It 
examines how bureaucratic structure, organisation culture and procurement practices 
affect delivery of the drivers for procurement. 
 
NATO and EU Bureaucracy and Culture 
This section considers organisation bureaucracy and the means by which different 
drivers for the procurement of surveillance capability are delivered.  Organisation role 
expansion is a driver for procurement generated in the micro, organisational context.  
Other macro level drivers for procurement - member state rationale, symbolic strategic 
culture, industrial and technical imperatives - are also present in this context.  The 
chapter considers how these are delivered via three aspects of NATO and EU 
bureaucracy: bureaucratic structures, organisation culture and procurement processes.  
Broadly speaking, NATO has an intergovernmental bureaucracy driven by member state 
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preferences, and the EU Commission has a supranational bureaucracy, with strong 
organisational and departmental loyalties.   
 
First, bureaucratic structures affect delivery and drivers for procurement.  Relevant 
aspects are decision-making committees, funding arrangements, departmental structures 
and levels of scrutiny.  Here, the measures by which organisations are scrutinised, 
accountable and judged transmit rational and cultural priorities, such as cost efficiency 
or cultural concerns related to the 'community of values'.   
 
Second, organisational culture impacts procurement practices where staffs are guided by 
ideational rules or 'logics of appropriateness'.549  Logics of appropriateness are generated 
from prior experience, personalities, and the professional norms of personnel, and also 
the ideology espoused by the organisation.550  Here cultural norms such as the Western 
'community of values' and political solidarity enter decision-making processes.551  Staff 
either act in 'conscious role playing', where they use the logics rationally to achieve 
departmental or organisation objectives, or as the 'right thing to do', where they act 
instinctively via acceptance of community and organisational norms.552  The research 
considers aspects of NATO and the Commission's history, recruiting practices and 
ideology that contribute to their cultures.   
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Third, NATO and EU procurement processes bring together different actor groups: 
member state representatives, organisation staff and industry officials.  The influence of 
these actors in decision-making introduces different drivers.  For example, industry 
actors affect the extent to which technical and industrial imperatives influence decision-
making.  Organisations facilitate policy and procurement discussions via formal and 
informal meetings, conferences and events.553  Actors from all three groups may attend 
these meetings and influence the proceedings.  Additionally, bureaucratic standard 
operational processes (SOPs) ensure continued focus and momentum.   
 
  The sections below detail NATO and EU bureaucratic structures and organisational 
cultures as they affect the delivery of drivers.  First, the research shows that structural 
elements such as bureaucratic arrangements, decision-making procedures and levels of 
scrutiny affect drivers for procurement.  Second, organisation culture is considered via 
elements such as history, staff background and strategic culture.  These also affect the 
presence of drivers for procurement.  
 
NATO Bureaucratic Structure and Culture 
Structure  
NATO's bureaucratic structure is governed by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) which 
is a political body staffed by high level, member state representatives.  The International 
Staff (IS) bureaucracy is the executive body and represents NATO's organisational 
interests.  NATO has around 4,000 staff of which 2,000 are member state 
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representatives.  1,000 IS personnel support the NAC and the Secretary General, and 
700 Military Staff (MS),554 support the Military Committee.555  Thus numerically, 
member state representation is dominant compared to the small IS bureaucracy.  This 
contributes to a dominant intergovernmental dynamic.556  The IS generally exhibits little 
institutional autonomy, although observers contend that recent reforms have 
decentralised decision-making away from member state governed committees, giving 
the IS greater influence.557   
 
The IS is organised functionally around seven divisions558 and two independent 
offices.559  These support powerful, member state committees such as CNAD, which is 
responsible for procurement policy at the political level.560    The Chairman of CNAD is 
NATO's Secretary General, but the Permanent Chairman, the Assistant Secretary 
General for the Defence Investment Division (ASG DID), is an influential IS 
representative.  The ASG DID advises the NAC on all procurement matters, and can 
influence and encourage procurement policy.  Other NATO divisions involved with 
																																																																		
554. MAYER, S. 2014a. Introduction: NATO as an Organization and Bureaucracy. In: MAYER, S. (ed.) 
NATO's Post Cold War Politics - the Changing Provision of Security. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 
555. Ibid. 
556. SCHIMMELFENNIG, F. 2007. Functional Form, Identity-driven cooperation: Institutional designs 
and effects in Post Cold War NATO. In: ACHARYA, A. & JOHNSTON, A. I. (eds.) Crafting 
Cooperation. Cambridge University Press. p.145 
557. MAYER, S. 2011. Embedded Politics, Growing Informalization? How NATO and the EU Transform 
Provision of External Security. Contemporary Security Policy, 32, 308-333. p.313 
558. Political Affairs and Security Division, Defence Policy and Planning Division, Operations Division, 
Defence Investment Division, Emerging Security Challenges Division, Public Diplomacy Division, 
Executive Management Division. 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_58110.htm Accessed August 2017 
559. NATO Office of Security and NATO Office of Resources 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_58110.htm Accessed August 2017 
560. NATO 2006b. NATO Handbook, Brussels. p.285 
	 170 
procurement policy are the Defence Policy and Planning Division (responsible for 
specifying NATO requirements and advising the NAC), the Defence Investment 
Division (responsible for developing and investing in assets and advising CNAD) and 
NATO Office of Resources (responsible for common funding issues and advising the 
Resource Policy and Planning Board (RPPB)).  Thus senior member state committees, 
enhancing intergovernmental dynamics, control decision-making for procurement 
policy.  Although there are standard procurement practices, governed by the AC/4-
D/2661561 document, this does not apply for high value, multinational procurement.  
This leads to additional complexities in creating sui generis procurement processes for 
certain transactions, such as the AGS Programme. 
 
NATO's 'consensus' based decision-making requires unanimous consent from all 
member states and is core to the multilateral ethos of the Alliance.562  This increases 
member state influence and affects the quality of decision-making.  As a former official 
observed: 
when you deal with NATO it is the question of lowest common denominator, the 
Consensus principal.  So whatever decision you want to make...... you can only 
realise what is the lowest common denominator.563  
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Thus the collaboration requires compromise in order to achieve agreement.  The 'silence 
procedure' supports this decision-making process.  Here proposals are accompanied by a 
deadline by which any dissent should be expressed, otherwise member states maintain 
their silence.  Thus, decision-making is laborious and in practice often leads to informal 
routes to achieve decisions.  This diversion from formal, committee decision-making 
weakens member state influence and IS and industry actors find influence via these 
informal channels.564   This can enable their role expansion or industrial imperatives 
objectives to be realised. 
 
NATO is subject to little scrutiny, in part due to its traditional, classified, military 
role,565 which lowers public expectations for access to information; and in part because 
it is closely controlled by member states.566  So there is little comment on the levels of 
transparency regarding its activities.  However recent, relatively low profile 
observations on the lack of disclosure by NATO from bodies such as NATOwatch,567 
SIPRI,568 and a small body of literature, note the unaccountability of the organisation.569  
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Critics claim that NATO publishes little information about voting activities within the 
political body of the organisation; it publishes no analyses or reports relating to 
decision-making; and makes few disclosures on its common budget or documents 
needed for accountability.570  Some countries, such as the Netherlands, publish their 
audits of NATO expenditures.571  The Netherlands Court of Audit has also launched a 
website to try to promote transparency in NATO.572  NATO's audit body, IBAN, has 
released limited audits and performance reports on agencies and other NATO bodies 
since 2005.573  NATO recently issued a directive on the Public Disclosure of NATO 
information,574 which builds upon previous transparency policies.575  Although some 
still say this is insufficient.576   
 
In sum, NATO is not subject to high levels of scrutiny by external observers, it does not 
disclose much information and its audit body releases limited reports.  This low level of 
accountability leads to less discipline regarding cost efficiencies and other rational 
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objectives in procurement processes.  It means that inefficient member objectives for 
industrial work shares or technical imperatives are able to influence decision-making 
unchecked.  The lack of scrutiny by member state constituencies and other 
commentators also means that macro, strategic cultural influences are not felt within the 
organisation.   
 
To conclude, NATO's bureaucratic structure provides an environment where diverging 
member state political and industrial interests thrive and dominate organisation 
objectives during procurement decision-making.  Here, member states have differing 
objectives, and IS staff have little power to encourage consensus.  The ‘consensus’ 
decision-making process and the lack of scrutiny exacerbate this dynamic.  The 




Three aspects affect NATO culture.  First, that the organisation is a political and military 
alliance.  Its initial purpose was a symbol of Western multilateralism, and a military and 
political deterrent to the Soviet Union.577    Second, NATO's intergovernmental 
bureaucracy leads to a contested culture that lacks a cohesive esprit de corps.  Third, 
NATO's culture is affected by the US hegemony within the Alliance.   
 
First, NATO, as an Alliance, embodies symbolic multilateralism and solidarity.  This 
cultural and political premise of the organisation exists alongside strategic 
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considerations.578  Previous studies have observed evidence of this in the AWACs and 
C17 Strategic Airlift procurements.579  Second, as a military alliance, NATO's IS staff is 
recruited directly by NATO or seconded by governments, with military, diplomatic or 
defence civil service backgrounds.580  The IS career structure is limited to a 10 year 
span, which means the organisation is unlikely to form an esprit de corps or institutional 
memory.581  Further, the presence of 'flagged' appointments, where nations are allocated 
positions enhances the intergovernmental dynamics.582  Thus personnel are not chosen 
via a competitive recruitment process for their expertise by the organisation, but by 
member states with differing recruitment policies and strategic objectives.  This leads to 
a contested culture, difficult decision-making dynamics, and enables member state 
industrial and technical imperatives as drivers for procurement.  Third, the US is the 
dominant military power within the Alliance.  The US also funds a high proportion 
procurement of capabilities, and its appointment of key personnel within the Alliance, 
such as SACEUR,583 means that US cultural elements are dominant in the generation of 
requirements for procurement.  The US' strategic culture has an industrial imperative 
and bias towards military solutions, and its RMA culture emphasises surveillance and 
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information based security solutions as well.584  These three factors affect the attitudes 
and approaches of NATO staff in procurement policies and practices.  Elements of these 
influences are identified and analysed in Chapter Four below. 
 
Recent studies indicate that the current rhetoric of NATO, and perhaps its culture, has 
altered direction to reflect European member states' bias towards civil military and 
security culture.  NATO's working practices have altered considerably since the 
1990's.585  Some argue that increased civilian and political roles are reorienting NATO's 
bureaucratic culture away from its military and defence origins.586  This has arisen from 
four factors.  First, cost cutting efforts have encouraged the MS and IS to work together 
on issues of joint interest diluting the military culture; second, NATO's increased 
involvement in crisis and peace support operations; third, an enhanced need for rapid 
decision-making and the use of informal decision-making channels that move away 
from member state bodies; and fourth, the increased political nature of operations.587   
 
To conclude, NATO's organisational culture is contested due to its bureaucratic 
structure that is arranged around member state appointees and seconded staff.  Western 
ideological influence is weak given the contested nature of NATO's organisational 
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culture and lack of public scrutiny, although there is evidence of increased input from 
organisation staff and other non-state actors.  The implications for procurement practices 
are that organisational drivers for efficient procurement are diluted, and member state, 
calculus, technical and industrial imperatives are enhanced via intergovernmental 
dynamics.   
 
EU Bureaucratic Structure and Culture 
Structure  
The European Commission is the civilian bureaucracy supporting the political bodies of 
the EU (EU Parliament and Council of the European Union).  The Commission was 
established in 1957 and now employs over 23,000 personnel.588  In addition, other EU 
services and agencies employ 10,000 staff.589  This compares to the member state 
oriented bodies of the European Parliament that employs 750 MEPs and 6,000 staff in 
the general secretariat; and the Council of the European Union that employs 3,500 staff 
in the general secretariat.590  Thus the Commission bureaucracy is significant and 
influential relative to the EU polity.  The Commission is 'supranational' and is arranged 
around 33 DGs,591 such as the DG MHA that employs 300 staff.592  These are focussed 
on sectoral and functional competence.  This generates organisation loyalties, and 
'internationalisation' may occur, where member state interests are subsumed and 
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departmental or organisational loyalties prevail.593  The vertical organisation of DGs 
into areas of competence means that contacts and communications within departments 
are better than across departments.  This leads to allegations of departmental fiefdoms 
and silo logics.594   
 
Frontex is the Agency, formed in 2004 under the Commission's DG MHA, responsible 
for the monitoring of the EU's external borders.595  Frontex is responsible for the 
coordination, procurement and performance of surveillance infrastructure and capability.  
The Agency is governed by a Management Board, which is made up of member state 
representatives.596  It has three major divisions: Operations Division, Capacity Building 
Division and the Corporate Governance Division.  The Operation's Division is where the 
Frontex Situation Centre (FSC) is situated and surveillance software is implemented.  
The Capacity Building Division includes the Research and Development Unit (RDU) 
that writes specifications for much of Frontex procurement, and the Pooled Resources 
Unit, which coordinates surveillance operations.  Finally, the Corporate Governance 
Division includes the Financial and Corporate Services Unit.  This unit oversees 
procurement processes, and the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
Unit, which procured the Eurosur Communication Network (ECN) contract.597  The 
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Agency has around 360 employees598 and benefits from significant support of DG MHA 
for resources, political weight and strategic vision.  Its procurement structures for low 
value contracts are structurally embedded in the organisation and it benefits from pan 
EU Commission standard processes for precedent and support.  
 
The Commission and Frontex are subject to scrutiny regarding their security activities, 
particularly those relating to border surveillance and migration.599  There is a high level 
of public and academic interest in this regard and bodies, such as Statewatch,600 monitor 
their activities where they may impact on civil liberties.  This reflects interest and 
unease at the Commission's expanding role in this area, and also transmits cultural 
imperatives for human rights and humanitarian behaviour.   
‘what is peculiar about Frontex is that it is operating in the humanitarian 
borderlands of Europe. Consequently, its operations are exposed to a greater 
level of scrutiny and demands for transparency, but at the same time also vested 
with a greater sense of political urgency.’601  
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The amount of information available and disclosed by the Commission facilitates this 
observation and criticism.  While exact details of policy decision meetings are not 
released, the Commission has a transparent disclosure process regarding legislation.  
Here, the EU Official Journal publishes drafts of legislation and shows EU 
Parliamentary comment on these documents.602  EU citizens also have a right of access 
to documents under Regulation 1049/2001.603  Further, Commission activity is formally 
subject to scrutiny from the European Court of Auditors (ECA).  This body reports on 
financial activities of the Commission, including security activities, and in this way it 
has an important influence on security policy and procedures.604  For example in 2012, 
the ECA criticised EU activities in Kosovo, relating to weak coordination, procurement 
procedures and lack of exit strategy.605  This elicited a response from the EU 
Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) as to how future policy 
would alter to meet those recommendations.606  In sum, there is evidence of sensitivity 
by the Commission and Frontex to the level of scrutiny under which is it placed.607  This 
affects policy and procurement decisions related to security capability where internal 
and external expectations for aspects such as procurement cost efficiency, Western 
libertarian values and relationships with industry, are likely to be referred and adhered 
to. 
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In sum, the Commission is a supranational, bureaucratic structure organised along 
departmental lines rather than on member state delegations.  This reduces bureaucratic 
politics and enables efficient decision-making.  The Commission's bureaucratic structure 
delivers cultural influences via similar methods to those suggested for NATO above.  
Here, conferences and forums enable non-state, normative bodies such as NGOs to have 
input into policy making.  Cultural influences are also absorbed via internal and external 
scrutiny.  The Commission's organisation culture is examined in greater detail below. 
 
Culture 
EU origins are bound in civilian trade development and as a vehicle to express solidarity 
after the Second World War, when three communities were formed to foster 
cooperation.608  The ideology of the Commission encompasses political solidarity and 
Western values of progress and democracy.609  These aspects and the civilian origins are 
reflected in the organisation culture.  Some view the Commission as a complex and 
fragmented organisation,610 and others assert that there is a reasonable esprit de corps 
and Commission wide culture.611  However, most academics agree that the Commission 
has a cohesive organisation culture within its DG's, and is successful in integrating 
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member state seconded officials.612  Departmental loyalty can lead to cultural conflict 
between DGs due to different ideologies and competencies.  Nonetheless, studies have 
found evidence of cultural coherence between DGs where the Commission deals with 
the external environment.613  In sum, there is a cultural cohesion within the Commission 
departments that facilitates procurement policy and decision-making.   
 
This study is concerned with the organisational culture of two departments in the 
Commission, DG MHA, and Frontex.  Few studies explore the Commission's 
organisation cultures in specific departments and their relationship to activities such as 
procurement.  Some consider the origins of the bureaucracies,614 but these do not focus 
on the implications of organisation culture for decision-making.  The sub cultures of 
these departments are significant for generation or facilitation of drivers for 
procurement.  DG MHA was one of the later DG's to be formed in 2001, when the 
Commission's mandate in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) was established.615  While 
many staff were initially seconded from other DG's, this department had to establish 
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itself and expand its mandate in competition with the EU Council and existing DG's.616  
This has encouraged a culture of expansion, using logics of appropriateness to align with 
member state security culture.  For example, the preamble of the DG MHA budget in 
2011 reads like a security strategy.617  This meets member state strategic concerns and 
Western 'community of values' culture, justifying expenditure and procurement 
initiatives within the security context.       
 
Frontex has a different staff profile to DG MHA, as many of its staff were originally 
seconded national experts and formerly worked in member state border agencies, 
national militaries, NATO or the EDA.618  However the assimilation of these staff and 
their similar security backgrounds leads to formation of a coherent organisation 
culture.619  Here, the logics of appropriateness become 'taken for granted', and inefficient 
drivers for procurement - such as member state sponsorship of national industry - do not 
occur to staff, as their interests are focussed on organisation and departmental objectives 
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rather than national interests.620  Frontex culturally aligns itself with the Western 
'community of values'.  A study by Aas and Gundhus considered the Agency's 
international policing activities and explored officials' behaviour and attitudes with 
reference to humanitarian and other Western values.621  The study found that human 
rights and humanitarian ideals feature prominently in the Agency's internal discourse',622 
noting the Agency's motto of 'Humanity, open communication, professionalism, 
trustworthiness, teamwork'.623  Further, the Code of Conduct and training procedures all 
stress the centrality of fundamental rights and the right to international protection.624  
However, it found that this contrasted with the Agency's approach to risk analysis and 
frontline practices of border control coordination.625   
 
NATO and EU Collaborative Procurement Processes 
Four stages of generic procurement decision-making are considered below: 
policymaking, specification, funding, and implementation.  This section considers these 
processes as they exist in NATO and the EU and identifies the input and influence of 
member state representatives, organisation actors and industrial officials at each stage.   
 
During the policy stage, member states agree policy regarding NATO and the 
Commission owning and operating a capability, and therefore their objectives are 
dominant.  As noted in Chapter Two, drivers for collaborative procurement policy may 
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include joint operation of a strategic capability, acquiring cost efficient assets, and 
achieving technical and economic benefits for national industry.  The initial generation 
of requirements is a key stage.  In NATO this occurs via the Military Headquarters in 
SHAPE by member state run committees.  In the EU, policy legislation is proposed by 
the Commission and authorised by the EU Council.  Procurement requirements are also 
proposed by DGs and Agencies in their Work Programmes and then approved by the 
Commission.   
 
NATO and the Commission provide forums for member state strategic discussions and 
consensus building for policy and procurement processes.  Here headline conferences 
impose deadlines for decisions,626 such as NATO Summits or EU Committee meetings.  
Decision-making bodies, for example, NATO's CNAD or the Commission's DG MHA, 
involve external figures in advisory roles.627  CNAD oversees meetings of expert groups 
that exchange information about evolving military needs and technology, for example 
NATO's Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG).628  Here, industrial figures may give input 
into NATO procurement policy, enhancing the potential for industrial imperatives to 
enter the decision-making process.  Equivalent dynamics are found in DG MHA.  For 
example, the External Security Research Board (ESRAB) was formed to advise on 
security research policy.  This body was criticised for its reliance on industrial 
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figures.629  Other influential bodies such as the European Organisation for Security 
(EOS) also hold roundtables with industry input for security policies.630  Parliamentary 
Committees and conferences, such as the EU's LIBE Committee,631 also include EU 
parliamentary representatives and NGO's who promote cultural norms and human rights 
influences.632  Once registered, these cultural aspects of policy are hard to ignore at 
future stages of the procurement.633    
 
At the specification stage, organisation staff and industry actors become further involved 
as they contribute to proposals for security solutions.  These are submitted to member 
state bodies for approval, often a Board of Directors who oversee the procurement 
process.  For example NATO's Airborne Early Warning Programme Office oversaw the 
specification process for AWACS.634  For NATO satellite contracts this takes place via 
the NATO Communication and Information Agency (NCI).635  In the EU, organisation 
actors such as Frontex Research and Development Unit (RDU), write the specification.  
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Frontex also has a member state Management Board that oversees activities.636  If there 
is member state reticence and debate, the persuasive powers of organisation staff and 
their industry advisors may prove essential for the procurement process.  For example 
NATO IS was described as an 'honest broker' during AWACs procurement.637  Here, 
organisation staff and industry officials may enable the procurement, driven by role 
expansion or industrial imperatives. 
 
Funding commitment is crucial for procurement.  Funding decisions vary with the size 
and format of the procurement contracts.  They may be made via centrally controlled, 
organisational processes or by individual member state commitment.  Central funding is 
found in Commission funding for outsourced capabilities such as satellite facilities, or 
NATO's centrally funded Resource Policy and Planning Board (RPPB) which funds 
much of NATO's infrastructure programmes.638  The Commission funds its low value 
civil security procurement and operations centrally via the DG MHA.  Here, the DG and 
its Agencies do not have to refer directly to member states during disbursement.  This 
reduces intergovernmental debate on immediate use of funds and heightens the 
influence of Commission decision-making.  The Commission also ensures that there are 
sufficient funds to perform certain security roles.  For example, there are earmarked 
funds for functions such as border security in the External Borders Fund,639 the Internal 
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Security Fund,640 and also Emergency Funds that can be drawn down.641  In high value, 
multinational procurement projects, such as the EU's A400M or NATO's AWACS, 
C17s and AGS, member states make individual contributions which are negotiated on a 
nation by nation basis.  This makes the procurement process complex and protracted.642   
 
In sum, member state, organisation and industry actors contribute at different stages of 
the procurement process.  This enables delivery of drivers to differing extents.  Member 
state representatives dominate early policy stages, where diverging objectives lead to 
bureaucratic politics and compromised solutions.  This can be resolved by building 
consensus through compromise and reference to cohesive and shared strategic cultures.   
Organisation staff is often involved at this stage.  Industrial actors also have input into 
policy and specification stages, where they may introduce industrial and technical 
imperatives for procurement.   They may also refer to civil military or Western 
'community of values' cultures to encourage the collaboration.  Organisation actors are 
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641. Ibid. 
642. TAYLOR, T. 2012. NATO's Customer and Facilitator Roles in Defence Equipment Co-operation. 




This chapter has considered the micro, organisation context for multilateral procurement 
of surveillance capability.  It described how NATO and EU security roles, procurement 
processes, bureaucratic structure and organisation culture affect procurement decision-
making.  It considered how organisation role expansion and other macro level drivers 
for procurement are delivered in the organisation context.  The chapter identified 
incentives and intentions for both NATO and the Commission to expand their security 
roles in a changing security environment.  It concluded that role expansion could shape 
preferences for procurement of surveillance capability for both NATO and the 
Commission.  NATO has incentive to expand its role to meet the civil military, security 
provision expectations of its member states.  The Commission has institutional 
incentives to expand and assert its security roles in a sector where it previously had little 
competence.   
 
The chapter found that procurement process, bureaucratic structure and organisational 
culture delivered drivers for procurement to differing extents.  It identified that factors, 
such as funding structures and scrutiny, affected the presence of drivers such as member 
state industrial imperatives and macro level, cultural drivers for procurement.  NATO 
and the Commission's differing bureaucratic structures have implications for decision-
making dynamics and dominance of actor objectives in procurement processes.  
NATO's intergovernmental structures and weak executive body enhances bureaucratic 
politics dynamics and dilutes organisation culture.    Conversely, the strength of the 
Commission bureaucracy and culture reduces bureaucratic politics and streamlines 
decision-making for procurement and the related funding commitments.  This lends 
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power to the Commission, and increases influence in procurement policy making and 
process.  NATO is subject to low levels of scrutiny and therefore inefficient decision-
making dynamics such as intergovernmental bureaucratic politics, or industrial 
imperatives continue with little public criticism.  Thus societal, cultural expectations are 
little heeded and member state industrial and political incentives given heavier weight.  
In contrast, the Commission and Frontex are subject to high levels of scrutiny.  This 
encourages a disciplined approach regarding cultural and efficiency expectations for 
procurement decision-making.  Both NATO and the Commission share the Western 
'community of values' that provides a cohesive ideology within which member states 
agree to security and surveillance policy and procurement.   
 
The next two chapters present the case studies.  Chapter Four analyses NATO's 
procurement of its AGS capability.  Here, NATO's intergovernmental structure 
facilitated the initial policy, which was driven by the US, but then distracted and 
constrained decision-making.  This resulted in a protracted procurement process that 
was eventually facilitated by cohesive political and cultural factors.  Chapter Five 
analyses two contracts, the Commission's procurement of its Eurosur Communication 
Network infrastructure and Aerial Surveillance Services.  Here supranational structures 
enabled a concerted, organisation drive towards a surveillance capability, and cultural 






This brief section introduces the case studies.  The research addresses two case studies 
that are considered relevant and valid to assess the social processes of collaborative 
procurement and answer the research question: is multilateral procurement of 
surveillance capability driven by culture or calculus?  NATO's procurement of its AGS 
Programme involves just one contract, and is managed by the prime contractor, 
Northrop Grumman (NG).  This procurement is considered in Chapter Four below.  The 
EU Commission's procurement of surveillance capability is not governed by a single 
contract with a prime contractor, rather Frontex manages separate contracts.  Chapter 
Five considers two of those contracts, the procurement of the Eurosur Communication 
Network (ECN) software, and the procurement of Aerial Surveillance Services (ASS).  
These case studies are both examples of collaborative, multilateral procurement of 
surveillance capability.  They contain similar elements of calculus and culture that 
generate data for analysis.   
 
Although the procurement processes in the case studies are considerably different 
regarding scale and format, there are enough commonalities in the political, security and 
organisation context to justify their consideration in the same research project.  NATO 
and the EU are both situated in a Western security context and serve a similar, 
constituency.  They have 21 overlapping states, (NATO has notable extra states of 
Turkey, the US and Canada).  Commonalities considered in the case studies include the 
attitude of member states towards the need for the capability and the effect of the macro, 
cultural context and societal ideas upon the procurement process.  Further 
commonalities relate to the international organisational context of the procurement.  The 
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case studies consider NATO and EU decision-making processes, financing 
arrangements, and the relationship with the industrial contractors providing the 
surveillance solutions.  The research demonstrates how NATO and EU bureaucracy and 
culture affect the delivery of the procurement drivers. 
 
The differences in contract characteristics mean that any commonalities found in the 
conclusions have a deeper significance than those with similar contract characteristics.  
If the contracts were similar then the research would essentially be demonstrating the 
one conclusion.  Where the contracts are different and similar findings result then these 
have a greater weight.  The findings discovered in the chapters below are not exactly the 
same for each case study, but they indicate similar cultural influences in the discourse 
surrounding the collaborative procurement decision-making. 
  
The case study chapters divide each case study into sections examining the decision-
making at different stages in the acquisition process: the generation of procurement 
policy for the surveillance capability, decisions regarding the specification, and the 
contractual process for the procurement.   They sift through the evidence regarding 
different drivers for procurement identified in the previous chapters: rational choice, 
industrial and technical imperatives, strategic cultures and multilateralism and 
organisation role expansion.  The analysis of each case study offers findings regarding 
four aspects of the collaborative procurement: what drivers led to an acceptable strategic 
rationale and mission for the surveillance capability; what drivers led to political support 
for the policy and procurement; what drivers led to the final surveillance solution 
chosen; and how did the NATO and EU bureaucracies affect the balance of drivers. This 
is illustrated in the figure below: 
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Calculus and Cultural Drivers for successful, collaborative procurement of a 
surveillance capability 
  
Figure 5. Calculus and Cultural Drivers 
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Chapter 4: NATO Case Study 
Introduction 
This case study considers decision-making for NATO's procurement of air-to-ground 
surveillance capability, known as the AGS Programme (the Programme).  This has been 
in the process of acquisition since 1992, and should come into operation during 2018.  
The Chapter explores the drivers of the decision-making for three Programme proposals 
considered by NATO over this 25 year period: the original JStars solution; the Mixed 
Fleet Solution; and the final Global Hawks solution.  The current contract acquires the 
AGS 'Core Capability': five Global Hawks, the related radar equipment and ground 
stations (the Contract).643  NG is the Prime Contractor, producing the Global Hawk 
aircraft and related radar assets; European sub contractors are delivering the mobile and 
transportable ground stations and providing operational support at Sigonella, the Sicilian 
base from where the Global Hawks will fly.   
 
Analysis of this contract is significant as an example of NATO's contemporary 
relevance regarding the functions of surveillance and collaborative procurement.  In an 
environment of rising equipment costs and stretched Western European defence 
budgets, NATO's AGS Programme gives European644 member states access to 
surveillance assets that they could not otherwise afford.  It fills a gap in transatlantic 
capabilities, delivers a modern capability for NATO operations, and will be a capability 
both owned and operated by NATO.  This status was never achieved by the AWACs 
																																																																		
643. Hereafter known as the 'Contract' 
644. Throughout this Chapter 'European' Member States denotes Member States other than the US.  For 
ease of reference Canada is assumed to come under this grouping. 
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capability, which is still owned by member states.645  However, the 25 year lead time for 
AGS reflects negatively on the decision-making processes in the organisation.  The 
study focuses on the importance of the NATO organisation.  First, regarding to its ISR 
role in the Western strategic cultural context and the impact of this upon the 
procurement; second, the influence of NATO's bureaucracy and culture on the 
procurement process; and finally, the implications of cultural, symbolic aspects such as 
multilateralism, solidarity and legitimacy associated with NATO.   
 
Officials who worked on the Programme since its inception note that AGS proposals 
needed to satisfy three criteria in order to succeed: cost considerations, member state 
industrial participation (IP), and political support of member states.646  The research 
demonstrates that intergovernmental debates within NATO led to difficulties in finding 
a solution that satisfied these three criteria.  It explores cultural elements underlying the 
political support, such as multilateralism associated with NATO, which are significant 
for the success of the procurement.  Other cultural influences relate to role expansion 
into civil military functions (such as transnational border surveillance) and 'community 
of values' driven roles which use surveillance, such as humanitarian aid.   
 
Evidence showed that NATO's procurement processes are not organised to contain 
bureaucratic politics, and indeed the bureaucratic structure exacerbates these dynamics.  
Member state representatives on the Military Committee, CNAD and the NAC decided 
the AGS Programme policy, specification and financial commitment.  Here, 
organisation staff had little influence.  Crucially, member states only committed funding 
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after the specification of the capability, to ensure their objectives were met.647  In other 
words, member state industrial imperatives and juste retour concerns, delayed funding 
commitment until specification and sub contractors had informally been agreed.  
Further, member state appointees rather than a professional procurement team staffed 
the NATO AGS Project office648 in the initial stages.  This embedded intergovernmental 
debate at all levels in the AGS specification decision-making.  The research found two 
overarching calculus influences on the early AGS procurement policy and decision-
making:  US industrial imperatives regarding the JStar capability; and the juste retour 
driver by member states to gain benefits for national industry.   
 
First, data revealed US political and industrial involvement from the early stages of the 
AGS procurement policy, through to the final specification of the Global Hawks.  The 
constancy of the US industrial presence and its political support is demonstrated 
throughout the Programme's history, and was a major factor behind the persistence of 
the Programme against strong intergovernmental debate over the AGS solutions.  
Member state juste retour and industrial imperatives were driven by political and 
defence industry interests for the acquisition of technical skills, and in profits and jobs.  
Four factors helped.  First, the lack of urgency for the capability - there was no direct 
threat to member states that required surveillance assets and to drive the pace of the 
procurement.  European member states also relied on the availability of US assets as a 
fall-back option (much to the irritation of the US).   
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648. Variously known as The Embryonic Project Office (EPO), the Provision Project Office (PPO), and 
Alliance Ground Surveillance Supplemental Services Office (AGS3).  This last oversaw the procurement 
to PMOU stage. 
	 196 
Second, NATO's 'consensus' decision-making processes empowered member states and 
enabled bureaucratic political dynamics as they vied for national contracts, and control 
of the Programme funding.  Third, the procurement was not for member state assets but 
for NATO.  This reduced member state procurement objectives for efficiency and 
timeliness, and enhanced objectives such as industrial participation (IP) and technical 
transfer.  Fourth, there was a lack of public scrutiny and accountability to member state 
constituencies concerning the efficiency of the AGS Programme procurement.  This 
reflected the limited information released by NATO, and also an acceptance by 
commentators of the complexities for such large acquisitions, which require 
compromise to succeed.  Significantly, this meant that inefficient juste retour and 
industrial imperatives within the AGS procurement proceeded with little public censure.   
 
The research concluded that the failure of the first two AGS proposals (JStar and Mixed 
Fleet) indicated that juste retour, industrial imperatives, strategic military calculus were 
insufficient drivers to conclude the AGS Programme.  Four additional drivers were 
needed to obtain member state support and financial commitment to the Programme.  
These were, first, heightened cost considerations.  The study demonstrates that the final 
specification for an 'off-the-shelf' US capability, the Global Hawks, gained political 
support and met cost considerations better than previous solutions identified.  There was 
also evidence of symbolic drivers for industrial partners who were keen to be associated 
with NATO for legitimacy reasons and for future business.  Second, NATO's cultural 
standard operating procedures (SOPs) did not allow the Programme to die when the first 
proposals failed.649  The existence of NATO's Minimum Military Requirement (MMR), 
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dedicated NATO leadership and staff urging the process forward with reference to 
CNAD meetings and NATO summits, and the tenacity of the AGS team in proposing 
alternative solutions, proved essential in maintaining the Programme.  Third, symbolic 
factors associated with solidarity and multilateralism played a role after the expansion of 
NATO to new member states.  These newer member states participated in the 
Programme for these symbolic reasons, giving it a critical, political mass.  Leon Panetta 
underlined the general symbolic importance of the procurement for NATO in 2011:   
AGS is a crucial symbol of alliance collaboration. If we are going to move into 
the future, if we to have a cooperative relationship with regards to capabilities 
this is crucial to be able to put into place.  AGS is not only a crucial symbol of 
alliance cooperate it is indeed a true bargain for NATO.  Unless it is 
implemented successfully, the drive for similar, cost-effective, multinational 
approaches to capability development would be seriously undermined.650  
 
Fourth, the re-articulation of the AGS mission to include civil military roles such as 








650. PANETTA, L. E. 5 October 2011 2011. RE: Remarks by Secretary Panetta at Carnegie Europe, 
Brussels, Belgium. 
651. Phone interview with Matt Copija 
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A summary of events is outlined below indicating the Case Study chapter structure:  
Timeline 1993 – 2014652  
Section 1: NATO AGS Policy and JStar Proposals 
1993 US proposes JSTARs aerial ISR solution to NATO after their successful 
use in the first Gulf War 
AGS becomes a NATO Minimum Military Requirement (MMR) 
1995 
 
NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) endorses 
recommendation for NATO 'owned and operated' AGS capability 
1997 CNAD decides to drop the US JSTAR proposal.    
 
Section 2:  Mixed Fleet Proposal, Global Hawk Proposal 
1998 - 2002 
 
CNAD considers 2 radar solutions: 
NATAR653 (US, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Luxembourg and 
Norway); 
SOSTAR654 (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain) 
CNAD considers 2 platform solutions for the ASG Programme:   
 TIPS655 Proposal (NG EADS and Finmeccanica, using the Airbus 321s 
and Global Hawks);  
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Transatlantic Cooperative AGS Radar (TCAR) formed out of NATAR 
and  
SOSTAR;  
2004 CNAD endorses TIPS Mixed Fleet proposal and development of TCAR 
radar 
2005 TIPS proposal shrinks to 5-6 Airbus 321s and 7 Global Hawks ($4bn 
budget); using US MP RTIPs657 radar rather than developing the 
European TCAR radar. 
2007 Airbus 321s eliminated from AGS consideration;  'spiralling costs and 
inability of partners to agree on a common way' force all previous AGS 
agreements to be scrapped 
Section 3: The AGS PMOU and Contract 
2008 AGS revived with NG as sole Prime Contractor; $1.4bn; for 8 Block 40 
RQ-4 Global Hawk high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) unmanned 
aircraft system including MP-RTIP radar and supporting ground 
elements;  
2009 Programme Memorandum of Understanding (PMOU) signed; US, 
Germany and Italy are the largest contributing Member States; 
NATO AGS Management Organisation (NAGSMO) and NATO AGS 
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Management Agency (NAGSMA) formed as the Procurement bodies for 
the Contract;  
2011 
AGS programme cut to 5 Global Hawks $1.4bn 
Contract Terms and Conditions finally agreed 
2012 
 
NATO Chicago Summit formal signature for AGS programme; still 
open to other member state contributions 
2014 Poland confirms that it is to re-join the Programme 
 
The chapter focuses on three chronological periods (described above) in the 
procurement timeline.  First, the formation of NATO's AGS Policy and the first iteration 
for the AGS solution, the JSTARs658 (1993 - 1999); second, the Mixed Fleet659 proposal, 
events leading to the decision for the unmanned Global Hawks solution, and the 
agreement to the AGS Programme Memorandum of Understanding (PMOU) (2000 - 
2009); third, the final agreement for the Contract and the conclusion of member state 
participation (2009 - 2014).  The Programme is still in its delivery stage as this thesis is 
being written, but it is unrealistic to analyse the on-going developments.  These 
concluding stages of the Contract are not necessarily significant in demonstrating 
additional drivers for procurement decision-making, over and above the decision-
making of previous stages.   
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NATO multinational programme procurement processes are opaque.660  There are no 
published records of any tendering notices and little information was disclosed in the 
interviews for this study.  The standard NATO procurement document AC/4-D/2661661 
was not used as it does not apply to the multinational procurement format.662  Therefore 
the study has pieced together information from interview data and public documents, 
considering these with the procurement outcomes and public commentary. 
 
Events and decisions will be analysed in the macro context of Western security concerns 
and the micro organisational context of NATO's bureaucracy to identify drivers for the 
procurement.  These include the strategic necessity for the Programme, technical 
imperatives, industrial imperatives, and NATO role expansion, as well as societal 
expectations relating to NATO's provision of security, bureaucratic drivers related to 
standard operating procedures (SOPs), symbolic, ideational drivers of multilateralism 
and prestige associated with NATO and the AGS Programme.  It categorises these 
drivers into either calculus or cultural motives.  Final analysis of the case study will 
consider four aspects of the collaborative procurement alluded to in the Case Studies 




660. Personal Interview with Brooks Tigner 
661. NATO 1996b. Procedures for International Competitive Bidding AC/4-D/2661 (1996 Edition). In: 
INFRASTRUCTURE COMMITTEE THE NATO SECURITY INVESTMENT PROGRAMME (ed.). 
Brussels: NATO. 
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Section 1: Initial NATO AGS Policy and JStar Proposals 
(1993 - 1999)  
In 1991, American and Canadian forces, as part of a UN Coalition, attacked Iraqi forces 
that were attempting to leave Kuwait via Highway 80.  With their air ground 
surveillance capability, using US JStars, the coalition forces were able to detect and 
destroy hundreds of vehicles.  This resulted in the well-known image of the 'Highway of 
Death'.  This operation was the first to demonstrate the utility of air to ground 
surveillance in military campaigns and generated a call, by the US,663 for NATO to have 
an AGS capability for future operations.  This section considers drivers for the initial 
adoption of the AGS Procurement into NATO's bureaucracy via a Minimum Military 
Requirement (MMR).  It finds evidence for calculus incentives behind the first, 
unsuccessful, proposals made by NG to provide this capability, the JStar E-8 aircraft and 
associated radar systems.  These included the strategic need for European ISR 
capabilities for NATO led expeditionary warfare, and technical and industrial 
imperatives.   The major proponents for the capability were the US, who had industrial 
objectives concerning JStar sales, but who were also concerned that other NATO 
member states should reduce reliance on US surveillance assets.  US representatives 
envisioned a similar procurement process to the 1970's AWACs procurement, where an 
'off-the-shelf' solution was decided and procured in two years.664  However, other 
member state objectives included access to the advanced US radar and aviation 
technology that the AGS Programme represented.  They wanted the NATO 
collaborative procurement to fund development of a similar ISR capability by European 
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defence industries.  This led to bureaucratic politics in the decision-making where 
member states 'pulled and hauled' the AGS proposals to meet their different objectives.  
NATO bureaucracy and decision-making processes facilitated these dynamics, and are 
explained below.  This section is divided into three parts, the first considers the security 
and organisation context; the second, considers the adoption of the MMR; the third, the 
initial proposal for a JStar AGS solution. 
 
Security and Organisation Context 
Three factors in the Western security context drove the early stages of the AGS 
procurement.  First, NATO's involvement in expeditionary warfare and peacekeeping 
initiatives, such as the first Gulf War and conflicts in the former Yugoslavia; second, the 
gap between the US and European defence capabilities, particularly regarding 
surveillance assets; and third, NATO seeking contemporary relevance after the end of 
the Cold War.  Thus the security concerns of NATO member states and the lack of 
European defence investment framed arguments  for the AGS Programme by its main 
proponents: US officials and NATO IS.   
 
Effective use of ISR capabilities was demonstrated in the first Gulf War.665  Later 
NATO coalition experiences in the former Yugoslavia and Kosovo, where European 
forces were reliant on the US for ISR assets, also demonstrated the need for the 
capability.666  Lord Robertson underlined this in a 2002 speech, when he noted that the 
difference in transatlantic capabilities meant that the US were shouldering most of the 
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costs and risks in the Kosovo and Afghanistan campaigns.667  John Young, former 
Under Secretary of State for Defence, also commented that the US government 
particularly supported NATO's AGS procurement to relieve the use of US assets during 
these multinational operations.668   Thus the collaborative procurement of the AGS 
capability was ideal for Western Allies to acquire surveillance assets in a cost effective 
way.   
 
Member states were also keen to support the NATO AGS Programme to gain contracts 
for their defence industries.  This included the US, the primary funder and industrial 
beneficiary of the Programme as the JStars production line was facing closure.669  
European defence industries had been suffering from the post Cold War 'peace 
dividend'670 and the NATO acquisition was viewed as an opportunity to gain contracts 
and access to US technology.671   
 
Alongside this calculus, Western allies, and especially Germany, were inspired to 
acquire surveillance capability in part by the US military culture of RMA with its 
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emphasis on information and intelligence.672  The AGS capability was intrinsic to this 
approach to warfare, and while the Programme was not often framed in this context, 
there was a cultural element that encouraged procurement of the latest, sophisticated 
surveillance assets used in the RMA approach to operations.  This cultural element 
meant that decision-makers were aligned in their approach to the procurement solutions 
through this reference to the RMA. 
 
The AGS Programme was not formally linked to any NATO strategy or vision in its 
early stages.  NATO's Strategic Concepts of 1991 and 1999 had included a requirement 
for an ISR capability, with no specific mention of the Programme.673  The Strategic 
Concepts were reactive to the external security context and geared towards 
expeditionary and peacekeeping missions.  NATO sought a post-Cold War role and the 
AGS Programme epitomised a sophisticated, shared capability that could be used in 
these missions.  NATO's Secretary General Claes and the Defence Planning Committee 
and Nuclear Planning Group made reference to the need for an AGS capability to 
complement NATO's AWACs assets.674  The first official NATO policy document that 
mentions the AGS Programme is the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) procurement 
policy in 2000, followed by the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) in 2002.675  
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	 206 
However, these policies were formed 10 years after the adoption of the AGS MMR.  
Thus, the member state actors initiating the procurement did not refer to a specific 
NATO strategy or policy; rather they were driven by their nation-centred, calculus 
objectives.   
 
The adoption of AGS as a NATO MMR 
President Clinton wrote to NATO Secretary General Worner about the JStars capability 
in 1992 and initiated the AGS Programme proposal.676  At this point the JStars were still 
in prototype and had only one demonstration of use in the first Gulf War.  Further, they 
needed some additional development and there was uncertainty surrounding future 
production of the capability.677  The US viewed the successful procurement of the 
AWACs capability as a precedent for the AGS procurement and US expectations were 
that the AGS procurement could take a similar path.678  The first AGS proposal was also 
based on the aircraft that were used by AWACs (Boeing 707s), so was further related to 
the capability.679  Member states generated the MMR for an AGS capability, via the 
Military Committee, as the first step in NATO's procurement process.  A former NATO 
official noted that the AGS MMR was written by US military officers based at NATO's 
Allied Command Operations Headquarters in SHAPE, with reference to the JStars.680  
This underlines US influence in the initiation of the Programme.  The AGS Programme 
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was noted in 1992681 by the Defence Planning Committee (now folded into the NAC) 
and later gained North Atlantic Committee (NAC) approval as an 'essential' NATO 
requirement.682   
 
Thus, NATO did not generate the AGS MMR internally with reference to strategic 
requirements.  The MMR was adopted after the Gulf War, when the JStars were still in 
prototype.  Although the utility of the capability had been demonstrated, there was no 
immediate need, and no evidence of a NATO strategy, that required the capability.  It 
was only later, after the conflicts in the Balkans and Afghanistan, where the Allies 
began to rely on US surveillance assets, that the strategic need became more apparent.  
Therefore, the procurement procedure was initiated by the US for national objectives 
that included industrial imperatives, as they already had national surveillance assets.683  
European member states agreed to the proposal with the objectives of gaining access 
both to lucrative defence contracts and to US aviation and radar technology.  The 
cultural driver of the US RMA is acknowledged,684 but there is insufficient evidence to 
suggest that this was a primary driver for the procurement programme. 
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Once the AGS MMR was generated it was referred to NATO IS for fulfilment.  
Therefore, although member states, and in particular the US, initially generated the AGS 
requirement, NATO IS coordinated proposals for solutions by working with industry 
and member state representatives.  Here, NATO officials play an active part in the 
procurement process and become proponents of the solutions.  It is important to note 
that the MMR remains in the NATO system until it is fulfilled.  In essence, there is an 
organisational momentum in favour of the procurement once it is set in motion.   
 
The initial proposal for the JStars capability 
The AGS capability comprised three major aspects for fulfilment by industrial partners: 
the aviation platform, the radar solution, and the intelligence stations that analyse the 
radar imagery.  NATO could agree to acquire either a US 'off-the-shelf' solution, or a 
more costly solution, developed by other member states.  Clearly, if strategic, efficiency 
objectives were paramount, then an off-the-shelf US solution would be preferable.  
However, with juste retour objectives, European member states demanded a European 
industrial contribution.  This necessarily involved a longer, more expensive 
development programme.  A compromise of the US sharing technical knowledge that 
would alleviate time and development constraints would prove too difficult with US 
ITAR restrictions.685 
 
Political problems also beset this proposal.  Nominally, there were four systems being 
studied for the AGS Core capability during this period:686 The US JStars; the French and 
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Italians each had low flying helicopter surveillance capabilities, HORIZON687 and 
CRESO688 respectively, although the CRESO was still in development;689 finally, the 
UK was considering developing its own air ground surveillance capability with US 
company Raytheon, using Bombardier business jets and developing a new radar 
(ASTOR).690  The JStar solution was an 'off-the-shelf' solution, where the development 
was largely complete.691  The JStar capability centred on E-8A aircraft, which were 
Boeing 707s, adapted, by NG, to carry surveillance radars that could perform ground 
moving target indicator (GMTI), fixed target indicator, and synthetic aperture radar 
functions (SAR).692  JStars send their data via secure data links to military analysis 
centres.693  The US option was favoured as it fitted the AGS MMR and it would be 
ready for a 2001 Initial Operational Capacity (IOC) date set by SHAPE.  Further, the US 
offered to forego sharing the development costs incurred on the capability to date.694  As 
European member states would not agree to fund their portion of a JStars based solution 
without IP or technical transfer,695 the French 'HORIZON' solution and the Italian 
'CRESO' solution were also included in an initial JStars 'deliberate track' proposal by the 
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AGS Project office.696  The UK also encouraged this 'deliberate track' version as they 
intended to contribute to the Programme via 'contributions in kind' and this gave them 
time to develop their ASTOR capability.  The costs of the programme were unspecified 
in data gathered in this research, but would have been similar to the AWACs 
procurement of around $3bn.697 
 
The JStars and their associated radar technology represented unique technology at this 
date, so member states were keen to get access to the capability.  However, ITAR698 
restrictions prohibited exports of the radar technology by the US defence industry.699  A 
former US official commented that the radar technology remained in 'black boxes'.  
Here, the Allies were being asked to buy something that they could not see, technology 
that they all wanted access to but were not being given.700  NATO leaders such as Lord 
Robertson publicly referred to this highly problematic aspect of the procurement,701 but 
US industrial imperatives regarding the AGS Programme could not overcome the ITAR 
restrictions.   
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The US also offered NATO a JStars 'fast track' option for six aircraft without the 
European industry development options.702  This was cheaper for the European nations 
to accept without IP incentives.  Despite the need for the capability becoming more 
apparent in the Balkans and Afghan conflicts, CNAD dropped this JSTAR Fast Track 
proposal in 1997.703  It also rejected a subsequent 'Compromise Offer' by the US of a 
bargain sale of four aircraft with no improvements, straight from the production line.704  
There were many reasons for this.  First, the inclusion of the European surveillance 
helicopter capabilities had not provided enough IP to obtain Programme support form all 
NATO nations.  Second, the costs were seen as prohibitive, as this would have been the 
biggest programme that NATO had ever embarked upon.  Funding agreement was 
required from the group of acquiring member states, and also from all NATO nations for 
joint funding of the infrastructure costs via the Resource Policy and Planning Board 
(RPPB).  This committee could not agree to the JStar solution because of member state 
IP issues.705  Third, Member States had problems justifying to their parliaments that they 
were going to spend money on specific aircraft where they were pursuing different 
policies domestically.  For example Germany were in the process of decommissioning 
all their Boeing 707s (the aircraft that the JStar capability used).  It was difficult for 
them to justify buying new 707s, when they were getting rid of their own aircraft.706  
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However, a significant obstacle was the US declining to release technical data.707  Thus 
the JStars AGS solution did not meet member state IP objectives for retaining or gaining 
technical knowledge and winning defence contracts.   
 
Although political considerations and juste retour were major factors in the failure of 
this proposal, this episode also revealed aspects of NATO organisation that were 
significant in the acquisition process.  These include NATO's bureaucratic structure, its 
funding arrangements, and scrutiny of the organisation and culture.   
 
NATO bureaucratic influence 
Three aspects of NATO's procurement processes affected the AGS acquisition: the 
constancy of the AGS MMR in the NATO bureaucracy; the precedent of the AWACs 
procurement, which laid the ground for a 'multinational' format, allowing members' 
selective participation, and the concept of member state 'contributions in kind'; and 
finally, the structure of the NATO bureaucracy including the AGS Project Office and 
the Steering Committee (AGSSC), staffed by member state 'voluntary' contributions.  
While these factors enabled the procurement, they also delivered national 'industrial 
imperative' drivers and explained delays in decision-making. 
 
First, the AGS MMR and 'Core Capability' status meant that the Programme was 
monitored via NATO's SOPs.  These included important formal meetings such as the 
NATO Summits and CNAD Committee.  These high profile conferences encouraged 
decisions and progress through political and diplomatic attention, which former NATO 
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officials called 'forcing mechanisms' for progress.708  This meant that there was a 
relentless six monthly focus on the progress of the Programme.  Useful bilateral 
meetings held at CNADs or NATO Summits, also gave opportunities for difficult 
aspects of the procurement to be agreed.  At other times, debates, private conversations 
and member state negotiations also took place in small, informal sub groups, the AGS 
Steering Committee (AGSSC) and bilateral meetings within NATO.709  These 
organisational SOPs help to explain the persistence of the Programme against the 
political and financial reticence of member states over the last 25 years. 
 
Second, the 'multinational' format of the acquisition, involved a coalition of the willing 
which was persuaded to participate in the procurement.  Member states were not 
compelled to participate, rather they made independent decisions depending on their 
interests.  For example, Spain joined NATO after the AWACs acquisition and was 
allowed to opt out of contributing to this Programme.710  Multinational format made 
decision-making easier with a smaller group of participating nations, rather than 
agreement by all 28 that would have been cumbersome.711  The precedent of 
'contribution in kind' was also set in the AWACs procurement, to which the UK and 
France contributed use of their national assets instead of direct funding.712   In the AGS 
Programme, the UK announced that it would again be 'contributing in kind' with its 
proposed ASTOR project.  The British were interested in delaying the AGS project so 
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that they could develop ASTOR.713  The 'multinational' format and 'contributions in 
kind' facilitated agreement and support for the Programme.  However where nations 
opted out, there was less money for the acquisition.  Significantly for timing aspects, 
NATO was powerless to move the procurement process forward without member state 
funding commitments.  Here, member states withheld their financial participation until 
they satisfied their IP objectives.  Moreover, because the assets were to be used by 
NATO, there was no 'national' urgency for the capability, especially as the US were 
providing the assets in the interim.  This led to further delays and inertia in member state 
agreement to the AGS specification. 
 
Third, aspects of the NATO bureaucratic structure affected the decision-making for the 
AGS procurement.  These included the Project Office, the AGSSC, and NATO's 
leadership.  NATO's Project Office for the procurement had various iterations during 
these initial stages of the procurement.714  Decision-making for the Programme was 
coordinated through this office that reported to the AGSSC.  These bodies were made up 
of member state 'voluntary' representatives rather than competitively recruited 
procurement professionals.  This meant that the staff working on the procurement 
prioritised member state interests rather than timely procurement.  Thus decision-
making became 'pulled and hauled' by bureaucratic politics.  Performance of the Office 
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during this period was criticised by former NATO officials for delays in decision-
making.715   
 
NATO is subject to little scrutiny and accountability regarding the efficiency of its 
procurement procedures.  Limited literature considers the AGS procurement in these 
early stages.  In his article 'The AGS Enigma - Reflections on a Fading Dream', Von 
Kospoth despairs at the organisation of the AGS project office,716 which is based on 
national appointments rather than procurement expertise.  Later Pierre Chao hints at the 
US agenda for defence sales.717  But there is little sense of public accountability even 
though cost efficiencies were often emphasised by NATO and Member State officials in 
references to the AGS procurement.718  However, any criticism was either in speeches 
with a narrow audience, or published in esoteric journals such as Military Technology 
and NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace.  These had limited impact on public 
opinion and therefore encouraged little discipline, sensitivity or incentives within NATO 
to change their practices.  The Defence Planning Committee and NAC were particularly 
involved in tracking the progress of the AGS Programme,719 and made reference to the 
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efficiencies of armaments cooperation regarding the AGS.720  However, member state 
decision-making that rejected the final US low cost proposals, demonstrated that cost 
efficiencies were clearly not the priority for this initial, unsuccessful JStar proposal. 
 
To conclude, the initial stages of the AGS procurement process were superficially 
driven by strategic ISR requirements for expeditionary military campaigns, linked to the 
imperative to lessen the gaps between transatlantic defence capabilities.  The US 
demonstrated enhanced drive for the Programme, compared to other member states, as 
they had a semi-developed capability that was facing production closure.721  The JStar 
solution for the AGS Programme represented an opportunity for economic benefits for 
the US, but it also represented an opportunity for an off-the-shelf, low risk, surveillance 
solution for European member states.  However evidence indicated that European 
member states prioritised the defence industry benefits of potential contracts and 
technical transfers.  Additionally the AGS Project Office facilitated member state 
bureaucratic politics.  This weakness in the NATO bureaucracy kept decision-making 
powers with national interests rather than impartial procurement professionals. 
 
The study found that these early AGS procurement proposals were reactive to US 
drivers rather than being part of an overall long-term strategy for NATO capability.  
Therefore the Programme lacked the political support of member states who recognised 
																																																																		
720. NATO 1995. Final communiqué Issued by the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear 
Planning Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in Ministerial sessions in Brussels on 29th 
November. Brussels.; NATO 1996a. Final Communiqué Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 
Defence Ministers Session 18 Dec. 1996; Press Release (1996) 172;  . Brussels. 
721. CHAO, P. 2004. NATO AGS - Finally Ready to Fly? Washington: Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies. 
	 217 
that the US, rather than NATO strategy, was initiating the procurement and gaining 
industrial benefits.  Thus calculus driven, bureaucratic politics are prevalent in the 
decision-making with the 'pulling and hauling' of member state preferences inhibiting 
procurement.  However, while NATO was weak, it was an essential actor in eventual 
fulfilment of the Programme.  Once the decision was made for the AGS requirement as 
an MMR, NATO's bureaucratic operating procedures meant that the wheels of the 
procurement process kept turning.  As will be seen, SOPs were a major factor in seeing 
the Programme through to the Contract stage.   
 
Section 2: Mixed Fleet Proposal, Global Hawk Proposal (1999 
- 2008) 
After the unsuccessful JStar proposal, the AGS Project Office continued to work with 
NG and their industrial partners to provide a solution to fulfil the MMR for an AGS 
Core Capability.  This section considers drivers that kept the AGS Programme alive, 
two subsequent proposals for the AGS solution, and the final commitment by NATO 
member states to the Programme.  The second AGS proposal for a 'Mixed Fleet' solution 
envisaged some development by European industry to develop a platform solution of 
manned Airbus 321s (to be produced in Europe) and unmanned Global Hawks (to be 
produced by NG).  This proposal attempted to meet European member state technical 
and industrial imperatives that included the development of their own radar system, 
rather than using the US radar solution.  However, the Mixed Fleet proposal failed due 
to the high costs this entailed.   
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The section also considers the evolution and drivers of the final 'off-the-shelf', Global 
Hawk Proposal.  This was a US, sole source solution with NG as Prime Contractor.  It 
involved little development and used US radar MP RTIPs system.  The Global Hawk 
solution was efficient concerning time and cost, compared to the Mixed Fleet solution, 
but it limited European IP to the provision of ground stations.  The study concludes that 
industrial imperatives were present in the final solution because European member 
states provided these ground stations.  An important factor for the Global Hawk choice 
was the German interest in the capability and NG seeking further sales of this aircraft.722  
Finally, although the Global Hawks solution was the most cost efficient of the three 
former proposals, there were some limitations with the capability that may have made 
alternative solutions preferable.  Here the study found additional, cultural drivers of 
prestige and aspiration influenced and drove decision-making.   
 
During this episode evidence that cultural motives of NATO multilateralism and 
solidarity were present when new member states participated in the Programme, after 
the expansion of NATO in 2004.  The commitment of these new member states gave the 
AGS Programme essential political weight to proceed to the Programme Memorandum 
of Understanding (PMOU) stage.  Further, the AGS Programme began to be framed in a 
'civil military' strategic culture.  The section begins by considering additional security 
context influences during this period.  As mentioned, an important factor in the 
organisation context was the tenacious efforts of the AGS Project office working with 
NG, and other industrial partners, to produce revised Programme proposals for member 
state approval.  Motivations for NATO staff behaviour include organisation survival but 
also NATO cultural SOPs. 
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Security and Organisation context 
Three factors in the Western security context affected the narrative around the AGS 
Procurement programme during this period.  First, the 9/11 terrorist attack and 
subsequent Iraqi and Afghan campaigns heightened the strategic need for European 
surveillance assets; second, evolving civil security narratives that referred to threats of 
terrorism, illegal migration and cross border crime justified alternative applications for 
the AGS capability, such as patrolling the Mediterranean;723 and third, the expansion of 
NATO following the collapse of the USSR.  While transatlantic ISR capability gaps 
continued to generate strategic logics for the AGS Programme, a new security narrative 
became prevalent in member state arguments during this period.  It included security 
concerns for terrorism, illegal migration and cross border crime.  NATO officials such 
as Secretary General Lord Robertson, framed the need for the AGS within this post 9/11 
narrative, insisting that political concerns for work division of the AGS programme had 
to be downplayed in the bigger context of an anti terrorism effort.724  Other senior 
NATO bodies, such as CNAD, also referred to the AGS Programme as equipping 
NATO for the fight against terrorism.725  These threats were more proximate than 
expeditionary warfare requirements and were now at the forefront of Western security 
concerns.  Other civil military roles such as international border monitoring, or civil 
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disaster aid began to be mentioned and associated with AGS, especially by NG and  
member state politicians, who wanted to justify the Programme to their 
constituencies.726  References to the transatlantic gaps in assets also continued, with a 
renewed emphasis in NATO to address these deficiencies.  Lord Robertson, in 
particular, prioritised collaborative procurement, his mantra being 'capabilities, 
capabilities, capabilities.'727  This was supported by other senior NATO staff such as 
Robert Bell, who often referred to the AGS procurement in his speeches.728   
 
A significant event for the AGS Programme in this period was the expansion of NATO.  
Seven new members joined NATO in 2004 (Bulgaria, Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania), following other new Member States who had joined in 
1999 (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland).  Many of these member states 
participated in the Programme, and while they were not big contributors to the 
procurement financially, as a decision-making block in the Consensus system, they were 
a significant contribution for political support to propel the Programme forward.  A US 
diplomatic cable notes that Germany would only sign the PMOU in 2009 once critical 
mass was reached.729  Drivers for their participation would have included multilateral 
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symbolism, and alliance with the US oriented project.  The commitment of these new 
member states revitalised cultural, ideational drivers for NATO solidarity that appeared 
absent in older member states.730  They could also contribute to the procurement from a 
small economy to gain access to sophisticated ISR assets and gain US approbation.731    
 
Additional collegiate and multilateral drivers that generated critical mass and political 
will for the Programme came from member states.  Multinational programme 
participation involves relationships and commitment between member states.  This 
engenders a sense of obligation to the acquisition that would not be found in national 
defence acquisitions.  Here member states encouraged each other to join the AGS 
Programme and momentum came from the participation of others.  An example is found 
in a US diplomatic cable from The Hague that notes that despite a 'stagnant economy', a 
long term Dutch commitment to AGS was possible.732    An NAC meeting report cable 
refers to member states such as Denmark, Estonia, Germany and Italy joining the US to 
encourage other member states to sign the PMOU during the Spring CNAD meeting in 
2009.733  Later diplomatic cables about the Dutch withdrawal from the AGS 
Programme734 reported that the Dutch Chief of Defence Staff (CHoD) was "ashamed" of 
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his government’s behaviour.  Another NAGSMA official suggests that Germany stayed 
in the Programme after the failure of the Mixed Fleet proposal and the reduction of its 
related work share, out of solidarity and its relationship to its industrial partners, as the 
Programme would definitely not have continued without its support.735  International 
programmes often had protected funding over and above domestic programmes due to 
these obligations that had the character of diplomatic commitments.736  While this driver 
of diplomatic obligation did not initiate the procurement, it was certainly an aspect of 
support for the Programme, being a manifestation of the multilateral symbolic driver. 
 
During this period, NATO staff and NG industry tenaciously maintained momentum for 
the Programme, and were responsible for generating additional AGS Proposals.  NG had 
a team of five who worked with the NATO AGS project office, and also with European 
industry to form partnerships to fulfil the AGS MMR.737  Former NG personnel claim 
that corporate investment amounted to around $100 million over the procurement 
period.  This investment of NG provides evidence of the symbolic, cultural driver 
concerning the prestige of the contract with its NATO association.738  NG also had 
calculus drivers of gaining Prime Contracting experience, where the company had little 
expertise,739 and hope of future national contracts.  After the failure of the Mixed Fleet, 
NATO prevented the Programme from failing due to the persistence of the MMR.  The 
organisation also provided forums and facilitated the progress of the procurement at 
crucial times, such Lord Robertson's ad hoc meeting in 2001 before the Mixed Fleet 
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agreement.  NATO also encouraged member state focus on capability enhancement and 
collaborative procurement with procurement initiatives such as the Defence Capabilities 
Initiative (DCI) and the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) that referred to the 
AGS programme in policy documents.740  These provided a framework for monitoring 
the progress of the AGS Programme, for example via NATO Parliamentary Assembly 
Reports to the Science and Technology Committee, regarding PCC implementation.741  
Here, NAC and CNAD could legitimately place pressure on member states at 
summits,742 such as the Istanbul Summit.  However despite these efforts, the data does 
not sufficiently demonstrate that without this pressure, the procurement would not have 
take place.  
 
Mixed Fleet Proposal   
Two events provide evidence for drivers behind the eventual AGS solution and 
commitment to the Programme and are examined in this section.  First, the Mixed Fleet 
proposal, which was considered from 1999 - 2004; and second, the successful Global 
Hawk proposal.  These events are analysed for evidence of contextual factors, but also 
for organisation factors that affected actor decisions.   
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Drivers for the Programme continued included the AGS MMR, US and European 
industrial interests, and the tenacity of NATO staff, the AGS project office, and NG 
personnel in proposing AGS solutions and maintaining interest in the Programme.  
Delays due to bureaucratic politics of member states continued to plague the AGS 
acquisition and gave rise to comments on the obvious inefficiencies in the decision-
making process.743  Leading figures, such as Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 
expressed frustration at the process,744 making overt reference to the lengthy AGS 
procurement.745  Debates over the JStars proposal had taken six years, and discussions 
over the Mixed Fleet solution took another nine years before they were discarded.  Here, 
persistence of NATO personnel such as Lord Robertson, Robert Bell, and Peter Flory, 
the Assistant Secretary General (ASG) DID,746 ensured that the Programme continued to 
progress towards a PMOU.  Diplomatic cables from NAC meetings and other NATO 
statements provide evidence of staff efforts for the process, constantly referring to open 
issues, such as IP and selection of the MOB, as well as NATO funding for in-service 
support and infrastructure costs.747    
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The Mixed Fleet proposal illustrated how technical and industrial imperatives incurred 
delays and distracted member states from finding an efficient AGS solution.  It revealed 
that the bureaucratic politics in NATO's decision-making processes resulted in an 
expensive, compromised solution that was never going to be accepted on cost grounds.  
While the proposals met with IP and political support they did not meet the cost 
requirements of member states.  It also demonstrates how NATO, despite its inability to 
limit bureaucratic politics, encouraged and urged the Programme forward, either by 
leadership or by its SOPs of its CNAD meetings and Summits. 
 
From 1998, after the failed JStar proposal, it seemed that European member states were 
determined to supply part of the AGS Programme, rather than agree to a single source 
US solution.  ISR was an area where the US maintained technical supremacy, and where 
these member states wanted to compete at some level.748  This would involve a 
development programme because European member states did not have their own radar 
technology, and the US was loath to hand over its technology.749 The AGS Programme 
had three aspects under consideration: the provision of a radar capability, the platform 
solutions, and intelligence analysis stations.   
 
The radar solutions were a major aspect of the technical transfer in the AGS 
Programme.  CNAD approved funding for Concept Definition studies for two radar 
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solutions in 1998.  First, the US/European consortium of NATO Transatlantic Advanced 
Radar Programme (NATAR),750 which included the US Multi Platform Radar 
Technology Insertion Programme (MP-RTIP) radar.  Second, the European consortium 
Standoff Surveillance Target Acquisition Radar (SOSTAR).751  The first proposal was 
an extension of the proposed JStar radar system, which could now be used with other 
platforms, including unmanned platforms such as NG's Global Hawks.752  The second 
proposal came from European member states and was accused of causing a 'first class 
tsunami' for the AGS Project Office.753  It was launched for the specific purpose of 
gaining European expertise in producing ISR assets.754  The US did not react positively 
to this and threatened to withdraw support for the AGS Programme in October 1998 
unless some decisions were made to progress the project.755   
 
In 2000, the two studies for a radar solution evolved into a 2-year competition, 
authorised by CNAD.  A former NATO official commented that the competition was 
doomed from the start, as due to NATO's principal of 'Consensus' decision-making 
where the two teams were bound to veto each other when the choice for radar was 
made.756  A breakthrough was achieved by the US offering two concessions.  First they 
offered the German contractor, EADS, technical participation in its RTIP.  Until this 
point RTIP had been run as a strictly 'black' programme.757  This gesture by the US was 
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important to gain agreement to the RTIP radar and also evidence of the close 
relationship with Germany.  Second, they proposed to merge the two radar solutions into 
a solution called the TCAR758 radar.759  This resulted in the National Armaments 
Directors (NADs) of France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and the US signing a 
'Statement of Intent' just before the Prague Summit in 2002.760  This episode illustrates 
the lack of urgency felt by member states towards the AGS Programme and undermines 
the military requirements for the capability.  Rather it underlines the importance of IP 
for member states. 
 
The competing platform solutions were the 'Transatlantic Industrial Proposed' solution 
(TIPS),761 using A321s and Global Hawks; and the 'Cooperative Transatlantic AGS' 
Solution (CTAS), which was based on the UK ASTOR capability using Bombardier 
business jets.762  The CTAS proposal was unsolicited and would have caused some 
delay due to development considerations.763  The intelligence analysis station solutions 
varied with the manned and unmanned platforms.  With the larger manned platforms, 
such as the Boeing 707s or Airbus 321s, the analysis could take place in the aircraft.  
The Airbus 321s were seen as an upgrade to the dated 707 aircraft and would have been 
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a like for like replacement to the JStars capability, which allowed battlefield 
management as well as ISR from the air.764  However, at this stage the Germans in 
particular, began to be interested in unmanned options in their domestic policy.  They 
were enthusiastic to evolve the AGS mission towards an ISR only platform such as the 
Global Hawks.765  These aircraft could be used for civil military applications which fed 
into a Western 'community of values' security agenda.  
 
NATO leadership was very supportive of the progress of the AGS procurement during 
this episode, with influential figures such as Secretary General Lord Robertson, who 
was focussed on capabilities as a priority, and Robert Bell, a distinguished defence 
diplomat who was Assistant Secretary General (ASG) for Defence Support.  These 
officials were unable to deliver the AGS Programme, but in this period they argued 
forcefully for the capability and generated momentum for the acquisition.  Lord 
Robertson arrived in 1999, and agreed that the strategic reasons for the Programme were 
sound due to operational pressures and over reliance on American assets.766  Robert Bell 
described Lord Robertson as 'very hands on, very savvy negotiator, a bargainer' who 
prioritised the Programme and raised the subject at every opportunity.767  In 2001, Lord 
Robertson announced a 'Reinforced NAC' meeting with the AGS Programme as its main 
agenda item.768  This meeting called for properly paid and recruited Project Staff for the 
AGS office (which did not materialise), and reaffirmed NATO member states' 
																																																																		
764. Phone Interview with Bob Zeiser and Matt Copija 
765. Ibid. 
766. Personal Interview with Lord Robertson 
767. Personal Interview with Robert Bell 
768. VON KOSPOTH, E. 2002. NATO AGS: Another Time..., Another Try. MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, 
26, 31-35. 
	 229 
commitment to the Programme.769  Further NATO conferences were used as targets to 
drive momentum for progress, for example agreement on the radar aspect of the AGS 
programme was announced before the Prague Summit in 2002.770   
 
In April 2004, CNAD endorsed the NG led, TIPS concept platform and the TCAR radar 
solution.771  The CTAS platform was discounted for technical reasons, although the US 
political backing for TIPS is likely to have been a major factor.772  Crucially no formal 
agreement for funding had been agreed or the final costs revealed.  The Programme was 
to be the largest in NATO history with a potential cost ceiling of over $5bn.773 The 
project required a considerable amount of development but it achieved the European 
industrial objectives for technical acquisition.  However, the costs of the programme 
proved to be prohibitive.  By 2005 the TIPs proposal had shrunk from 12 Airbus 321s to 
5-6 A321s and 7 Global Hawks.  This still represented a hefty $5.2bn acquisition.774  
Apart from the costs, a major delay was the technical transfer agreements required from 
the US.  In the TIPS consortia, the TCAR radar systems would be developed by six 
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countries, thus providing European IP, but necessitating US technical transfer of their 
radar technology.775  This was still problematic for the US.  With technical transfer 
issues and development for the radar becoming problematic and costly, a decision was 
made for the Global Hawk to be equipped with the single source, US MP-RTIPs radar 
rather than the TCAR solution.776  This was a blow for the European effort especially for 
IP concerns and technical transfer, but was important for cost and risk reduction.777  It 
facilitated member state agreement in principle, but it significantly lowered incentives 
for participation in the Programme.  For example, Spain was funding its planned 
participation via a Research and Development budget rather than Defence Department 
budgets, but without TCAR this funding fell away.778    
 
The Mixed Fleet Request for Proposal (RfP) actually moved into negotiation phase in 
2006,779 but the financial implications became clear when the PMOU, a Design and 
Development Supplement, and Radar Implementing supplement were released for final 
signature and staffing approval.780  A subsequent US Department of Defense (DoD) 
document charts the demise of the Proposal in July 2007:781  
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'At an Extra-ordinary CSC782 meeting, Canada, France, Germany, and The 
Netherlands indicated they could not support the Program of Record due to 
affordability. The CSC recommended ceasing work on the Program of Record in 
favor of a UAV only capability based on an Off-The-Shelf Global Hawk (OTS-
GH) equipped with the U.S. Multi-Platform Radar Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) 
sensor. This capability was previously endorsed by the user, Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Command Europe (SHAPE).'783   
 
The Mixed Fleet proposal had been driven by industry responding to member state 
requirements for technical transfer and IP, as well as continuing US industrial 
imperatives.  This led to an expensive, development driven outcome.  Although it was a 
solution that the Europeans could live with from an industrial point of view it was 
simply unaffordable.  Further the US could not agree to reveal the technical details of 
the radar.784  In order for the Programme to proceed, additional drivers were needed 
and/or the difficulties regarding cost and technical transfer needed to be reduced.   
 
Global Hawk Proposal 
Factors driving consensus for the AGS Global Hawk solution are considered below.  
The final solution entailed NG's unmanned Global Hawks, using the US MP RTIP radar, 
with European industrial partners providing the ground intelligence analysis stations.  In 
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this choice, cost efficiency drivers overcame member state industrial imperatives.  There 
were repercussions in that some member states (such as Spain and Turkey) no longer 
participated in the Programme, although industrial imperatives were somewhat met with 
European provision of the ground stations.   The research found that, as Global Hawks 
were a unique, unmanned solution in the early 2000's, member state aspiration for this 
sophisticated asset included drivers of cultural prestige.785  For many member states, 
NATO's AGS Programme presented an opportunity to gain access to these sophisticated 
assets at a lower cost that for a national programme.786  This meant that shortcomings of 
the solution were overlooked.  These included the appropriateness of the Global Hawk 
capability (detailed below), the inexperience of NG in managing international 
programmes, and the expensive provision of ground stations by European industry.  
These shortcomings were also overcome by US support, driven by industrial imperatives 
and lobbying efforts of NG.   
 
Further, the lack of scrutiny of the acquisition process meant that negative aspects of the 
process were little mentioned by academics or the press.  This facilitated inefficient 
symbolic drivers and industrial imperatives.  Finally, a multilateral sense of obligation 
persisted.  New member states had signed up to the Programme, but Germany had also 
persisted with the procurement, despite significant loss in IP.  This reflected the high 
level of investment and the importance of German industrial partnership with NG.787  
NG had responded to German interest in unmanned solutions regarding a potential 
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national contract.788  Officials commented that German commitment was essential for 
the Programme; if Germany had left the Programme there simply would not have been 
enough political traction to acquire the capability.789 
 
In September 2007, NG and the AGS Project Office, AGS3, put forward the Global 
Hawk AGS solution.790  As in previous proposals, IP considerations were important to 
gain political will for funding commitment at the PMOU stage.  The revised proposal 
stated that:  
'The AGS Core capability will consist of an air segment based on the U.S. Block 
40 version of the RQ-4B Global Hawk high altitude, long endurance unmanned 
aerial vehicle (UAV) equipped with the state-of-the-art multi-platform radar 
technology insertion program (MP-RTIP) ground surveillance sensor. The 
ground segment, which will be developed by Canadian-European industry, will 
provide data to multiple deployed and non-deployed operational users and is 
foreseen as an interoperable interface between the AGS Core and a wide range 
of national and NATO Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
systems.'791   
This was immediately picked up in its October session by the CNAD who urged 
progress, noting that the capability was off-the-shelf and therefore low risk, as it 
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required little development.  The Committee emphasised a contract signature target of 
2008, with delivery for 2012.792  AGS3 then worked with NG and CNAD to gain 
consensus for this revised, lower cost package.   
 
Farrell stipulates that procurement of a certain capability may demonstrate a calculus, 
rational purpose if it: first, carries out a necessary mission; second, is capable of 
carrying out its mission; and third, if it is the most efficient equipment to carry out the 
mission.793  If the capability does not fulfil these requirements then it can be concluded 
that the acquisition of the capability was driven by other non-strategic calculus or 
culture factors.  First, although a military need was stipulated for the ISR capability in 
the 1990's, a lack of strategic urgency was clearly demonstrated in European member 
state attitudes to the AGS procurement for the first two proposals, which prioritised 
industrial imperatives over timeliness of the procurement.794  The AGS acquisition was 
attractive to NATO on many fronts including role expansion into civil military roles.  As 
noted by NAGSMA General Manager, Jim Edge: 
‘NATO is good at intelligence, moving information, understanding what is going 
on, making sure that the Nations are aware.  NATO doesn't do kinetics very well.  
They are reluctant to do kinetics because 28 would have to say yes.  All nations 
have an equal and similarly loud voice in any of those decisions. ISR capability 
like Global Hawk, 1) its not armed 2) it has instantaneous civil application.  So 
NATO is going, 'yes that is really nice.'795   
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Thus proponents of the AGS programme rearticulated its mission into a civil military 
narrative, first reflecting an anti terrorism context and latterly to humanitarian 
'community of values' context.   These fitted the contemporary strategic culture.  Further 
comments from the current General Manager of NAGSMA: 
'we never talk just about military intelligence, surveillance reconnaissance 
gathering capability.  We always talk about humanitarian capabilities, search and 
rescue for example, predictive imagery for example.... we have always reminded 
any audience that the NAC and Shape have the ability to answer from a pure 
good steward and good samaritan perspective a need with surveillance, 
reconnaissance capability. ..... It's a military aspect but it is being used for civil 
actions.'796 
A former Chairman of NAGSMO also noted: 'So we sold this as civilian dimension, 
with natural catastrophes, pollution'.797  These quotes show awareness that civil military 
missions were helpful in generating political will for the capability.  It places AGS 
within the civil military and 'community of values' strategic cultures and lends it a 
cultural legitimacy.  Thus NATO supports this role expansion and mentions these roles 
on its AGS website.798  This discourse is used as a cultural tool for societal purposes 
rather than the military audience.  Again the former Chairman commented 'my [military] 
units wouldn't like this'.  But as the General Manager insists: 'it is a great magazine part, 
people see it as not only having military utility.  Clearly there is a civil application for 
this system.  Its sells well when I talk to members of parliament, because they recognise 
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that they are buying potential dual use or multi-use type systems, certainly it has a 
capability.'799 
 
Second, were the Global Hawks the most capable solution?  The answer is 'probably', if 
one were looking for an unmanned solution in the early 2000's where NG was the only 
supplier of this cutting edge radar technology.  At this time, the NATO AGS version of 
Global Hawks provided the most sophisticated military specification of surveillance.800  
A NG press release notes: 'The UAV is equipped with state-of-the-art, multi-mode, 
Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) ground surveillance 
radar sensor, enhanced with an extensive suite of network-centric enabled Line-of-Sight 
(LOS) and Beyond-Line-of-Sight (BLOS) long-range, wide-band data links.'  The 
sophistication meant that there were extensive surveillance capability that could be 
deployed in all visibility situations and provide real time 'concurrent terrestrial and 
maritime Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) 
information in all-weather, day or night operations'.   
 
At this time, European member states were interested in unmanned surveillance 
solutions and countries such as Britain, Germany and France were considering their own 
programmes.801  A former NATO official commented: 'Others would have been happy 
to do the Airbus alone, ....... But Germany had just decided to buy the EuroHawk.' 
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Therefore they could not politically justify a manned alternative in NATO.802  However 
manned aircraft, and later UAV models such as NG's MQ-4C Triton,803 have fewer 
limitations.   
 
The Global Hawks were cutting edge technology, but not without complications.804  
They were a unique asset, developed as an Urgent Operational Capability, and were still 
in development when used during the Kosovo, Afghan and Iraq campaigns in the early 
2000's.805  The Global Hawk Block 40 model does not have 'sense and avoid' systems.806  
This is a safety mechanism and without it, Global Hawks cannot fly in the heavily 
restricted, densely used, air space over Europe.  Therefore the aircraft may have to be 
based at quite some distance from potential targets, due to flight restrictions, which can 
negate its long endurance feature.    
 
The Global Hawk has also been criticised as to its vulnerability in extreme weather 
conditions.  The aircraft does not have an anti icing system and 'hot weather conditions 
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present special challenges as well'.807  Finally, Jack Nelson observes that the Global 
Hawk is 'basically defenceless' in contested environments.808  He points to evidence that 
the USAF is looking to equip itself with a 'more survivable fleet'.   
 
Thus NATO's AGS Programme has suffered from its long lead times.  When technology 
advanced, it was impossible to alter the specification to the more sophisticated technical 
model, such as NG's Triton,809 due to the politically fragile procurement process.  
Tritons were developed for the US Navy and addressed the problems outlined above.  It 
is interesting to note that when Germany dropped its national Eurohawk programme in 
2011, due to concerns with the capability - notably the inability to fly the aircraft in 
European airspace810 - it placed an order for the MQ-4C Triton.811  To conclude, 
member states were prepared to overlook the limitations of the capability in order to 
participate and have access to sophisticated assets,812 to avoid a politically charged 
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change in specification, and under US pressure and multilateral obligations to fellow 
member states in the existing process. 
 
Third, were the Block 40 Global Hawks the most cost efficient, rational choice for 
NATO's AGS ISR capability?  Manned alternatives, discounted in the Mixed Fleet 
Proposal above, were more expensive to produce, and were less sophisticated and 
'sexy'.813  Pierre Chao favourably compares the costs of unmanned solutions to manned 
alternatives.814  However, the Block 30 aircraft, an earlier model of Global Hawks used 
by USAF, had a number of problems that included high costs of production.815  There is 
historic evidence of US domestic industrial imperatives overcoming concerns regarding 
costs and capability.  The USAF had earmarked Global Hawks for cuts, but the 
Programme had Congressional support due to its significance for regional employment 
in California.816  Press articles have described the lobbying activities of NG, particularly 
regarding the Block 30 Global Hawks.817  Here, sales to the USAF were charged with 
being a 'technology push rather than a requirements pull'.  The aircraft had huge cost 
overruns, but when the USAF tried to drop the aircraft from its budget in 2011,818 the 
effort was defeated in Congress after lobbying efforts by NG.  There are allegations of 
timely donations from NG employees to politicians in these relevant constituencies to 
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enlist their support for the aircraft.819  Various other tactics were also used to affect the 
debate.  These included arguments regarding the economy and jobs in constituencies 
where NG's manufacturing was based, a 'Support Global Hawk' website, and 
distribution of fliers showing the broad support that the manufacturing of the aircraft 
gave to communities across the US.820    
 
While no explicit evidence of lobbying is available regarding NATO's Global Hawk 
Block 40, the episode with the Block 30 revealed powerful support for Global Hawks.  
Similar narratives are found in press releases during the early stages of NATO's Global 
Hawk procurement detailing the number of extra US jobs that the AGS contract 
represented, clearly playing on the US State support.821  Further, diplomatic cables 
reveal the US Embassy encouraging Department of Defence participation in the 2007 
Paris Air Show and promotion of the Global Hawks and the AGS procurement.822  Thus 
US industrial imperatives, while not entirely explaining the support for the AGS 
Programme, certainly were present, and were a reason why the US accepted paying a 
majority share of the Programme costs.  This aspect, along with IP, gained European 
political will for the Programme.  European member state provision of the ground 
stations added costs, but it met with IP demands and thus generated support despite the 
additional cost implications. 
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Thus the Global Hawk solution met cost demands compared to previous proposals.  But 
on a standalone basis it needed the input of cultural drivers, and irrational European 
government member state IP drivers, to overcome the limitations of the capability.  
Cultural drivers for the Global Hawks included symbolic drivers of having access to a 
prestigious, state-of-the-art surveillance capability and multilateralism at this stage.  The 
participation of seven new member states meant that 15 out of 28, supported and gave 
the Programme the critical mass that it needed for agreement in NATO member state 
driven committees, such as CNAD and the RPPB.  As well as access to sophisticated 
ISR assets, these states also wanted to prove their credentials within NATO and 
particularly to the US.  A former NATO official commented: 'why would Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania and all these small nations, very small contributions?  Why would they 
be interested in this if there weren't kind of, they would get some goodwill out of it from 
their article 5 guarantors?.'823  Further comments regarding their participation included: ' 
.....to say that  'I was part of the team that bought that system for NATO' is a political 
feather around the CNAD, around the NAC'.824   
 
This section considered drivers for the successful Global Hawk proposal.  There remain 
questions as to the usefulness of Global Hawks in bad weather, restricted European 
airspace or contested environments.  Evidence suggests that calculus drivers to 
overcome these concerns were the lower costs of the Programme; US industrial 
interests; US funding the principal share of the acquisition; and European member state 
IP opportunities regarding the ground stations.  These factors generated political will for 
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a US 'sole source' solution.  However, cultural drivers were also necessary for the 
acceptance of the Global Hawks proposal.  First, the articulation of civil military 
missions for the AGS capability aligned with European societal expectations for the 
provision of security under their civil military and community of values culture; second, 
the political weight of the Programme achieved by the participation of new member 
states for multilateral reasons; and finally aspirations for the prestigious nature of the 
capability compared to manned alternatives.  The next section considers the signing of 
the PMOU and events concerning the implementation of the Contract.  
 
Section 3: The AGS PMOU and the Contract (2009 - 2014) 
This final section of the AGS Case study considers two major events, first, the 
commitment to the PMOU and second, finalising the AGS Contract terms (the 
Contract).  The section considers drivers for the choice of sub contractors, securing 
NATO wide agreement to the infrastructure and logistical costs from the RPPB, and the 
final member state participation in the Programme.  These stages represent the 
culmination of the AGS procurement process up until 2014 when the final participating 
member state, Poland, agreed to rejoin the Programme.  Member states continued to 
dominate decision-making until they committed to the PMOU and to funding the AGS 
acquisition.  After this, significant actors at the Contract stage were NAGSMA,825 the 
NATO AGS procurement body, and NG, the Prime Contractor, who was responsible for 
coordinating subcontractors and IP.  Drivers for the Contract conclusion included 
NATO and NG incentives to conclude the Contract after the lengthy lead-time; NG 
incentives were to realise the investment that they put into proposals for the Programme; 
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to de-risk their potential liability in the Contract; and to gain additional, national 
contracts from NATO member states, such as Germany.  The research considered the 
balance of power between NAGSMA and NG in the Contract negotiations given the 
pricing and specification within the PMOU, industry desire for profit, desire for 
prestigious associations with NATO, but also negotiating leeway of the NAGSMA and 
NG teams.  NAGSMA and NG had to overcome inter-industrial contractor tensions, 
particularly due to differences in transatlantic practices.  These added complexity and 
difficulties to the progress and implementation of the Programme. 
 
Security and Organisation Context 
From 2008 to 2014 the Western security context demonstrated the continued lack of 
European ISR assets in NATO's Afghan operations and the 2011 Libyan intervention.  
There were also increased defence budget concerns following the 2008 global financial 
crisis.  Cultural factors included Western expectation for the use of UAVs in civil 
security contexts, such as border security and disaster relief.826  First, NATO was 
involved in expeditionary campaigns in Afghanistan and Libya during this period, which 
underlined the calculus need for European sourced surveillance assets.827  References to 
these campaigns explicitly linked NATO's future roles to the AGS capability and 
therefore leant pressure for the procurement.828  For example, Joseph Collins (Defense 
Department Acting Director on NATO policy) observed that success in Libya was 
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dependent on the US ISR assets that NATO's AGS could have provided.829  The military 
requirements, and gaps in European provision of surveillance assets, gave NATO and 
the US arguments to push forward the AGS PMOU.  Second, the global financial crisis 
in 2008 affected defence budgets.  The US had an especially bad crisis and Leon Panetta 
emphasised that future budget cuts at the Pentagon meant that the US would not always 
be able to fill gaps in European capabilities.830  This increased the US drive for 
implementation of the AGS capability.  However, European governments had difficulty 
in justifying the AGS Programme in their budgets at this time.  For example in 2009 the 
Czech government asked for financial help from the US government to meet its AGS 
commitments.831  Cost concerns often provided a useful foil for political issues.  
Denmark temporarily pulled out of the Programme in 2010 citing cost pressures (but 
subsequently rejoined in 2012 when their defence budgets had actually increased).832  
Canada also cited financial pressures when it left the Programme in 2012,833 but actually 
disagreements over the use of NATO's AWACs in Afghan operations purportedly led to 
Canadian withdrawal from both the AWACs and AGS programmes.834   
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The AGS was increasingly framed as a capability for civil military, humanitarian 
missions, in a positive cultural light, during this period.835  This met Western societal 
concerns for contemporary security issues that were proximate to their territory.  
Further, military 'drones' had bad press and so defence functions were played down to 
the public, and politicians wanted little public association with military applications of 
UAVs.836  Official press releases from this time were calculated to enhance 'culturally 
positive' aspects of the Programme.  Thus NG emphasised that the 'affordable, 
executable Programme' would perform all of NATO missions but explicitly mentioned 
'border and maritime security, counter and anti terrorism, crisis management, 
peacekeeping and enforcement, and natural disaster relief'.837  Robert Bell notes the dual 
use aspects with civil military missions that included 'Mediterranean migrant ops' 
alongside dealing with 'Russian challenges to the east'.838 
 
Other AGS presentations emphasised the civil military aspects of the Programme, 
meeting member state preoccupation with humanitarian concerns and border control as 
seen in the slide below.839  This civil military emphasis plays into societal expectations 
for contemporary provision of security.  Although the AGS acquisition policy had 
largely been agreed at this point, this emphasis would have been influential in gaining 
member state agreement to the RPPB common funding for the AGS infrastructure costs. 
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Figure 6. EDGE, J. 2016. AGS Briefing, Alliance Ground Surveillance, a 
Transformational Capability for NATO. Brussels. 
	
Finally, there were other organisation dynamics that drove progress towards the final 
PMOU terms and the Contract negotiation and closure.  The fact that it had taken over 
20 years to conclude the AGS acquisition raised questions over the role of NATO as a 
credible procurement agency.840  NATO's IS played an important role in maintaining 
momentum towards the PMOU signature at the 2012 Summit in Chicago.  
Organisational survival concerns regarding the lengthy procurement process provided 
incentives to conclude the Programme.  A former Chairman of NAGSMO noted the 
pressure to conclude the AGS procurement resulting from sheer embarrassment at the 
length of time that the process had taken.841    
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A final note regarding NATO bureaucracy is that much has been made of Smart 
Defence, the latest iteration of NATO's procurement policy.  However the AGS 
procurement was not made with reference to this policy and therefore it is not 




Once the Global Hawk solution had sufficient informal support,842 the PMOU had to be 
signed to commit the 15 member states' funding for the acquisition.  All 28 NATO 
member states also had to agree to fund the lifetime and infrastructure costs of the 
Programme via the RPPB.  This eventually involved top-level US political pressure on 
reticent member states such as France.843  The informal agreement to a 70% IP return on 
member state Programme investment was an important incentive to commit to the 
PMOU,844 as well as the choice for the AGS Main Operating Base (MOB) location.  
This target of 70% was further confirmed in later cables detailing Turkish concerns for 
IP in the Programme.845  In November 2007, diplomatic cables from CNAD and NAC 
meetings reveal member state arguments linking AGS programme investment directly to 
member state IP.  Spain argued that the US, as Prime Contractor, should bear a larger 
share of the costs.846  Italy's query regarding the location of the MoB suggests that this 
																																																																		
842. NATO 2007. October 2007 CNAD makes progress; 25 Oct. 2007 - 26 Oct. 2007. 
843. Personal Interview with Robert Bell 
844. Personal Interview with Bogdan Horvath, Ludwig Decamps; US DIPLOMATIC CABLE 2009c. 
Turkish Participation in NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) Program. Wikileaks. 
845. Ibid. 
846. US DIPLOMATIC CABLE 2007c. NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL READOUT - NOVEMBER 
21, 2007. Wikileaks. 
	 248 
decision would affect its commitment to the Programme.847   Rick Froh, a former NATO 
official, observed that countries fell out of the Programme where they did not feel that 
they received commensurate work share for their cost share.848   
 
By the summer of 2008, 15 participating member states had openly stated their intention 
to sign the PMOU, and the draft document was circulated in July 2008, for national 
staffing and approval purposes.849  In September a Request for Proposal (RfP) was 
released and NG 'identified a transatlantic team made up of industry from the AGS 
participating nations'.850  These industrial partners were picked by the participating 
member states, without a competitive procedure, and informally agreed before the 
PMOU was signed.851  Evidence of this juste retour can be seen in the final 
subcontractors detailed below.  Thus, before the Contract terms were negotiated, 
informal agreement on Contractors and IP levels were necessary to ensure political 
support and signature for the PMOU for many member states. 
 
At the 2008 October CNAD meeting, the issue of the MOB location was still 
unresolved.852  This decision was important for member state IP and political support for 
the Programme.  The MOB infrastructure was funded by all 28 member states via the 
RPPB.  The decision for the location was made via a mix of member state compromise 
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and NATO efforts.  There were extensive exercises carried out by both NATO military 
personnel, General Michael Hain, and NATO IS, Ludwig Decamps, due to the 
sensitivities of costing and competition between member states.853  The MOB was to be 
staffed by about 600 personnel.  These would be trained for intelligence analysis and 
operational skills, and would be key personnel for national intelligence organisations.854   
 
The main contenders for the base were Spain (Zaratoga); Germany (Schleswig-Jagel); 
and Italy (Sigonella).  Other contenders were Turkey (Corlu), Poland (Powdiz), Greece 
(Aktion), Portugal (Beja), Romania (Timisoara) and Slovenia (Cerklje).855    Diplomatic 
cables reveal calls from countries like Spain and Italy for the MOB to be based in their 
territory.856  General Michael Hain carried out the first study for the location of the 
MOB.  He visited all the sites and concluded that all of them were appropriate as the 
MOB to varying degrees.857  Without strong military preference, the location decision 
for Italy was political, but rationally justified via a NATO IS study.858  Ludwig 
DeCamps drew up a business case that justified the decision via an evaluation matrix.  
This provided arguments for Sigonella that were strong enough to make the case for the 
NATO decision, and also for member state representatives, whose location nominations 
had been declined, to take back to their Governments to gain their consent for the RPPB 
funding.  The decision for Sigonella was efficient given the colocation with the USAF 
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Global Hawks, and the US were planning to enhance the infrastructure at the location.  
This, together with the support of Italy, meant that the operating costs for NATO could 
be reduced at the base.859  It also meant that the aircraft could fly straight into 
transnational airspace.  The choice for the base location had implications for Spanish, 
Turkish and Greek participation.  None of these member states signed the PMOU.  Here 
again IP is shown to be a major driver for the AGS procurement.  
 
The failure of the Mixed Fleet solution had shown that the period before commitment to 
the PMOU was crucial to build support for the Programme.860  Here, NATO's 
bureaucratic procedures and conferences drove momentum and progress.  The 2009 
NAC meeting in May emphasised the need to maintain momentum with the AGS 
acquisition.861  During this period, a collegiate, multilateral dynamic emerged which 
encouraged participation from those wavering member states.  A cable from the 2009 
May NAC meeting refers to states such as Denmark, Estonia, Germany and Italy joining 
the US and encouraging other member states to sign the PMOU.862  It notes that 
Germany would only sign the PMOU when there was critical mass and not before, 
which demonstrates the fragility of the progress.  In 2009, France reintegrated into the 
NATO command structure that meant that it could be liable to join the NATO joint 
programmes such as AWACS and AGS.  A diplomatic cable indicated that France 
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would only pay into programmes on a selective basis. It wanted to participate in the 
AGS Programme via 'contributions in kind', as did the UK.863   
 
Another cable shows the US rehearsing the arguments for Turkey to remain in the 
Programme, detailing that Turkey's IP target of 70-80% of their potential €35 million 
cost share.864  Despite the momentum, member states such as Spain, Portugal and 
Turkey began to withdraw their support for the Programme due to budgetary and IP 
concerns.865  With member states pulling out at an alarming rate, NATO Defence 
Investment Division called an 'Ad Hoc' meeting to urge participation in the Programme, 
fearing that it would fail.866  Here, NATO IS urged member states to commit to the 
acquisition or suffer another failed AGS proposal, possibly failure of the entire 
Programme.  To the surprise and relief of IS staff, member states agreed to support the 
Programme, thus the PMOU gained sufficient support for signature.867   
 
The PMOU was finally signed in September 2009 by 15 Member States: US, Germany, 
Italy, Denmark, Canada, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Norway, Roumania, Slovakia, Slovenia.868   The Press Statement details:  
'The PMOU, along with the AGS Charter, sets the legal, organisational, and 
budgetary framework for the AGS programme and launches both the NATO 
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AGS Management Organisation (NAGSMO) and NATO AGS Management 
Agency (NAGSMA) to take charge of the programme.'869   
The PMOU set a budget ceiling on the AGS Core Capability at $1.4bn.  All member 
states had received government commitments for this amount and could not increase this 
limit without going back to their Parliaments.870   
 
The paragraphs above demonstrate that IP, political pressure, multilateral collegiate 
support and NATO role expansion drivers ensured that PMOU signature and agreement 
for common funding of AGS infrastructure were achieved.  Political support was 
generated through calculated industrial benefits, but also aligning the capability in a 
security culture and emphasising the multilateral aspects.  NATO performed an 
important role in facilitating member state agreement at critical points in this process 
that in part reflected the calculus driver of organisational role expansion.  But as the 
NAGSMA General Manager commented: 
'...first and foremost it was the political will to be part of that [PMOU].  And the 
CNAD helped solidify that political will.  And pushed the 15 saying that this is 
the right thing to do, and all the ministries came together and said 'lets do it'.871 
After the PMOU was signed, the role of CNAD and DID staff receded, and it became 
the responsibility of NAGSMA, the NG industry team and the Board of Directors to 
deliver the AGS Contract.  The next section focuses on the industrial partnerships and 








NG, the Prime Contractor, and NAGSMA now had to agree to Contract terms.  Here, 
both parties were equally committed regarding their investment of reputation and effort 
into the Programme over the past 20 years.  The PMOU conferred decision-making 
power to NATO's procurement body, NAGSMA.  Member states were not operating the 
AGS capability; therefore they had little interest in the Contract details, leaving 
NAGSMA to decide the final terms with NG.872  This meant the Contract negotiating 
stage was more flexible for NATO representatives compared to their counterparts at NG 
who had to refer to senior management for direction.873  However, the Contractor 
awards and payment ceiling had been fairly publicly settled at the PMOU stage.  This 
gave significant negotiating power to the Contractors when agreeing Contract terms.874   
 
Another dynamic that affected Contract negotiations was the transatlantic cultural 
difference.  Here the clash of corporate cultures where the different objectives of US 
actors versus European actors meant that agreement was difficult and provided 
distraction from efficient decision-making.  National support of contractors exacerbated 
this dynamic.  While the balance of Contract negotiating power nominally resided with 
the NAGSMA team, corporate actors had much information and member state support 
which empowered their negotiating stance.  This maintained complex, time consuming, 
bureaucratic political decision-making. 
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A major motive for NAGSMA was organisational success and reputation and the 
fulfilment of its procurement role.  There was also a concern for the cost efficiency of 
the Contract.  However, as the Contract price and sub contractors had largely been 
chosen before the PMOU, negotiations for cost efficiency were hard to achieve.  It 
would have been difficult for NATO to be coy about the price ceiling for the capability 
given the publicity that the Programme had concerning the PMOU and the conversations 
leading up to Contract negotiations.  This put NG and other subcontractors in a stronger 
position regarding the terms and conditions (T's and C's) of the contract.  NG had not 
had much experience of being a Prime Contractor in the past,875 and was keen to 
succeed in the AGS Programme and to showcase the capability for potential future 
national contracts.876  The NG objectives were also to conclude the procurement and to 
salvage some profit, given their 20-year investment into the Programme.877  However, 
all industrial partners demonstrated elements of symbolic drivers to their actions relating 
to the prestige of a contract with NATO.  This meant that the profit element, while 
important, was somewhat subsumed by the marketing benefits of a NATO contract.  
Finally, the negotiating team had to satisfy the expectations of the NG Management who 
were concerned to reduce the corporate risks of the Contract.  Thus NG personnel had to 
refer extensively to their legal team and Management during the negotiations.878     
 
The 2012 NATO Chicago Summit879 was the target date for the Contract signing, and 
three events drove the Contract to its final agreement, demonstrating NATO 
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commitment, NG compromise and member state multilateral, collegiate support.  First, 
NAGSMA organised a retreat to thrash out the final T's and C's, the Statement of Work 
and to finalise the Contract price; second, NG's negotiating team managed their AGS 
risk management and final 'descoped' specification with NG Senior Management; and 
third, the US support of German obligations at the initial financing stage.   
 
First, the NAGSMA and NG retreat was organised as a response to the tensions between 
the transatlantic business teams implementing the AGS Programme.  Participants 
observed that the US corporate aims and objectives of personnel bonuses and 
management cultures differed strikingly from European corporate personnel outlooks 
that were longer term and less bonus driven.880  This led to difficulties where member 
states were familiar with different procurement and legal priorities.881  Further, NATO 
did not have a standard multinational procurement procedure, so NAGSMA had to 
create a process that satisfied the multinational industrial teams.882  In July 2011, the 
negotiating parties reached a stage where the T's and C's had 25 outstanding items, the 
Statement of Work883 and the final Contract Price were still not agreed.  The NAGSMA 
team were under pressure to conclude the negotiations in time for the Chicago Summit.  
With this in mind the NAGSMA General Manager, Otfried Wohlleben, called for a 
weeklong meeting with NG, in the Belgian forest, to thrash out the final items.  By 
Friday morning the price was still open and there were eight T's and C's to agree.  The 
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teams then agreed to the Contract price via a 'descoping'884 of the Statement of Work 
(subject to the agreement by NATO's SHAPE Headquarters, who ran the military 
requirements.)  NAGSMA insisted that they would walk away unless there was a final 
agreement to the T's and C's by 6pm on the Friday evening.  Finally, for the last four 
disputed items, the lead negotiators on each side went into a room with legal witnesses 
to make decisions.  Thus NAGSMA leadership drove the format of the final negotiating 
meetings and achieved agreement to a working Contract. 
 
Second, NAGSMA had to satisfy NG's risk management objectives within the 
Programme.  Transatlantic attitudes to legal arrangements differ, as US corporate culture 
relies heavily on legal advice and documentation.885  Officials observed differences in 
approach where the European Civil Law system usually involves very short T's and C's.  
This compares to the Anglo Saxon Common Law system (used by the US) that relies on 
precedent and longer T's and C's.886  A major driver for NG was to get the legal context 
agreed and to limit their corporate risk and liability.  This ultimately related to their 
calculus profit motive.  NG corporate officials had to refer to their legal counterparts at 
every stage in the decision-making process,887 whereas NAGSMA were able to make 
decisions without too much onerous oversight.888  The NG objectives were eventually 
satisfied through the efforts of their legal team and their Project Manager, but it was a 
long and difficult process.  For example, it took over a year to agree to NATO's 
																																																																		
884. Descoping is a term used in procurement where the Statement of Work is reduced 
885. Personal Interview with Otfried Wohlleben 
886. ECONOMIST 2013. The Economist Explains What is the difference between Common Law and 
Civil Law. Economist. 
887. Personal Interview with Otfried Wohlleben 
888. Ibid. 
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Arbitration Court (rather than having the ability to take NATO to court in Melbourne, 
Florida).889  Further, NG wanted to ring fence Contract risk in their operating company, 
NGISSII,890 the legal procurement entity.  This limited the exposure of the NG parent 
company to any liabilities incurred by the Contract.  The teams took a year to agree to 
the NG parental guarantee demanded by the NAGSMA team.891  Finally, NG was also 
reluctant to accept the SDI892 design responsibility risk, normally borne by NG 
customers.893  This was eventually agreed to as per the NAGSMA demands.894  The 
agreement to the Contract through these difficulties shows the tenacity of the negotiating 
partners, the organisational role assertion drivers of NAGSMA, to achieve the 
procurement, and the profit and prestige incentives for NG. 
 
The third event concerned the Contract Authorisation to Proceed (ATP).  This was 
planned for March 2012 before the signing of the Contract at the Chicago summit.  This 
released preliminary funding for industrial partners so that teams and processes could be 
assembled for the implementation of the Contract.895  The ATP required finance 
authorisation, so the 'Call for Contributions' went from NAGSMA to the AGS Finance 
Committee, to obtain member state approval.  The Finance Committee approved the call 
for contributions, but Germany needed to get Parliamentary Approval.  However, 
because the team only translated the first 20 pages of the AGS Contract into German, 
the German Parliament refused to sign its approval until the whole Contract was in 
																																																																		
889. Ibid. 
890. NG Integrated Systems Sector International Incorporated 
891. Personal Interview with Otfried Wohlleben 
892. System Design Integrity 
893. Personal Interview with Otfried Wohlleben 
894. Ibid 
895. Personal Interview with Erling Wang; Phone Interview with Bob Zeiser and Matt Copija 
	 258 
German.896  This was not given in time for the ATP, and the US therefore stood for the 
German liability.  This demonstrated US commitment to the Programme, and the 
importance of US ability to underwrite the project.  After the ATP was given, the 
'Technical Assistance Agreements' were signed.  Importantly, these governed the 
authorisation of release of technical information by the US Export Control Regulations 
ITAR,897 another obstacle that could have held up the Contract signing.   
 
The AGS Contract was signed on May 2012 at the Chicago Summit.  It was a Fixed 
Price, Single Programme898 contract for the AGS Core Capability,899 with the US 
corporation NG, as Prime Contractor for a Sole Source Contract,900 with Flexible 
Industrial Participation (IP).901  Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR)902 lies 
with NGISSII.903  At this stage the subcontractors were confirmed and published.  Many 
of the contractors had been working with NG during the proposal stage and were 
																																																																		
896. Personal Interview with Otfried Wohlleben 
897. BUNDESTAG 2013. Minor interpellation tabled by Member of the Bundestag Andrej Hunko, other 
Members of the Bundestag, and the Left Party parliamentary group 
German participation in NATO’s Alliance Ground Surveillance Programme Bundestag printed paper 
17/14018. Berlin. 
898. i.e. acquiring a single capability 
899. NATO 2009b. NATO’s Allied Ground Surveillance programme signature finalised; Press Release 
(2009) 139. Brussels. 
900. i.e. with one Prime Contractor 
901. Here NG has responsibility for the allocation of work shares to sub contractors; NAGSMA 2014. 
Acquisition of Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) Logistics Information System (ALIS) NAGSMA-
CON-0018. Brussels: NATO.; NATO Northrup Grumman Systems Corporation: ADDENDUM TO 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
FOR SUBCONTRACTS IN SUPPORT OF NATO ALLIANCE GROUND SURVELILLANCE (AGS) 
CORE RQ-4B UAV SYSTEM GLOBAL HAWK. p.14 
902. i.e. NG has responsibility for delivering the Core Capability 
903. NG Integrated Systems Sector International Incorporated 
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informally confirmed before the PMOU commitment.904  These were either chosen by 
member states, or identified by NG as a participating member state contractor with 
sufficient expertise to contribute to the Programme.905  Evidence for member state 
industrial imperatives can be seen in the table below which outlines participation and the 
associated corporate contracts.  While NG were the main contractor (Tier 1) there were 
four heads of sub tiers (Tier 2) who dealt with the different aspects of the Programme, 
NG, Airbus (Germany), Leonardo (Italy) and Kongsberg (Norway).  These companies 
dealt with Tier 3 member state industry within their section of the Programme:906  
 
Nation Funding Base (€M) Contractor 
Bulgaria 7.86 ZTA AD, Bianor (Bulgaria) 
Czech Republic 20.51 ICZ Group, Retia (Czech),907 
Denmark 32.70 Terma (Danish)908 
Estonia 2.47 Aktors OU (Estonia) 
Germany  400.47 Tier 2: Airbus 
Italy 177.23 
Tier 2: Leonardo (Italy) 
Electronic systems (formerly 
Selex Galileo)909 
																																																																		
904. Phone Interview with 001 
905. Phone Interview with Bob Zeiser and Matt Copija 
906. EDGE, J. 2016. AGS Briefing, Alliance Ground Surveillance, a Transformational Capability for 
NATO. Brussels. 
907. http://www.opinicus-sro.com/Participation-de-l-industrie-de Accessed January 2017 
908. https://www.terma.com/press/news-2016/terma-contracted-to-supply-an-automated-target-
recognition-and-identification-system-for-nato-ags/ Accessed January 2017 
909. ARMY TECHNOLOGY.COM. 2012. Northrop awards Nato AGS subcontract to Selex [Online]. 
Available: http://www.army-technology.com/news/newsnorthrop-awards-nato-ags-subcontract-selex 
[Accessed April 2018]. 
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Nation Funding Base (€M) Contractor 
Latvia 3.17 DATI (Latvia),910 
Lithuania 4.78 ELSIS (Lithuania),911 
Luxembourg 3.47 SES (Luxembourg) 
Norway 39.91 Tier 2: Kongsberg (Norway) 
Poland 56.53 (3 Battle laboratory contracts)912 
Romania 25.28 UTI Elletra (Romania) 
Slovakia 10.33 Konstrukta (Slovakia)913 
Slovenia 5.90 Comtrade d.o.o 
United States 502.38 
Tier 1: Prime Contractor: NG 
International Systems Sector Inc 
(NGISSII) 
Canada (withdrawn) 37.00 General Dynamics (Canada) 
TOTAL 1,329.99  
Figure 7. AGS Funding Base 
 
As seen above, every member state has at least one contractor that is associated with the 
Programme.  Thus this table demonstrates how industrial imperatives supported the 
AGS Contract.  NG had experience of producing Global Hawk ground stations for the 
USAF.  However, European IP demands meant that their inexperienced industry 
fulfilled this aspect of the Programme.  There would have been no PMOU agreement 
																																																																		




Accessed January 2017 
912. Personal Interview with Jim Edge 
913. http://www.dmdgroup.eu/sk/our-company/konstrukta-defence Accessed January 2017 
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without this.  Former NATO officials estimate that the inclusion of European industry 
added over €100m onto the costs of the Programme.914  A former NATO official 
observed that all nations were looking for technological contracts or 'noble' work.915  
Therefore, as far as possible, all participating member state contractors received a 
software or technology contract.  Thus calculus drivers for industrial imperatives were 
evident in the Contract outcome.   
 
There is some evidence that the smaller, newer member states did not receive significant 
IP indicating that multilateral drivers were stronger for their participation. These 
countries received industrial training as part of their participation where their industries 
were not able to contribute to the transportable and mobile ground stations.  NG staff 
comment that some countries' industry had limited technical ability but their personnel 
were 'allocated' to the European teams.916  Where IP drivers were less strong, symbolic, 
multilateral drivers for the new member states are in evidence.   
 
Symbolic drivers were also present in industry contributions to the successful 
procurement.  Here, cultural aspiration for prestigious association with NATO led to 
sacrifice of profits.  While specific profit figures for the sub contracts are not available, 
symbolic prestige associated with the NATO contracts was a widely held view.  A 
																																																																		
914. Personal Interview with Otfried Wohlleben 
915. Personal Interview with Erling Wang; Personal Interview with Jim Edge 
916. Phone Interview with Matt Copija and Bob Zeiser 
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former US official noted the low value of the NATO AGS Contract in the defence 
industry,917 and that incentives for the fulfilment included branding: 
So for Airbus Group or for Leonardo or Thales, these programmes are important 
because they have high profile and it helps brand the company as a major player 
globally, you [supply] the most important Alliance in history sort of thing.918 
Further, the former Chairman of NAGSMA also commented on the perception of 
industry on working with NATO and the prestige of the Global Hawks Contract and 
noted that Kongsberg is unlikely to profit on the NATO contract because: 'Its important 
to be part of this because this is the future.'919  Thus these prestigious cultural aspects of 
the NATO AGS Programme lend legitimacy to industry for future contracts. 
 
Final Decisions 
The research now considers the final decisions concerning the funding, member state 
participation, and the crucial role of the US in encouraging and supporting the AGS 
Programme.  Drivers for the US were economically driven, but also to politically 
encourage European member states to acquire more defence assets.  The separate 
decision-making process for the common funded operational and infrastructure costs of 
the AGS Programme occurred alongside the Contract negotiation.  While this 
negotiation was not directly part of the procurement process, agreement to these costs 
was a necessary step to enable the acquisition of the AGS assets.  The body responsible 
for disbursing the Common Funds is the RPPB.  The RPPB has the largest budgets in 
																																																																		
917. National UAV Contracts would be in the region of €1bn per nation: SIEBOLD, S. & SHALAL ESA, 
A. 2017. Germany to buy Triton drone to replace canceled Euro Hawk-sources [Online]. Available: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-northrop-idUSKBN16E14D [Accessed April 2017]. 
918. Personal Interview with Robert Bell 
919. .Personal Interview with Erling Wang 
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the NATO Headquarters.  It is responsible for allocating NATO's Civil and Military 
Budgets as well as NATO's Security and Investment Programme (NSIP).920  It is 
therefore a powerful actor in the NATO bureaucracy.  The focus of the RPPB was 
different to the NAGSMA team.  They considered the long term, total costs of the AGS 
capability, rather than the details of the immediate acquisition of the assets.  The RPPB 
was concerned to cap AGS on-going costs, and drivers for agreement were that the 
assets were to be available as soon as possible, and to be part of a broader NATO joint 
surveillance effort.921   
 
From September 2011 to March 2012 Common Funding debates took place.  NATO's 
'Consensus Principle' requires unanimity from all member states and the October 2011 
Defence Ministers' meeting did not achieve agreement.  France was particularly reticent 
and their eventual agreement was finally obtained at the November 2011 G20 meeting 
in Cannes.  Here the two leaders, Obama and Sarkozy, went for a walk on the beach and 
agreed that the AGS Programme would be part of a broad NATO Joint Surveillance 
effort.922  This aspect was subsequently emphasised in the narrative surrounding the 
AGS, for example where DoD official, Joseph Collins described the Programme: 'AGS 
provides the core for NATO Joint ISR'.923  The episode reveals the importance of US 
political pressure and leadership in the procurement decision-making process.  
Consensus was finally reached in February 2012.924  Costs were capped at €105.4m for 
																																																																		
920. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67653.htm Accessed January 2017 
921. Personal Interview with Robert Bell 
922. Ibid. 




the AGS infrastructure; €250.0m for 20 years leasing of satellite communications;925 and 
operational costs were set at €79.3 million a year.926 
 
Despite the signed PMOU, member states continue to prevaricate; Poland, Denmark and 
Canada left the Programme from 2009 to 2011 citing budgeting concerns.  Denmark and 
Poland then rejoined at later stages.  NAGSMO still actively sought to recruit further 
participants for additional funding and political support for the Programme.  This effort 
in particular was aimed at new NATO member states.  NAGSMA held meetings in 
Croatia in December 2009 with a delegation that included high-level NG personnel, and 
in Albania in April 2010 shortly after they both joined the Alliance.927  These 
movements emphasise member state drivers for the procurement such as multilateral 
loyalty and industrial imperatives. 
 
Canada withdrew from both the AWACs and AGS Programmes in 2011.928  The official 
reason cited was the Programme costs and national budget cuts,929 but it is often 
																																																																		
925. BUNDESTAG 2013. Minor interpellation tabled by Member of the Bundestag Andrej Hunko, other 
Members of the Bundestag, and the Left Party parliamentary group 
German participation in NATO’s Alliance Ground Surveillance Programme Bundestag printed paper 
17/14018. Berlin. 
926. COON, S. 2013. NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS). Shape.; 
927. Details of these press releases can be found at http://nagsma.nato.int/news/default.aspx accessed 
January 2017. 
928. BUNDESTAG 2013. Minor interpellation tabled by Member of the Bundestag Andrej Hunko, other 
Members of the Bundestag, and the Left Party parliamentary group 
German participation in NATO’s Alliance Ground Surveillance Programme Bundestag printed paper 
17/14018. Berlin. Q.40 
929. BREWSTER, M. 2013. NATO surveillance programs withdrawal will cost Canada contracts. The 
Globe and Mail.; PUGLIESE, D. 2012. Canada pulls out of NATO airborne surveillance programs to save 
$90m National Post. 
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explained as a political decision.  Canada's defence spending actually rose in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis.930  Observers note that when France debated the use of 
AWACs in Afghanistan,931 Canada objected and decided to leave the AWACs 
Programme.  Subsequently, Belgium insisted that Canada left the AGS Programme too, 
on the grounds that member states should not be able to pick and choose participation in 
joint assets.  In the event, Canada had to pay to leave the AGS Programme, but it still 
retained part of its industrial contract,932 the rest being absorbed by NG.   
 
Denmark left the Programme in 2010, citing financial reasons.933  This resulted in a 
public remonstration by the Danish Secretary General Rasmussen934 for two reasons.  
First, in his capacity as the former Danish Prime Minister; and second, to discourage 
other member states from leaving the Programme.  In May 2012, Denmark announced 
that it was rejoining the Programme, explaining the decision due to a resolution of its 
defence finances; because the Libyan intervention had demonstrated that ISR had 
avoided collateral civilian deaths; and that Smart Defence was a policy that they 
supported.935  Anecdotally, the US President directly called the Danish president to 
																																																																		
930. PONTIROLI GOBBI, F. 2013. NATO in the Aftermath of the Financial Crisis. In: LIBRARY OF 
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encourage participation,936 a further example of the US driving the process forward 
against European hesitation.   
 
Finally, Poland had left the Programme in early 2009 before committing to the PMOU, 
citing financial problems.937  However, it also increased its defence budget by 29% after 
the financial crisis.938  Poland then announced its intention to rejoin the Programme in 
2014 with a significant contribution of 4.5% of the Programme costs.939  This is thought 
to have been because they wanted access to assets.  Again, significantly for this late 
stage, Poland was able to gain three contracts when rejoining the Programme, including 
the creation of a 'battle lab', mirroring information retrieval and analysis systems, to 
provide back up and training.940  
 
This section considered concluding aspects of the AGS Programme procurement.  
During the Contract discussions, drivers behind progress of the procurement process 
were the negotiating parties' objectives regarding the reputation and organisational role 
expansion of NATO, and managing the profit motives and risk objectives of NG.  Both 
these drivers can be classed as calculus.  During the agreement for Common Funded 
infrastructure and operational costs, evidence indicates that the US high-level 
involvement cleared the final obstacles such as French reticence.  The selection of the 
Contractors confirmed member state industrial imperatives and juste retour drivers for 
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participation in the Programme.  Crucial cultural drivers included the continued 
commitment of the newer member states for multilateral reasons.  This was supported 
by evidence of their limited industrial participation, indicating that they had few 
industrial imperatives.  Further symbolic drivers that supported the procurement were 
the prestigious associations with NATO that generated the commitment of industry to 
invest time and effort into AGS proposals.  Finally, the realignment of the AGS mission 
to civil military functions and the community of values strategic culture also helped to 
cement political support for the Programme.  Anecdotal evidence, public statements and 
NATO official literature all support arguments for this cultural influence.  
 
The final section of the case study applies the theoretical framework to the findings and 
assesses the presence of calculus and cultural drivers for NATO's AGS Programme. 
 
NATO AGS Conclusions 
This concluding section applies the theoretical framework to the findings of the NATO 
AGS case study.  The first section identifies the presence and balance of drivers 
(strategic rationale, industrial imperatives, technical imperatives, organisational role 
expansion and symbolic drivers) during decision-making stages of the AGS programme.  
It applies the Bennett's tests for causation to the findings.941  This aids analysis of 
evidence for the dominant driver at different stages of the procurement decision-making.   
 
																																																																		
941. Bennett's Tests for causation were outlined in Chapter 1 Methodology Section p.61.  Tests for 
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The second section applies the broader theoretical framework, strategic choice, 
sociological institutionalism and organisation theory to the findings.  It demonstrates 
how strategic choice, calculus drivers are insufficient to solely explain the collaborative 
procurement outcomes; and how sociological institutionalism and organisational 
theories can aid the explanations of successful collaborative decision-making. 
 
Findings and Analysis regarding Drivers for Procurement 
The three successive proposals (JStars, Mixed Fleet and Global Hawks) for the AGS 
Programme solution provide useful evidence for the analysis of the drivers for the 
procurement.  The Global Hawk solution demonstrates aspects of each driver, but 
referring to the two failed proposals enables analysis of those drivers that were 
insufficient to conclude the process in the early stages.  Using Bennett's tests for 
necessary and sufficient causation, to adjudicate between differing explanations,942 this 
section considers each driver in turn.  There is a balance and combination of drivers that 
collude to generate political support.  This section looks at the combination that seems 
to explain the final decision for the Global Hawks AGS solution. 
 
Strategic Choice (Calculus) 
Strategic Rational Driver  
The rational theory for the AGS procurement involved three drivers: first, of necessary 
security missions that required surveillance; second, the capability (of JStars and Global 
Hawks) for the mission; and third, the cost efficiencies of collaboratively acquiring the 
capability through NATO.  First, the JStars and Mixed Fleet proposals were backed by a 
military requirement but this proved insufficient to generate European member state 
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political will for these solutions and to overcome the paralysis of industrial imperatives 
clashing with cost considerations.  Thus the strategic choice driver (military 
requirements) explanations for the procurement would appear to be insufficient to 
explain the procurement. 
 
Second, the JStars and Mixed Fleet solutions both involved manned solutions capable of 
carrying out the mission.  The Global Hawk solution is an unmanned solution that has 
limited capability in a contested scenario, but is suited to uncontested, benign 
environments.  Thus, strategic choice driver of mission capability would not seem to 
be a sufficient justification for the Global Hawk solution.  Third, both the JStars and 
Mixed Fleet solution failed the cost efficiency requirements of member states.  The 
Global Hawks proposal cost far less than the two previous proposals.  This calculus, 
strategic choice driver, of cost efficiency, then passes the 'hoop' test as necessary 
for the Programme.  Thus calculus, strategic rationale explanations for collaboration 
would appear to fail Bennett's tests for AGS military mission and capability 
requirements, but pass for the cost aspects of the Global Hawk solution. 
 
Industrial Imperative Driver 
Industrial imperative drivers and European IP943 were crucial for the generation of 
political support during the AGS Process.  Evidence showed that this driver 
underpinned US essential support for the Programme, passing the hoop test.  
However, the Programme needed European IP to succeed, as the failure of the JStars 
proposal demonstrated.  The failure of the Mixed Fleet proposal where there was 
extensive European member state IP, shows that the industrial imperative driver for 
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these states not sufficient to drive the collaborative procurement.  Finally, data 
indicated that European member state IP, and related industrial imperative 
drivers, increased the cost of the final Global Hawk solution, but this was necessary 
for the European member state political support for the Programme.   
 
Technical Imperative Driver 
Technical imperatives were present during the procurement process particularly in the 
Mixed Fleet solution. However the final Global Hawk, Single Source solution 
showed that technical transfer was not a priority necessary for the procurement, 
and therefore this driver has been discarded.  While there are some symbolic 
technical imperatives related to the Programme giving access to prestigious, 
sophisticated assets, there was little technical transfer in the final contract that 
demonstrates any significance for this explanation. 
 
Organisation Theory 
Organisation Role Expansion Driver 
Organisation survival and role expansion was present as a driver in all three proposed 
solutions, so it is difficult to deduce its importance from this angle.  However without 
NATO as an organisation with its determination to conclude the process, the Programme 
would not have existed.  Thus NATO organisation role expansion driver  would 




Sociological Institutionalism (Culture) 
Symbolic Drivers 
Multilateralism:  Multilateralism related to the NATO organisation was present to gain 
the critical mass for the AGS solution.  While this was not related to a particular 
solution or aspect of the capability, the presence of the new member states in the 
Programme gave it critical weight.  This symbolic driver was not present in the first 
JStars proposal.  Further, there was evidence of relationships between nations providing 
momentum for the collaborative procurement during debates.  Therefore the study 
concludes that multilateralism is necessary and passes the 'smoking gun' test 
(sufficient but not necessary) for driving the procurement. 
 
'Community of Values': The realignment of the mission to civil military functions 
within Western symbolic 'community of values' driver is also proved to be a further 
sufficient factor in progressing agreement to the AGS Programme.  When the mission 
began to be re-articulated and influenced by the civil military strategic culture, the 
Programme gained additional traction with European member states.  The Global Hawk 
solution was more flexible for civil military functions, despite being an expensive 
solution for these missions.  The driver of political will for the AGS mission had 
cultural influences related to European civil military strategic culture.  Symbolic 
drivers related to Western 'community of values', civil military missions may then 
be seen to pass the 'smoking gun' test as a cultural explanation for the 
procurement.   
 
Symbolic Prestige: Finally, the tenacity of industry in the procurement process was 
driven by the prestige associated with NATO contracts alongside a rational profit 
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motive.  Symbolic prestige would also seem to be a 'smoking gun' test, where it is 
sufficient to support the procurement but not necessary to explain it. 
 
In conclusion, the balance of drivers for the AGS collaborative procurement was 
affected by a number of factors at different stages of the decision-making: the 
dominance of the US member state, with its important defence industry and the fact that 
it was prepared to shoulder the large portion of the procurement costs; the expansion of 
the organisation to new member states in 2004; the articulation of new civil military and 
Western 'community of values' missions after 9/11, and the escalating migrant crisis.   
 
Findings and Analysis regarding the Theoretical Framework 
The paragraphs below consider strategic choice, sociological institutionalist and 
organisation theory explanations for the collaborative procurement processes at different 
stages of the decision-making chain. 
 
1) Explanations for AGS Requirement and missions 
Strategic Choice Explanations:  Strategic Rationale for the AGS Requirement  
This NATO case study demonstrates that the initial military, strategic rationale driver 
for the AGS Programme was insufficient to drive the procurement to a successful 
conclusion.  US military officers wrote the MMR for the AGS Programme with 
reference to expeditionary warfare requirements in Afghanistan and Iraq.  However, 
case study data demonstrated the diversity of member state opinion, where other 
Western member states did not share the US' priorities for the Programme.  The lack of 
urgency subdued the strategic rationale driver in the process.  This was demonstrated by 
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the slow progress of the initial AGS proposals and the increased weight of other drivers, 
such as industrial and technical imperatives.   
 
Sociological Institutionalist Explanations: Symbolic 'community of values' driver for the 
AGS Requirement 
Symbolic drivers became important at later stages of the procurement.  The AGS 
Programme requirements evolved from solely military purposes to include civil military 
roles of counter terrorism and border control.  This mission definition encouraged 
political support for the Programme from Western member states.  The culturally driven, 
civil military drivers were referred to in later arguments for the Programme by US 
representatives, NATO IS and NG personnel as 'magazine aspects' to ensure the 
acceptability of the policy and procurement to domestic constituents.   
 
2) Explanations for Political Support for the NATO AGS Programme 
Strategic Choice Explanation: US Industrial Imperative drivers, cost sharing 
imperatives, and political influence on other member states 
A major political factor driving the procurement was the US' industrial imperatives and 
political concerns.  The procurement made no rational sense for the US, as it already had 
the Global Hawk capability, therefore a major driver for this member state had to be 
industrial imperatives.  It was also important to the US, and NATO, that Western 
member states contributed to the cost of surveillance assets in multilateral NATO 
operations.  The AGS Programme met this objective.  Although the US presented the 
AGS procurement as a military requirement, and the US also had industrial imperatives, 
evidence suggests that it also desired some commitment from Western member states 
regarding the burden sharing of surveillance assets for future joint operations.  This 
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strategic choice driver gained in significance where US representatives and leaders 
invested time and energy in the process, and employed pressure upon other member 
states to participate in the Programme. 
 
Sociological Institutionalist Explanation: Symbolic multilateralism within NATO 
Multilateralism and political objectives were important for new European member 
states' participation in the AGS procurement.  This symbolic driver for these states 
gained in significance when older member states withdrew their participation in the 
Programme due to IP and cost concerns.  The driver did not subdue industrial 
imperatives,  NATO's bureaucratic process ensured that these were strong, but 
multilateralism drove the participation of a significant block of smaller member states.  
This made a difference during consensus decision-making for aspects of the Programme, 
such as agreement to the common funding of the AGS infrastructure required by the 
RPPB. 
 
Political, collegiate dynamics related to multilateralism were also significant during the 
CNAD negotiations.  Here older, participating member states, such as the US, Germany, 
Norway and Italy, encouraged fellow nations to support the Programme, using political 
and diplomatic relationships to achieve collaboration.  Thus the spirit of multilateralism, 
while difficult to perceive with the transatlantic tensions and the bureaucratic politics 




3) Explanations for the final AGS Global Hawks Solution 
Strategic Choice Explanation: Industrial imperatives and Cost saving imperatives 
The final AGS Global Hawk solution was relatively expensive to perform civil military 
roles, and relatively constrained regarding military roles.  As the solution was 
compromised with regard to cost and role, other drivers were considered to explain the 
choice for the solution.  Industrial imperatives were important for member states to 
agree to an acceptable solution for NATO's AGS Programme.  This driver was present 
for some member states' participation, such as the US, but could not fully explain the 
final consensus for the Global Hawk solution that involved low levels of IP for 
European member states.  The research noted that a more efficient solution would have 
been the NG 'Triton'.  However, member state reluctance to commit funding to the 
Programme, and the laborious decision-making structures within NATO, made the 
PMOU an inflexible document and constrained any amendments to the specification 
especially with regards to cost, but also regarding the solution itself.   
 
Calculus, cost efficiency drivers were present in the decision-making processes for the 
AGS Programme solution.  A significant driver for making the acquisition through 
NATO was that the US funded a large percentage of the Programme costs.  The final 
solution of Global Hawks was certainly much cheaper than the previous proposals for 
the Programme.  However, in the final Global Hawks solution, European member states 
provided the ground stations element of the Programme due to industrial imperatives 




Institutionalist explanation: Symbolic drivers for specification and industry 
participation / profit sacrifice 
When the industrial imperatives clashed with the cost savings driver and derailed the 
JStars and Mixed Fleet proposals, symbolic drivers gained weight in the decision-
making.  Cultural associations with the final Global Hawk specification, such as 
references to dual use, civil military functions of the Global Hawks increased with 
member state 'community of values' priorities; and the prestigious RMA culture 
encouraged consensus for the Global Hawks specification where this aligned with 
domestic programmes. 
 
Another aspect to finding an acceptable solution was where industrial actors sacrificed 
profit margin in supplying the surveillance solutions.  This had cost implications in that 
they did not reflect their full investments in the final price for the AGS solution.  The 
incentive for this was the reflected prestige of working with NATO.  This symbolic 
driver became significant in the balance when decision-making stalled and necessitated 
increased investment from industrial partners to continue to submit proposals.  Thus this 
driver gained in importance for the success of the collaboration.   
 
Despite its limitations in contested airspace, and the fact that it was an expensive 
solution for civil military roles, Global Hawks was chosen as a solution by member 
states.  It represented sophisticated US technology emanating from the US RMA culture.  
It could also be used for civil military roles that was attractive for member states, 
particularly for nations such as Germany who were buying this capability for domestic 
military forces as well.   
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4) Explanations for Bureaucratic Procurement Processes and Contractual 
Negotiations 
Organisation Theory explanations: Role expansion driver 
NATO, as an organisation, was eager to prove itself of use to member states in order to 
establish and expand its role in future security operations.  Therefore NATO's IS readily 
supported the AGS Programme, despite there being little European member state 
enthusiasm to buy a US generated capability.  However, the lack of scrutiny and slow 
pace of funding commitments to the Programme limited accountability and the influence 
of NATO on the procurement process, and lent power to member states.  This 
strengthened drivers such as industrial imperatives.   
 
Sociological Institutionalist Explanations: Standard Operating Procedures 
The procurement benefitted from NATO's SOPs and bureaucratic committees that kept 
the procurement process alive when momentum stalled.  NATO bureaucratic summits 
and conferences also provided opportunities for political intervention, and strengthened 
the multilateralism driver.  Bilateral meetings also circumvented laborious decision-
making structures and contributed to the generation of political support for the 
Programme.  These were especially important where the procurement stalled due to the 
clash of cost efficiency drivers and industrial imperatives.  At this point NATO's CNAD 
meetings and the AGS steering committee ensured continued efforts to fulfil the MMR.   
 
Strategic Choice Explanations: Industrial imperatives 
Finally, the form of contract used by NATO, 'Total System Performance Responsibility' 
with the Prime Contractor, NG, lent power to industry.  This meant that industry 
imperatives continued especially where the US supported NG's solutions.  The 
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transatlantic corporate teams suffered from cultural clashes between the European and 
US contractors, and these were exacerbated and given weight where member states 
supported their national contractors.   
 
In sum and to answer the research question, the 20-year length of time taken to acquire 
the AGS capability suggests that initial strategic rationale, industrial and technical 
imperatives, while contributing to the policy stage, were insufficient to fully explain the 
consensus for the AGS Programme.  These divisive calculus drivers clashed and caused 
the Programme to stall.  The low levels of scrutiny over the process led to a lack of 
discipline and restraint regarding IP and costs.  Agreement was only found where there 
was acceptable cost profile that met with a culturally acceptable security solution and a 
politically acceptable coalition within NATO.  Here, symbolic, cultural drivers gained in 
significance and generated collegiate dynamics related to civil military missions, 
multilateralism and prestige.  The cultural and political factors discussed above provided 
the essential glue and political support without which the Programme could not have 
survived the juste retour imperatives, the pulling and hauling of member state debates or 
the corporate difficulties in the transatlantic industrial teams.  
 
What is interesting about the findings is the change in balance of drivers during the three 
proposals.  Where IP and cost considerations paralysed the process, the motivation to 
progress the collaborative procurement did not fall to rational drivers of the security 
mission, but rather to symbolic drivers of multilateralism, civil military solutions and 
the tenacity of industry staff motivated by the prestige of a NATO contract.  Industrial 
imperative, calculus, drivers were strong and unchecked through the weak NATO 
organisational power and lack of public scrutiny.  However cultural, symbolic drivers 
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provided essential coherence for political support towards the Programme.  Without 
these cultural drivers the final Global Hawk proposal would not have survived the juste 
retour pulling and hauling of Member State debates or the corporate difficulties in the 




Chapter 5: EU Case Study  
Introduction 
This chapter considers the decision-making behind Frontex's944 procurement of two 
contracts for surveillance functions related to the Eurosur regulation.  Eurosur is a 
border surveillance network, a 'system of systems' that draws information from external 
sources to form a situational picture of activity at the EU borders to raise reaction 
capability.945  The last chapter considered NATO's award of just one contract for the 
procurement of its AGS capability, managed by a 'Prime Contractor', Northrop 
Grumman (NG).  NG then managed subcontracts for the related software and 
surveillance assets under this contract.  This chapter considers the Commission's smaller 
scale surveillance capability contracts, directly managed by Frontex rather than an 
industrial partner.   
 
The chapter considers two contracts, where the policy and procurement has evolved 
over a period of 12 years from 2003 to 2015.  First, the contract for IT services to build 
the Eurosur Communication Network (ECN), which coordinates and disseminates 
surveillance information amongst EU member states.  Second, the Aerial Surveillance 
Services (ASS) contract, where external contractors perform surveillance on behalf of 
Frontex.  These are two low value (in the context of security and defence spend) 
																																																																		
944. Frontex: 'European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders 
of the member states of the European Union': Hereafter known as Frontex, the Agency, or the 
Organisation. 
945. PAWLAK, P. & KUROWSKA, X. 2012. The fog of border. In: KAUNERT, C., LEONARD, S. & 
PAWLAK, P. (eds.) European homeland security: a European strategy in the making? Abingdon: 
Routledge. 
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contracts of €10 million - €12 million each.  Analysis of these contracts is significant in 
that they represent instances of the EU Commission (the Commission) procuring and 
carrying out security functions in its own right.  At that time in 2015, they were also the 
highest value procurements that Frontex had carried out.   
 
The research analysed the policy and procurement processes to identify drivers that 
facilitated member state political support and organisation incentives for the 
procurement of these contracts.  The study poses the research question: is the 
procurement of surveillance capability driven by calculus or culture?  It found the 
procurement in this case study has been driven by a combination of factors which 
included the migrant crisis, cultural alignments, role expansion, cost efficiency, and 
solidarity within the organisation culture. 
 
First, the rising numbers of illegal migrants since 2000, lead to the Frontex and Eurosur 
regulations forming key parts of EU policy to address member state concerns regarding 
border surveillance.  The security environment was pressurised with these concerns, 
which ranged from calculus security objectives linked to transnational crime, to cultural 
objectives for migrant safety and fundamental rights, linked to the Western 'community 
of values'.  The migrant crisis was high profile and generated much comment in popular 
and academic press.  This contributed to the urgency and scrutiny of Frontex's response 
and affected procurement activities concerning surveillance capability.   
 
Second, collaboration also symbolises cultural solidarity of member states.  The Frontex 
contracts demonstrate collaboration regarding a security function, demonstrating 
coherent strategic purposes and alliances.  This involves a certain cultural alignment and 
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evidence is shown of how imperatives, such as a civil security context and the humane 
treatment of illegal immigrants, facilitate political will for Frontex's expanded security 
mandate and agreement to the Eurosur regulation.  The research demonstrates how the 
successful procurement of the contracts reflect the Commission's ability to achieve 
member state political will by referring to these drivers.   
 
Third, the research found evidence of role expansion drivers where the two contracts 
procured delivered new security functions for the Commission and Frontex.  Here, 
Commission staff and procedures drove the procurement contracts that delivered 
surveillance capability.  The research applied the findings of Chapter Three to the case 
study and found that the bureaucratic structure and organisational culture enabled 
Frontex's procurement processes.  These include aspects such as the low levels of 
bureaucratic politics and access to funding, and are expanded below.   
 
Fourth, collaborative procurement is an effective way to fulfil joint border surveillance 
functions and can provide calculus cost efficiencies.  This may be through the sharing of 
assets, but also through cost efficiencies achieved through industrial competition related 
to contracts awarded by the Commission and Frontex.   
 
Frontex and the Commission's coherent organisation culture reduced bureaucratic 
politics and enhanced efficient decision-making.  The involvement of multiple member 
states brings a complexity to multilateral procurement that may or may not be managed 
by the organisation.  This study concludes that decision-making for the Frontex policy 
and procurement was coordinated and governed by the Commission's strategic vision for 
border surveillance.  It was underpinned by a coherent, culturally aligned staff with few 
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member state allegiances.  The organisation operated with reference to academic and 
research oriented positions alongside member state security concerns.  Thus the research 
also refers to some of the secondary literature that influenced policy for Frontex and 
Eurosur.   
 
The Commission was proactive in its strategy concerning border surveillance and 
related capabilities, linked to the FP7 planning and research programme946 followed by 
implementation of policy.947  This chapter finds that the Commission and Frontex's 
processes reduced reliance on member state decision-making, and the occurrence of 
bureaucratic politics, through its bureaucratic structure.  Some evidence of bureaucratic 
politics was found in the specification of the ECN,948 where national border agency 
objectives distracted from the most optimal solution.  However, the research found that 
the Commission and Frontex, achieved considerable decision-making efficiency 
regarding agreement to the proposed Eurosur policy and decision-making, and 
especially regarding the ASS949 contract.       
 
Frontex's procurement processes were also enabled by access to funding, the low value 
of the contracts and the Framework contract format.  A major factor in Frontex's 
effective procurement process is access to finance.  This empowers Frontex, lessens the 
influence of member state interests, and increases the weight of organisation objectives 
																																																																		
946. https://ec.europa.eu/research/fp7/understanding/fp7inbrief/what-is_en.html Accessed June 2017 
947. EU COUNCIL 2006. Council approves EU research programmes for 2007-2013; 16887/06 (Presse 
366). Brussels. 
948. Eurosur Communication Network 
949. Aerial Surveillance Services 
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for role expansion, and meeting societal expectations for organisational efficiency and 
functional legitimacy: 
 'I can tell you a very very simple but very important difference between NATO, 
the [EU] Council and this Agency of the Commission. .........  Council doesn't 
have money, the money has to be put for any activity you want to do. The 
Commission has the money and you have to find a good case to explain it.  So 
the difference is in NATO and in the European Defence agency, we have ideas 
and no money. Here we have money, I am trying to find ideas. It's a big 
difference, it is day and night.'950 
In 2016 Frontex' budgets grew from €84.9 million (in 2012)951 to €254m.952  This 
increase in budget reflects the Agency's widening remit.  Frontex budgets are small in 
the context of national defence budgets, but in relation to EU collaborative security 
functions this represents a large amount.  For example the European Defence Agency 
(EDA) budget was €30.5 million in 2016,953 and Europol's budget was €100.2 million in 
the same year.954  Audit reports reflect that the Agency sometimes did not spend the 
entire budget, which leads to censure regarding carryovers.955  This will be shown to be 
significant with regard to the procurement of the ASS contract.   
 
																																																																		
950. Personal Interview with Gregorio Ameyugo 
951. FRONTEX 2011. Frontex 2012 Programme of Work. Warsaw. 
952. https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Budget/Budget_2016.pdf Accessed April 2018 
953. https://www.eda.europa.eu/Aboutus/who-we-are/Finance Accessed May 2017 
954. EU COMMISSION 2016d. Statement of revenue and expenditure of the European Police Office for 
the financial year 2016. Brussels: Official Journal of the European Union. 
955. EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 2014b. Report on the annual accounts of the European 
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States for 
the financial year 2013. Luxembourg. 
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Frontex obtains financial authorisation via its Programme of Work (PoW) but it can also 
access other funds such as EU External Border Funds, and Research and Development 
Funds.956  Each year Frontex has a PoW with an associated budget that is written and 
approved in advance.  It is under this PoW that budgets for the contracts are, in theory, 
approved.  Thus the budget for Eurosur infrastructure can be seen in the 2010, 2011 
PoW and onwards.957  Interestingly the ASS contract did not appear in the PoW when it 
was first procured in 2014/2015, due to the short timeline of the migration crisis, 
although it does appear in the 2016 PoW.958  The PoW document is initiated by Frontex 
officials and approved by member state representatives on the Management Board and 
the Commission.  The input from the Commission is lengthy and from many different 
departments, including DG MHA,959 DG HR,960 DG Budget, DG Mare, European 
Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), and DG Grow for Research and Development.961  
Commission input in general, is significant and fundamental to the definition of the 
Frontex policy and workflow.   
 
Two further factors empower Frontex in the contracts analysed below, their low value 
and the Framework contract format.  First, taken individually, the contracts are small, 
																																																																		
956. EU COMMISSION 2008a. COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying 
document to the COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND 
THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Examining the creation of a European Border Surveillance 
System (EUROSUR) Impact assessment. Brussels. p.35 and confirmed by interview with EU Official 
957. FRONTEX 2009. Frontex Programme of Work 2010. Warsaw. p.34,38,57 ;FRONTEX 2010a. 
Frontex Programme of Work 2011. Warsaw. p.54; FRONTEX 2011. Frontex 2012 Programme of Work. 
Warsaw. 
958. FRONTEX 2015c. Frontex Single Programming Document 2016-2019, Warsaw. p.35 
959. Migration and Home Affairs 
960. Human Resources 
961. Personal Interview with 003 
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which means that Frontex is currently able to manage each contract individually, rather 
than employ a Prime Contractor.  EU officials find this control over contracts desirable 
compared to the use of Prime Contractors where the industrial partner may have a 
stronger position in the procurement process.  Another implication of the low value 
contracts is that larger industrial players find it difficult to make a profit, resulting in 
smaller companies being used.  These companies have less lobbying power, are eager to 
gain Commission contracts for prestigious reasons, and are easier for Frontex to 
manage.   
 
Second, the Framework form of contract conferred negotiating powers to the Agency.  It 
allowed Frontex to retain flexibility regarding the specification of the services required, 
and enhanced competitive behaviour by industrial partners as there are multiple tenders 
within the contract.  This increased the efficiency of the procurement process, especially 
for the ASS contracts.  The Framework contract is described in greater detail below.  
 
A final point overarching the Frontex procurement activities is that the role expansion of 
the Commission into the security arena has been closely observed by academic and 
liberal observers.  Some have criticised the Commission's aspirations and allege that 
industry interests lead to disregard for fundamental human rights of illegal migrants.962  
Commission decision-making activities are somewhat transparent with Parliamentary 
transcripts and amendments to legislation, such as the Eurosur regulation, available in 
																																																																		
962. BIGO, D. & JEANDESBOZ, J. 2010. The EU and the European Security Industry, Questioning the 
'Public-Private Dialogue'. CEPS, IN:EX Policy Brief, No.5.; HAYES, B. 2009. NeoConOpticon, the EU 
Security Industrial Complex. Statewatch.; AKKERMAN, M. 2016b. Border Wars, The Arms Dealers 
Profiting from Europe's Refugee Tragedy. Transnational Institute. 
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the EU Official Journal.963  Procurement documents are accessed on the EU Tender 
Electronic Daily (TED) website or via requests under right of access to documents in the 
EU treaties, as developed in Regulation 1049/2001.964  Budgetary spending behaviour is 
further scrutinised by the European Court of Auditors who make annual reports as well 
as special reports on particular issues.  The research found two consequences of this 
scrutiny and criticism.  First, it transmitted humanitarian, liberal, cultural concerns for 
migrant safety and influenced the tone of the regulation and drivers for procurement, 
especially for the ASS Contract.  Second, it generated caution and emphasis on efficient 
decision-making, partly due to the scrutiny, partly due to Frontex's care for procurement 
competence and thus its reputation.   
 
A summary of events is outlined below indicating the structure of the case study 
chapter: 
Timeline 2003 - 2015 
Section 1: Creation of Frontex and Eurosur Policy 
2003 Civipol publishes ' Feasibility study on the control of the European Union's 
maritime borders'965 
2004 Frontex formed via EU Council Regulation 2007/2004/EC966 as the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
																																																																		
963. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/HIS/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052&qid=1495883813752 
Accessed May 2017 
964. http://ted.europa.eu/TED/main/HomePage.do Accessed April 2018;  
REGULATION (EC) No 1049/2001 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 
30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents 
965. CIVIPOL CONSEIL 2003. Project 114410 “Feasibility study on the control of the European Union’s 
maritime borders”. In: COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (ed.). Brussels. 
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External Borders of the member state of the European Union. This called 
for the establishment of a ECN and allowed for the procurement of services 
2008-
2013 
Eurosur Regulation discussed internally with the Commission and EU 
Member states 
 
Section 2: Finalising the Eurosur Regulation and Procuring the Eurosur 
Communication Network (ECN) 
2010 
€2m Contract for the Pilot Project awarded to GMV for the IT infrastructure 
including the ECN 
2011 
Frontex regulation revised via Regulation 1168/2011.967  Article 8 allows 
for further procurement or lease of technical equipment by the agency 
2013 Eurosur Regulation published to establish border surveillance system968 
2014 
€12m Framework Contract awarded to GMV for maintenance and evolution 




966. EU COUNCIL 2004. COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 2007/2004. Brussels. 
967. EU COUNCIL 2011. COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1168/2011 amending COUNCIL 
REGULATION (EC) No 2007/2004. Brussels. 
968. EU COMMISSION 2013b. REGULATION (EU) No 1052/2013 OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the European Border Surveillance System, 
Eurosur. Brussels: Official Journal of the European Union. 
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Section 3: Procurement of the Aerial Surveillance Services (ASS) Contract 
2014 Frontex runs a pilot project for ASS 
2015 April Frontex issues contractor notice for €10m ASS Contract 
 
July ASS Framework Contract awarded to the Consortia of: EASP Air 
(Netherlands); CAE Aviation s.a.r.l. (Luxembourg); Diamond-Executive 
Aviation Ltd (UK); Défense Conseil International (France); Vigilance BV 
(Netherlands); Indra Sistemas SA (Spain) ; SIA 'Meža īpašnieku 
konsultatīvais centrs' (Latvia) 
 
 
The chapter identifies and analyses three periods in Frontex policy and procurement 
processes regarding the two contracts:  first, the formation of the EU border monitoring 
policy, and the creation of the Eurosur project (2003 - 2009); second, the procurement of 
the Pilot phase of the ECN software, formation of the Eurosur regulation, and the 
transition from the Pilot phase to the Live phase of the ECN (2009 - 2015); and third, 
the procurement of ASS contract (2014-2015).     
 
Evidence gathered suggests that calculus concerns for security mission fulfilment and 
role expansion were the dominant drivers for the procurement in the organisational 
context.  However, data indicates that cultural drivers in relation to societal, 
humanitarian concerns regarding illegal migration in the macro context.   Other drivers 
are also acknowledged to the extent that they have an impact on the procurement; these 
include bureaucratic standard operating procedures (SOPs) such as policy 
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implementation and financing arrangements.  These drivers will be categorised as to 
whether they represent calculus or cultural drivers below. 
 
Section 1: Creation of Frontex and Eurosur Policy (2003 - 
2009) 
This section identifies drivers behind the policy for cooperative border surveillance and 
the Eurosur regulation and infrastructure.  Eurosur is a border surveillance network, a 
'system of systems' which draws information from a number of sources to provide a 
situational picture used to monitor activity at the EU borders and enhance reaction 
capability.969  The ECN infrastructure was outlined in the 2008 Commission 
Communication 'Examining the creation of a European Border Surveillance System 
(EUROSUR)'970 and further expanded in the 2011 Impact Assessment document.971  
Information is fed into the system via a network of hubs and nodes.  Under the 
arrangements, each member state has a National Coordination Centre (NCC).  There is a 
Frontex hardware 'node' installed in each NCC to interface with a similar node installed 
in the Frontex Situation Centre (FSC).972   
 
																																																																		
969. PAWLAK, P. & KUROWSKA, X. 2012. The fog of border. In: KAUNERT, C., LEONARD, S. & 
PAWLAK, P. (eds.) European homeland security: a European strategy in the making? Abingdon: 
Routledge. p.134 
970. EU COMMISSION 2008b. Examining the creation of a European Border Surveillance System 
(EUROSUR) COM(2008) 68 final. Brussels. 
971. EU COMMISSION 2011c. Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Border Surveillance System 
(EUROSUR). Brussels. 
972. Personal Interview with Gregorio Ameyugo 
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As referred to in Chapter Two, most EU member states national security strategies 
reflected concerns over illegal transnational movement.  However, it was the 
Commission who explored options for cooperative border surveillance and policing.  
This led to the creation of Frontex, the Eurosur legislation and entailed the procurement 
of the ECN software and ASS contract.973  The section explores how these policies 
expanded the mandate of Frontex and initiated the procurement of Frontex's surveillance 
infrastructure and capability.  It demonstrates that the Commission rather than member 
states drove the policy.  Although member state representatives agreed and authorised 
the process, Commission officials wrote the policy and drove consensus at the decision-
making meetings.   
 
The section first explores the origins for Frontex policy in the macro security context, 
including the literature that informed EU and member state actions.  It then continues to 
consider the drivers for the policy and procurement of a surveillance capability in the 
organisational context.  It finds that the Commission facilitated and drove the process 
via by meeting member state security and 'community of values' expectations. 
 
European Security Context 
From 2003 to 2009, EU member states focussed on security issues such as terrorism 
related to post 9/11 and the Madrid bombings.974  During this period illegal migration 
across European borders, particularly from the south, was linked to terrorism975 but also 
																																																																		
973. EU COUNCIL 2004. COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 2007/2004. Brussels. 
974. These were generally explored in Chapter Two with regard to EU member state National Security 
Strategies 
975. LUTTERBECK, D. 2006. Policing Migration in the Mediterranean: ESSAY. Mediterranean politics, 
11, 59-82. 
	 292 
associated with humanitarian challenges.976  There was a small body of literature that 
addressed the concerns of illegal migration at this time.977  For example, Lutterbeck 
described migrant routes through the Mediterranean and the counter measures used by 
member states.978  Also, in October 2005, a Europol report focussed on organised crime 
and cross border crimes.  It emphasised eastern routes and borders of the EU such as 
Albanian, Greek and Serbian borders.979   
 
This section concentrates on civil security (rather than military) concerns for terrorism 
and cross border crime as these security concerns fall within the Commission's remit and 
relate to the creation of Frontex and the Eurosur regulation. During this period, two 
aspects are relevant for EU strategy regarding surveillance solutions.  First, two 
influential reports made recommendations: In 2004, 'Research for a Secure Europe' was 
written by a 'Group of Personalities' which included politicians and industrial figures 
from European Industry.980  This report built upon the 2003 European Security Strategy 
(ESS)981 and referred to globalisation and the movement of people as a threat.  It called 
for both military and civilian responses and lists missions to include border control, 
																																																																		
976. PUGH, M. 2001. Mediterranean Boat People: a case for co-operation? Mediterranean Politics, 6, 1-
20. 
977. MONZINI, P. 2007. Sea-border crossings: The organization of irregular migration to Italy. Ibid.12, 
163-184.; BALDWIN-EDWARDS, M. 2005. Migration in the Middle East and Mediterranean: A regional 
study prepared for the Global Commission on International Migration. 
978. LUTTERBECK, D. 2006. Policing Migration in the Mediterranean: ESSAY. Mediterranean politics, 
11, 59-82. 
979. EUROPOL 2005. 2005 EU Organised Crime Report Public Version. The Hague. 
980. BUSQUIN, P. & ERKKI, L. 2004. Research for a Secure Europe, Report of the Group of 
Personalities in the field of Security Research. Luxembourg: Office for the Official Publications of the 
European Communities. 
981. EU 2003. A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy. Brussels. 
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protection of critical infrastructure and disaster management.982  The report was 
criticised as having an 'industrial complex' agenda,983 but nonetheless was important for 
articulating concerns regarding cross border movement that the Frontex and the Eurosur 
regulation would later meet.  In 2006, the European Security Research Agenda report 
had a similar theme.984   
 
Second, the 7th Framework Programme (FP7) project was launched in 2007 to increase 
the EU's research and development activities.985  It had a budget of over €50bn, of which 
€1.4bn was earmarked for security.986  This project aimed to encourage industrial and 
technical development in security sectors so that the EU could compete with other 
nations such as the US.987  Despite these research projects, there was little follow on 
procurement for security programmes, partly because the EU had little mandate in this 
area988 - until the Frontex / Eurosur project.  The 2011 Eurosur progress report makes 
explicit reference that Eurosur should refer to these efforts: 'FRONTEX should ensure 
that the results of research and development are continuously used for developing 
																																																																		
982. BUSQUIN, P. & ERKKI, L. 2004. Research for a Secure Europe, Report of the Group of 
Personalities in the field of Security Research. Luxembourg: Office for the Official Publications of the 
European Communities. p.18 
983. HAYES, B. 2009. NeoConOpticon, the EU Security Industrial Complex. Statewatch. 
984. ESRAB 2006. Meeting the Challenge: The European Security Research Agenda. European Security 
Research Advisory Board Report. Luxembourg. 
985. EU COMMISSION 2016a. Commission presents its evaluation of the 7th Framework Programme for 
Research. Brussels. 
986. EU COUNCIL 2006. Council approves EU research programmes for 2007-2013; 16887/06 (Presse 
366). Brussels. 
987. MÖRTH, U. 2003. Framing an American Threat: the European Commission and the Technology 
Gap. 
988. MAWDSLEY, J. 2013b. A European Agenda for Security Technology: From Innovation Policy to 
Export Controls. Flemish Peace Institute, Report. 
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EUROSUR.'989  It must be noted that most of these projects do not relate to the two 
contracts examined in this research but were relevant to other aspects of the Eurosur 
programme such as satellite and maritime surveillance.990   
 
The context described above informed EU member states and Commission decision 
makers when considering Frontex and Eurosur policy, generating objectives to address 
security concerns, the humanitarian agenda, and industrial interests. 
 
Frontex Policy 
The origins of Frontex and Eurosur policy can be traced to 2001 when the Commission 
instigated border management policy and published a Communication that referenced 
coordination of European border guard operations.991  In 2003 Civipol (a French 
security consultancy)992 wrote a report that called for an integrated information system 
to monitor illegal migration at the EU's Maritime Borders: 'Feasibility Study on the 
Control of the European Union's Maritime borders'.993  It made reference to the existing 
surveillance arrangements of the Spanish 'Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Exterior' 
(SIVE) system, and the Finnish Vessel Traffic Monitoring Information System 
(VTMIS).  The report estimated that a similar EU system could be set up at a cost of 
																																																																		
989. EU COMMISSION 2011b. Determining the technical and operational framework of the European 
Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) and the actions to be taken for its establishment SEC(2011) 145 
final, Brussels. 
990. FERNANDEZ, G. A. 5th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean, Multi 
Dimensional Security. 
991. EU COMMISSION 2001a. Communication from the Commission to the Council and European 
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€150 million.994  This project was not adopted, but moves to create an agency to monitor 
the EU's borders were in progress, and in 2004 the European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the member state of 
the European Union or 'Frontex' was formed and based in Warsaw, Poland.995   
 
The Frontex regulation996 stipulated that the Agency would coordinate member state 
efforts for border regulation and maintain the Schengen Code as a 'specialised expert 
body tasked with improving the coordination of operational cooperation between 
member states in the field of external border management.'997  Three aspects made the 
Frontex regulation acceptable to member states.  First, member states were clear that 
any security capability associated with border management would be controlled by 
them.  Second, border control would be a civil security function rather than a military 
function.  Third, the regulation addressed humanitarian requirements regarding the 
safety of migrants.   
 
First, control of border management by member states is expressly laid out in the 
Frontex Regulation:  
'The responsibility for the control and surveillance of external borders lies with 
the member states. The Agency should facilitate the application of existing and 
future Community measures relating to the management of external borders by 
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ensuring the coordination of member states' actions in the implementation of 
those measures.'998   
However, Article 8 para 3 allows for Frontex functionality and states: 'The Agency may 
acquire technical equipment for control and surveillance of external borders to be used 
by its experts for the duration of the deployment in the member state(s) in question.'999  
This was strengthened in 2011 when the regulation was amended to:1000   
'The Agency may acquire, itself or in co-ownership with a member state, or lease 
technical equipment for external border control to be deployed during joint 
operations, pilot projects, rapid interventions, joint return operations or technical 
assistance projects in accordance with the financial rules applicable to the 
Agency.'   
This authority for procurement authorises the Agency to perform the security functions 
of intelligence sharing and surveillance, not just in cooperation with member states, but 
also in its own right. It provides incentive for role expansion.  Thus, Frontex's 
procurement of surveillance capability, the ECN and ASS, performed with respect to the 
legislation above, achieved role expansion despite member states' initial concerns to 
control border management.  This in part was due to the Commission's alignment with 
acceptable strategic cultural aspects of the border surveillance function in the second 
and third aspects below. 
 
Second, the civil security aspect was important as it placed the remit of border 
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(EDA) which is concerned with military capabilities, see Chapter Three).  The Schengen 
Code was conceived within the civil security sphere, and any measures taken with 
reference to the Code at the EU borders are expressly non-military.1001  Existing member 
state border management agents are mainly coast guards but some countries, such as 
France, Italy and Malta, have military aspects to their border management.  However, 
the Commission was careful to emphasise the civil security elements leading to 'civil 
military' type solutions.  An EU military capability has historically been contentious 
with some member states, like the UK, who focus on NATO as the region's military 
cooperative effort.1002  Academic and journalist critics were also sensitive to the military 
aspects of the Commission's increased security role.1003  However, the Frontex 
regulation meant that the function could be legitimately fulfilled within the civil security 
remit of the Schengen Code.1004   
 
Third, amendments made to the Frontex regulation show humanitarian aspects of the 
role being emphasised.1005  These amendments were important to gain political will for 
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the regulation.  Thus, once concerns relating to this humanitarian aspect were addressed, 
further competences could be allocated to Frontex.  This evidence indicates that ideas of 
liberal progress towards a common good, such as multilateral responsibility for migrant 
safety, facilitated agreement of member states for Frontex, an EU Agency, to procure 
equipment and to perform security functions such as intelligence sharing and aerial 
surveillance.  While this aspect is important for societal acceptance of Frontex's 
increased powers, it is paradoxical in this context as it does not solve the problem of 
illegal migration and associated transnational crime - indeed surveillance probably 
encourages it.  An interviewee observed that increased surveillance was not a solution to 
the illegal migration as this, and the increased maritime patrols, meant that 'more 
migrants are going to sea than ever'.1006  
 
This section has demonstrated that the Frontex policy and regulation were achieved via 
alignment with member state security concerns but also within an acceptable strategic 
culture of civil military solutions and the Western 'community of values'.  The next 
section considers the Eurosur policy in the same vein. 
  
Eurosur Policy 
The Frontex regulation authorised the Agency to coordinate the monitoring of the EU's 
borders, but member states also had to agree to the methods and principles by which 
they could share border information.  In 2005 the EU Council authorised Frontex to 
carry out two feasibility studies1007 for Eurosur funded by the External Border Fund: 
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Bortec and MEDSEA.1008  Some, slightly critical, analysis has been carried out on the 
costings of these studies,1009 but for this research it is pertinent in that these studies led 
to the specification of National Coordination Centre (NCC) infrastructure for the 
ECN.1010   
 
In 2008 the Commission issued a Communication that examined the setting up of 
Eurosur in its 'Stockholm Programme'.1011  The Communication ascertained three 
objectives for border surveillance that met with member state security and strategic 
cultural concerns: first, to reduce illegal immigration via the provision of timely and 
reliable information; second, to contribute to the prevention of cross border crime; third, 
to enhance search and rescue capability and prevent the loss of life during migration.1012  
Thus the Commission, backed by the political support of member states, drove the 
creation of Eurosur.   
 
The Commission document set out three phases and the next steps for the 
implementation of Eurosur.1013  Phase 1, is relevant to this case study and entailed 
'Upgrading and extending national border surveillance systems and interlinking national 
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infrastructures in a ECN'.1014   The other two phases were: Phase 2, targeting research 
and development to improve the performance of surveillance tools and sensors (e.g. 
satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles), and developing a common application of 
surveillance tools; Phase 3, to create a Common Information Sharing Environment 
(CISE) between the relevant national authorities.  The Communication expanded the 
three phases into 8 steps of implementation.  Phase 1 consisted of three steps, which 
included the creation of the ECN that would link surveillance infrastructure between 
member states.  This provided the policy behind the ECN Contract analysed below.1015  
Step 2 entailed the procurement of ECN software that linked member states. An Impact 
Assessment of Eurosur,1016 that accompanied the Communication, outlined the financing 
arrangements.  This was important for the feasibility of the project and indicated that 
there were no financing implications for member states.1017  Thus the Commission 
continued to drive the process forward by meeting member state concerns for cost and 
implementation. 
 
The 2009 Eurosur progress report revealed that member states had agreed, in principal, 
to the Eurosur regulation.1018  While member states controlled the final approval of the 
Eurosur regulation, the Commission's influence and control over Eurosur and Frontex 
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with member state cultural concerns; and providing the financial means to realised the 
project.   
 
First, the Commission drove the drafting of the policy papers, both in process and via 
the charismatic leadership of the Policy Officer for Eurosur, Oliver Seiffarth.1019  He is 
referred to as the 'father' of Eurosur,1020 and oversaw the drafting of the Eurosur 
regulation and agreement of the member states.  The documents referred to above 
provide evidence for the Commission driving Eurosur policy and this is backed up by 
interviews held at Frontex.  A Frontex official commented that the Commission 
dominated the process, and that Eurosur was very much a Commission initiative 
'because they have their own interests for Eurosur'.1021  Another interviewee noted that if 
Frontex had not taken the role, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) would 
have fulfilled it, indicating the Commission's determination to organise the functionality 
via one of its Agencies.1022  The Eurosur Regulation later stipulated that Frontex had to 
provide the network.1023   
 
Second, the Commission facilitated the agreement of member states by addressing 
cultural concerns regarding civil security and humanitarian issues in the 2008 
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Communication objectives for Eurosur mentioned above.1024  An interviewee observed 
that member states and the Commission allocated money to Frontex as a salve to 
societal concerns, passing the burden onto Frontex.1025  This represents a cultural, 
ideational motive, as the need to save lives does not address identified, fundamental 
threats.   
 
Third, the Commission ensured that finance the Eurosur programme was readily 
available via multiple budgets.  This was important for member states who did not want 
additional financial obligations associated with the programme.1026  Finance for border 
surveillance was available via Frontex budgets (authorised through the PoW), either via 
grants or direct procurement, and also from various EU sources including the EU's 
External Borders Fund, which totalled €1.8bn between 2007 - 2013.1027  The 2007 - 
2013 Internal Security Fund of €4.6bn could also be used for Frontex operations and 
functionality.1028   
 
The study finds therefore, that the Commission drove Frontex and its Eurosur policy.  
Member states were concerned about illegal migration and transnational crime, but did 
not instigate the policy.  Rather, evidence gathered from regulation amendments and 
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interview data indicates that member states sought to constrain the Commission role.1029  
The Commission overcame these misgivings by meeting member state calculus 
concerns about the purpose and cost of the Eurosur solutions, and their cultural concerns 
regarding the civil nature of the security solution and treatment of migrants.  Previous 
chapters have indicated that the Commission had calculus role expansion motives in the 
security arena.1030  However, alternative rationales for the Commission driving Frontex 
and Eurosur policy include industrial and technical imperatives, where the Commission 
could use policy to develop and procure sophisticated surveillance technology to 
compete with other nations, such as the US, thus meeting recommendations in the 
European Group of Personalities and ESRAB reports.  Evidence for industrial and 
technical imperatives will be considered in the procurement outcomes below.  The next 
section considers the processes and outcomes of the finalised Eurosur regulation in 
2013, and the procurement of the ECN. 
 
Section 2: Finalising the Eurosur Regulation and Procuring 
the ECN (2009 - 2015) 
This section follows the implementation of Eurosur policy and the procurement of the 
Eurosur Communication Network (ECN) in four stages.  First, the agreement of member 
states to the specification and format of the ECN.  Second, this happened concurrently 
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with the final drafting of the Eurosur regulation, which was published in 2013.  Third, 
decision-making related to the Pilot phase contract (Pilot) for the ECN software, a €2 
million contract awarded in 2010.1031  Fourth, the Pilot and the Eurosur regulation then 
significantly informed the procurement of the €12 million Live phase 'Framework 
contract for the maintenance and evolution of the Eurosur network' in 2014.1032  Thus, in 
an unusual move, software from the Pilot ECN was merely adapted for the Live phase, 
rather than rebuilding the software with reference to the Pilot prototype.1033  The study 
finds that this was due to timing constraints as the Eurosur regulation came into force, 
but that the migration crisis and the threat of rival systems also heightened urgency for 
the final contract solution.   
 
The ECN contract was one of the largest procurements carried out by the Agency since 
its inception.  The research found that Frontex and Commission actors drove agreement 
to the Eurosur regulation, the initial Pilot specification and procurement of the ECN 
software.  The Commission's incentives included role expansion, expanding and 
establishing its civil security remit, especially in the context of rival systems such as 
MARSUR.1034  They achieved their objectives by meeting member state concerns on the 
emphasis on Frontex's coordination role, diluting intelligence sharing parameters to 
acceptable levels for national border agencies, streamlining procurement processes so 
																																																																		
1031. FRONTEX 2010b. Invitation to the Open Tender procedure No: Frontex/OP/98/2010-Eurosur Big 
Pilot Project. Warsaw. 
1032. FRONTEX 2012. Contract Notice: framework contract for maintenance and evolution of the 
Eurosur network. TED.; FRONTEX. 2014c. GMV contract notice for Eurosur [Online]. Available: 
http://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:17853-2014:TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=1 accessed December 
2014 [Accessed December 2014]. 
1033. Phone and Personal Interview with 008, 003 
1034. https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/maritime-surveillance-(marsur) 
Accessed April 2018 
	 305 
that member state decision-making and financial burdens were low, and aligning with 
Western 'community of values' in the Eurosur legislation.   
 
Security and Organisation Context 
In the period preceding the ECN and ASS contracts, EU member states became 
increasingly concerned with the rise of illegal migration, and also the loss of life 
resulting from the dangerous routes and methods used by migrants to come to 
Europe.1035  European member state security actors increasingly mentioned strategic 
concerns for the rising level of illegal migration.1036  The Syrian conflict continued to 
drive people from their homes and many wanted to reach the relative safety of 
Europe1037 via the porous borders in Turkey and Greece.1038  By 2014 this represented 
the largest population movements in Europe since the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia 
in the 1990's.1039  References to Frontex in the context of these increased movements 
were frequent and led to an increase in Frontex's resources linked to an expectation 
related to Frontex's role in the crisis. 
 
Security concerns for a rise in transnational crime and terrorism arose from the 
migration crisis, but another driver for increased monitoring of EU borders was a 
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cultural, ideational emphasis on the plight of the migrants due to the dangerous routes 
used to gain access to Europe.  This concern reflected EU ideals of a civilised, 
progressive society, related to the concept of the EU as a community of values.1040  The 
increasing emphasis on the plight of migrants was reflected in member state politics, 
such as the Maltese Prime Minister's evocative reference to the Mediterranean as 
becoming 'a cemetery'.1041  Influential press and academic literature also contributed to 
the discourse with accounts such as the 'Left to Die' report.1042  This enhanced political 
will for surveillance programmes to monitor these routes, and again led to calls for 
increased Commission and Frontex led activity in transnational border areas such as the 
Mediterranean migration routes from Libya, or from Turkey.   
 
As noted above, the humanitarian logic ran counter to the rational, strategic concerns of 
transnational crime and terrorism arising from this illegal population movement, as 
increased European surveillance activity was an incentive for migrants to make these 
journeys in order to be found by the surveillance patrols.1043  Therefore surveillance 
does not present a solution to the problem of illegal migration; rather it exacerbates it 
and counters member state efforts to stem the tide of movement from the South and East 
of the Mediterranean.  
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A related cultural factor that affected the policy and procurement surveillance 
capabilities was the concern for migrant's fundamental rights.  Observers and academics 
were increasingly critical of Commission and Frontex solutions to the migration 
problem, with allegations of militarised response to the situation, and alliance with 
industry actors rather than considering NGO led solutions.1044  This literature alleged 
that member state security and corporate profit interests superseded the concern for 
fundamental rights of the migrants and betrayed the values of the EU community.  The 
Commission and Parliament tried to address these cultural concerns, as seen in the 
Frontex regulation amendments referred to in the sections above.1045  Frontex also made 
repeated allusions to its humanitarian efforts in an attempt to meet member state 
requirements and to respond to the criticisms.1046  An additional consideration during the 
procurement was therefore the preservation of the reputation of the Agency.  This made 
Frontex cautious when proceeding with surveillance tasks and even partaking in 
research such as this.  It meant that concern for a successful and efficient procurement 
was foremost in the Agency's objectives, due to the scrutiny that it was likely to receive.  
 
Regarding organisational drivers, the research found evidence that Frontex was initially 
reluctant to expand its workload and change its work patterns.  It therefore concluded 
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that drivers for the additional security remit and the ECN stemmed from the 
Commission.  The Commission encouraged the implementation of Eurosur policy, and 
issued documents centrally.  Further, while the EU had a civil security remit related to 
Schengen, the military surveillance solution that had been supplied by MARSUR, and 
then later Operation SOPHIA,1047 provided a level of competition for coordination of 
EU border intelligence.1048   This gave the Commission additional drivers to provide a 
solution for coordinating border intelligence that could beat other rival solutions, 
including CISE that was delegated to DG MARE.1049  
 
Procurement of the ECN Infrastructure 
Frontex had to procure and specify ECN software for exchange of border information 
where both the form and content were acceptable to member states.  Throughout 2009 to 
2010, the Commission gained member state assent for three aspects.  First, agreement to 
the principle of sharing data and to participate in the ECN; second, agreement to the data 
content to be exchanged via the ECN; and third, the format of the ECN software 
infrastructure.  This inevitably involved compromise, especially where border agencies 
were protective of the information that they collected.  
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First, the Commission had to organise member state participation in the Eurosur project.  
This required a certain amount of persuasion.  The first six member states to commit 
included those with greatest strategic interest in the project.  This included Poland 
(where Frontex was based), Spain (forefront of both the migration problem and 
industrial solutions for surveillance), Italy (at the forefront of the migration problem), 
Slovakia, France (industrial interests) and Finland.1050   
 
Member state discussion centred on the extent of their obligations under the Eurosur 
regulation.  Principally, the Commission and Oliver Seiffarth drove progress and 
agreement to the proposals.  The strategy was to gain momentum so that the others 
followed this direction and consensus was found.  A Frontex official observed that he 
was 'really pushing' and talking bilaterally to obtain single state agreement before taking 
an issue to a broader audience of member states.  Strategic1051 tactics were used by the 
Agency to gain momentum and support for the Pilot.  Where non-participating member 
states began to be interested and to attend the Eurosur meetings: 'I sat them in the 
second row to make perfectly clear, that I was discussing with four.  All the others were 
sitting behind.'1052  Progress of the programme was well organised by Frontex and the 
Commission and agreement to the Eurosur regulation proceeded efficiently according to 
the policy papers issued.1053   
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In 2010, the Eurosur project was divided into workgroups that focussed on its technical 
framework (associated with the infrastructure) and the operational framework (the rules 
and workflows for the sharing of information).  These working groups consisted of 
member states, European Agencies such as Frontex, EMSA, and the Commission.1054  
Thus the Commission bureaucracy and officials ensured that momentum was maintained 
and that progress was made towards the regulation and subsequent procurement of the 
ECN. 
 
The second stage was to secure consensus regarding the data content shared via the 
ECN.  Difficulties arose where different member state agencies controlled border 
surveillance information and did not want to share their responsibilities and power base 
linked to this information.  There was only one NCC per country, but there were often 
multiple border agencies who dealt with different aspects of border management, such 
as land borders, sea borders and airport borders.  Therefore border guard representatives 
in these meetings were anxious to control the information that they generated.  For 
example, in France border surveillance is traditionally carried out by the French Navy in 
the Maritime area, but by the police for the land and air borders.1055  Frontex initially 
engaged with French border surveillance teams via the Department of International 
Affairs and the national police rather than the Navy.  Therefore there were inter-
departmental tensions as to which service would maintain the NCC.  An official 
commented that there were different French agency representatives at every meeting.1056  
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This inter service tension between member state border agencies led to restrictions in the 
form and amount of intelligence that they were prepared to share, both internally and 
externally.  Officials tasked with initiating the ECN Pilot phase, corroborate this when 
describing the process of defining the parameters of the shared surveillance data.  
National representatives were asked for not just what information they gathered but 
what they felt that were able to share.1057  The impact of this was that there was 
agreement to share only low levels of intelligence data on the ECN.1058 
 
The third stage was agreement to the format of the ECN infrastructure.  Officials noted 
that the ECN architecture was accepted by member states because the software remained 
external and information gathered was 'push' only, i.e. submitted by the member state 
border agencies rather than Frontex accessing national systems.1059  Decision-making 
took place between member state border surveillance agencies and the Commission (DG 
MHA), with representatives from Frontex.  Member states were primarily concerned 
with control of data input.  This overrode any technical concerns, so a technical 
imperative was certainly not a driver for procurement of the Pilot phase software.  A 
Frontex official commented that the infrastructure was not 'the most modern set up' as 
the member states wanted to retain control over the information that they shared with 
Frontex.1060  This demonstrates that member state reticence impacted the form of the 
ECN and restrained the sophistication of the technology used.  Thus the drivers for the 
member state agreement to the Eurosur at this point was a bureaucratic calculus to 
maintain information and the related power.  This negated any presence of a technical 
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imperative for the procurement and led to a compromised outcome for the specification 
of the software infrastructure. 
 
A further factor in the member state acceptance of the ECN was the financial 
independence of the scheme.  Member states were keen to avoid any financing 
obligations.1061  Therefore they were pleased to find that Frontex supplied all the 
hardware associated with setting up the NCC and that the funding considerations for the 
ECN were being found at the Commission level.1062  Here, the strategic prominence of 
Frontex' border management role meant that allocation of funds was a priority at the DG 
MHA level, so budget was allocated centrally via the PoW.1063  Second, there were 
additional funds available that supported the Eurosur infrastructure under the External 
Borders Fund, a limited amount from FP7 funding, and the later arrangements of the 
Internal Security Funds.1064   
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From January 2009 to January 2010, Oliver Seiffarth commissioned a feasibility study, 
funded under the External Borders Fund: 'to develop the key concepts of EUROSUR, in 
particular, the technical and management concepts for establishing or further developing 
national border surveillance systems and national coordination centres.'1065  It was 
awarded to the German company, ESG, who then subcontracted to EADS, SELEX, 
Thales.1066  The study used an academic consultant, SECUNET (University of the 
German Federal Army).  Some literature regarding EU border surveillance solutions 
alleges that private sector industrial pressure led to border surveillance policy and the 
procurement of the Eurosur functionality.1067  However, the research concludes that the 
ECN Pilot outcomes do not demonstrate evidence of inefficient juste retour or lobbying 
from this feasibility stage.   
 
The Commission made budgetary allocations for the ECN Pilot centrally, thus avoiding 
any ‘juste retour’ or member state leverage.1068  Further, overt member state promotion 
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of national industry runs counter to the culture of the Commission and Frontex.1069  
When questioned on member state sponsorship for contractors, Frontex officials 
emphasised the level playing field between member states related to Commission 
contracts, observing that it would be an 'unimaginable situation' for member states to 
promote national contractors.1070   
 
Finally, scrutiny of Frontex by academic and journalist communities would not support 
member state sponsorship.  There was some evidence that industrial actors lobbied the 
Commission and Frontex directly before the ECN Pilot contract award.  A Frontex 
official noted the industry lobbying activity at this point, where Selex, GMV, and Thales 
all demonstrated potential infrastructure arrangements:1071  'they did [a] mini pilot, and 
then they also called Oliver frequently and wanted to know the status.  But I think that 
Thales was like the most pushy of all of them.'1072  The research concludes that as the 
Pilot contract was awarded to GMV, while the contractors from the feasibility study, 
such as Thales, did not gain from their lobbying activities. 
 
The tender process is a bureaucratic, standard operational procedure.  The €2 million 
Pilot contract was awarded through an Open Tender procedure and the Invitation to 
Tender was issued in April 2010.1073  While Commission officials and member states 
were involved with the policy decisions for the ECN, the Frontex procurement team 
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carried out procurement decisions.1074  The Commission's Open Tender Procedure1075 is 
a generic, transparent process that can be tracked online via the EU Official Journal and 
the TED1076 website where notices are published.  Further, official requests can be made 
for the Tender Dossier documents under the EU Regulation 1049/2001.1077  These 
documents are not classified and easy to obtain.   
 
Contract notices are issued making an invitation to tender followed by an evaluation and 
contract award according to a strict scoring schedule.1078  The Frontex Procurement 
team with the Research and Development Unit (RDU), tasked with specifying the assets 
or capability required, wrote tender documents and specifications.  For the Live ECN 
the tender documents were also written with the Information, Communications and 
Technology (ICT) Unit.1079  For the ASS contract examined in the next section, RDU 
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and the Pooled Services Unit wrote them.1080  A Tender Dossier is issued containing 
Tender Specification Document (which explains the evaluation and scoring for the 
contract award) and a draft contract.  An Evaluation Committee (EC) is formed for each 
contract, for the ECN contract EC there were 4-5 people from Operations, from ICT, 
and from the Procurement teams.1081  Thus the procurement process is Frontex led with 
little intervention from member state or industrial representatives.  The ECN Pilot 
contract was awarded in November 2010 to the Spanish contractor, GMV.1082 
 
The research found no evidence of member state sponsorship or lobbying at the tender 
and contract award stage.  Industrial competition for the Frontex contracts was fierce as 
working with the Commission is prestigious and could lead to other contracts with 
member states or the Commission.1083  There are high levels of complaint from 
contractors who fail to win the contract award, and even industrial spying on those 
companies fulfilling the contracts.1084  This increases Frontex's objectives for fairness 
regarding procurement processes, and reduces the chances of member state sponsorship 
or corporate lobbying.  The decision for GMV was actually challenged by a Greek 
contractor, Evropaïki Dynamiki, who failed to win the contract.1085  The European Court 
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of Justice examined the evaluation process and ruled that Frontex's evaluation 
committee had fairly evaluated the contractor's bid.1086  The ruling describes the process 
in some detail, demonstrating that the decision-making fairly followed the procurement 
procedure rules.  Thus, with Frontex officials leading the procurement process, 
organisation objectives for fairness and cost efficiency could be met, with little 
distraction from member state or industrial interests. 
 
The Framework Contract used for the ECN Pilot enhanced the flexibility and efficiency 
of the contract specification, lending negotiating power to Frontex for each aspect of the 
software development.  A Framework Contract is an instrument for fast, transparent 
recruiting of services that are regularly required.1087  They are mostly multi-year 
contracts where companies become 'preferred suppliers' for so-called 'Lots', which are 
the required services.  For the ECN Pilot contract, GMV were the only 'preferred 
supplier' but in the ASS contract below, six preferred suppliers were chosen.  Procedures 
vary between Framework contracts, but typically each Lot is serviced via a Request for 
Services (RfS), where contractors submit an offer for service provision.  The time 
between the RfS and the deadline to submit an offer is short, often not longer than two 
weeks.  For the ECN, the Framework contract meant that the specification could be 
altered for each RfS, so decisions were not front-loaded with the Contractor.1088  Thus, 
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as the software was developed, Frontex was able to control and change its specification 
to suit evolving requirements without involving adjustment charges (which would have 
occurred in a front loaded contract). 
 
During 2011 the Frontex RDU team worked with GMV and member states to 
implement the Pilot contract and specify the parameters for the Live ECN.  The Pilot 
revealed two difficulties with the development of the Network software: member state 
disagreements and Frontex internal tensions.  These were overcome with GMV's 
patience and Commission tenacity in the development of the ECN.  First, the GMV team 
had to work with the member state NCCs to ensure that they could interface with the 
Frontex system, this was a difficult process, creating new intelligence sharing 
arrangement with member states as this involved multiple communications and 
approvals before any progress could be made.1089  Second, there is anecdotal evidence 
that some Frontex departments were reticent to adopt new work patterns and roles as 
required by the Eurosur regulation.1090  This further indicates that Frontex staff did not 
seek increased security roles of gathering and dissemination of intelligence, but rather 
the Commission encouraged the Agency to widen its remit.  Industrial input was present 
in the development of the solution, but did not affect the overall specification and form 
of the ECN beyond the objectives of the member states and Frontex.    
 
The research concludes that the Commission proffered the ECN as a solution for 
member state security concerns, but the low levels of information exchange and 
technical sophistication of the solution indicated that member state objectives for 
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security or technical imperatives were not strong in the decision-making process. The 
tender and contract award stage further demonstrates the lack of industrial or technical 
imperatives behind decision-making.  This would indicate that the main driver behind 
the ECN specification and Pilot procurement was the Commission's role expansion and 
Frontex' objectives for a fair, efficient and transparent procurement process. 
 
The Live Phase 
In 2012 there was a sense of urgency for the Live ECN, due to the increasing migration 
crisis and imminent Eurosur legislation, which was to be published in early 2013.1091  
The inclusion of the ECN in the Eurosur Regulation meant that it became a legal 
requirement to be provided by Frontex and complied with by member states.1092  
Further, the prospect of rival information gathering systems provided incentive to make 
Eurosur live.1093  Therefore in early 2012, Frontex prepared to move the ECN into its 
Live phase.  The process was unusual in that the Pilot was directly adapted to the Live 
software.  Thus, rather than building a clean new software that incorporated the lessons 
learned, the existing software had to be adapted for the Live requirements.  This was 
difficult for the contractor, GMV, who were given six months to adapt the prototype to a 
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live system.1094  It was suboptimal for the efficiency of the Live ECN but meant that 
Commission and Frontex objectives for a timely Live phase could be met.   
 
This section also demonstrates the care taken by Frontex to avoid allegations of bias or 
lack of integrity in its choice of contractors, an example of external scrutiny affecting 
organisation behaviour.  The Open Tender process was carried out in a similar fashion 
to the Pilot tender.  In December 2012 Frontex issued a notice for the Live ECN tender 
on the TED system.1095  Thirty-five companies responded and these were reduced to a 
shortlist of five.1096  The five companies included GMV, but in an unusual move, 
Frontex made sure that other companies, which had not been involved in the Pilot, had 
equal access to the Pilot software.  A Frontex official commented that they were keen to 
avoid criticism and the reputational risk of a court case after their experience with the 
Pilot tender process.1097  All the technical information related to the Pilot software was 
released, including the technical designs and architecture.1098  The continuation with 
GMV was not assured, as there were internal tensions as to how the infrastructure would 
be implemented.1099  This process demonstrated Frontex's priority for transparency and 
awareness of public scrutiny regarding the award of the ECN contract.     
 
Upon award of the Live Phase, GMV observed that there were further difficulties due to 
interdepartmental friction within Frontex, firstly with the technological aspect of the 
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programme, where the ICT department had not been involved in the initial technical 
build of the software, but also with new working practices associated with the Eurosur 
regulation.  The Frontex team were unfamiliar with new working practices and some 
departments resented the additional work.1100  Additionally, ICT did not like the original 
software language that the Pilot used, which had been specified by the RDU.1101  The 
main driver through these difficulties was the patience of GMV and the requirements of 
Eurosur regulation for the implementation of the ECN.  Thus the procurement of the 
Live phase was driven by Frontex procurement teams and Commission urgency to get 
the legally required Network into place, even with departmental concerns and contractor 
observations that more time would be optimal. 
 
This section examined the procurement of the ECN within the macro context of EU 
member state security expectations, and the micro organisation context of the 
Commission and Frontex.  Eurosur policy and procurement processes took place in a 
scrutinised, pressurised environment, driven by calculus, security concerns concerning 
the migration crisis, and cultural, humanitarian concerns regarding the safety and 
fundamental rights of migrants.  The Commission had objectives for establishing its 
security role, especially driven by competing data gathering systems such as MARSUR 
and the future CISE.1102  These objectives were realised by the bureaucratic processes 
that facilitated the procurement by funding, form of contract and driving forward 
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acceptable legislation.  Organisation scrutiny by commentators, contractors and internal 
audit processes provided further discipline for efficient processes by Frontex.   
 
The evidence indicated that the decision makers for the ECN policy were Commission 
officials who drove the legislation process for the Eurosur Regulation and coordinated 
the initial specification decision-making meetings for the ECN.  The rapid adoption of 
the Eurosur policy and regulation drove the pace of the procurement of the ECN 
software and provided urgency for the transition of the Pilot to the Live Phase.  This 
altered the balance of drivers away from technical aspects of the software to timeliness 
of the implementation, reflecting the Commission's objectives for role expansion.  The 
research found that member state focus was on the intelligence sharing aspect of the 
ECN.  Thus some bureaucratic politics dynamics led to a compromised software 
solution so that member state border agencies could retain control over surveillance 
information.   
 
Data gathered indicated some external input from industrial personnel, and anecdotal 
evidence of lobbying at the initial stages of the Eurosur feasibility study and the Pilot.  
Industry actors showed their keenness to win the contract via lobbying and the 
competitive behaviour regarding the lawsuit following the award of the Pilot contract to 
GMV in 2010.  However, evidence in the procurement outcomes did not support claims 
of industrial and technical imperatives driving the choice of contractor and form of ECN 
solution.1103  Once the Contract had been awarded to GMV, the company had input into 
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software infrastructure but did not control specification as demonstrated by the format of 
the Framework contract.   
 
The research finds that the ECN contract was not procured with reference to member 
state sponsorship, industrial lobbying, or input from industrial figures.  But rather with 
reference to Commission role expansion objectives and member state 'community of 
values' cultural objectives for coordinated border surveillance in transnational border 
zones.   
 
Section 3: Procurement of ASS (2015) 
This section considers the procurement of 'Aerial Surveillance Services' (ASS) by 
Frontex in 2014 and 2015.  This €10 million Framework Contract (the ASS Contract) 
was awarded by Frontex to 6 contractors1104 for ASS to monitor 'objects of interest'1105 
such as illegal movement across EU land and maritime borders.  A pilot programme was 
run from March to May 2014.  In April 2015 the Contract Notice was posted on the EU 
Tendering website (TED),1106 and in July 2015 the Contract was awarded.1107  Analysis 
of the ASS Contract is significant as Frontex continues to expand its remit and arguably 
becomes the Commission's first agency to be able to procure security capability under 
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its own authorisation, using multilateral funding.1108  The research considers the 
pressures upon Frontex to perform its mandate to monitor EU borders, and therefore to 
procure aerial surveillance capability.  It concludes that scrutiny of the organisation gave 
weight to cultural 'community of values' drivers to save migrants and procure 
surveillance capability. 
 
As in previous sections, macro drivers for the procurement included a demand for a 
solution to the crisis levels of illegal migration, and also cultural, humanitarian motives 
to save migrants' lives.  These motives originated from member states and the 
Commission, via its role as security provider as well as representing the 'community of 
values'.1109  The research found that the urgency of the situation amplified the cultural 
drivers and gave the procurement momentum.  It also concluded that an additional 
influence on the procurement was the literature criticising member state and EU border 
surveillance measures.  This scrutiny (additional to bureaucratic accountability) gave 
Frontex significant incentives for an efficient and successful procurement.   
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Drivers for the procurement in the organisational context included pressure from the 
Commission to spend Frontex's expanded budgets, and organisational, strategic 
objectives for a low risk, cost efficient surveillance solution.  This was achieved via the 
format of the Framework Contract and the choice of contractors.  Further, bureaucratic 
politics were avoided by limiting member state and industrial involvement in the 
decision-making process.  The research finds that although member state actors and 
industry actors were present during and after the procurement process, Frontex was the 
primary actor and its interests were the dominant drivers for the procurement outcomes.  
Thus Agency objectives superseded member state interests in the choice of surveillance 
solution, where Frontex chose to directly procure the ASS rather than award member 
state grants.  Agency objectives also superseded industry interests as demonstrated by 
the competitive nature of the Framework Contract, which proved very advantageous for 
Frontex.  Here, the Agency was able to capitalise strategically on industry perceptions of 
symbolic prestige associated with an EU agency.  The section first examines the macro 
environment of Commission policy concerning Frontex aerial surveillance requirements, 
and then the micro, bureaucratic context of the procurement process decisions. 
 
Security Context 
In the months preceding the ASS procurement in 2014 and 2015, member state and 
Commission discourse demonstrated both calculus and cultural drivers for aerial 
surveillance solutions.  The escalation of the migrant crisis over the summer months 
meant that increased demand for surveillance assets coincided with shortages in 
personnel due to summer breaks.1110  Aerial surveillance to monitor illegal movement 
over borders was routinely performed by member states and coordinated by Frontex 
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Joint Operations Unit, in operations such as Operation Triton.1111  These surveillance 
measures were accepted by member states and the Commission as an aid to member 
state border agencies so that they could apprehend migrants and mitigate perceived 
threats of cross border crime and terrorism as well as preserve lives and rights of 
vulnerable groups of people.  However, Frontex had not directly contracted aerial 
surveillance capability, until the ASS Contract. 
 
As well as calculus drivers, cultural drivers were also present.  The influential 'Left to 
Die Boat' report1112 had investigated the events surrounding the deaths of 72 migrants 
fleeing from Tripoli in March 2011.  While Frontex was largely exonerated in the report, 
the EU Parliamentary Assembly response reflects the societal horror at the tragedy, in a 
maritime area that was being monitoring by many agencies and ships,1113 including the 
military maritime surveillance network MARSUR.1114  The mandate of Frontex was 
referenced in this published response to the incident, and the report probably had an 
influence on Agency policy and procurement.  Here, Frontex felt societal pressure to 
maintain a liberal, humanitarian stance towards the migrants as representative of the 
EU's 'community of values',1115 despite increased surveillance actually encouraging the 
migration figures, which was a security concern of the member states.  This cultural 
driver was amplified in 2015 due to the migrant crisis with urgent calls for solutions 
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from both member states and the press.1116  It was no coincidence that the Frontex ASS 
Contract notice1117 was posted just before the deadliest incidents in April 2015 when 
over 1,500 people died in 2 shipwrecks in the Mediterranean between Libya and 
Italy.1118 
 
Thus the macro context for Frontex's procurement of ASS in 2015 generated two major 
drivers; first, the strategic mission of meeting member state concerns over the threat of 
illegal movements across EU borders; and second, the cultural, humanitarian driver to 
save migrant lives.  The cultural concern for migrants stimulated much criticism from 
academics, politicians and journalists of the EU and Frontex border surveillance 
solutions.  This would prove influential in the procurement processes and decisions 
described below.  The research also considered evidence of drivers for procurement in 
the micro, organisational context of Frontex's bureaucratic processes.  It found that the 
procurement processes were driven by Frontex's strategic objectives of efficiency, 
flexibility and low risk thereby ensuring institutional reputation and survival.  The 
research finds that these objectives supersede member state interests for grant giving and 
that the Agency avoided the bureaucratic politics of involving member states in the 
decision-making process.  Further, the study demonstrates that, despite accusations of 
																																																																		
1116. DEEB, S. E. 2015. More than 700 migrants feared dead in largest loss of life in the Mediterranean 
since April 2015. Associated Press: National Post.; BONOMOLO, A. & KIRCHGAESSNER, S. 2015. 
UN says 800 migrants dead in boat disaster as Italy launches rescue of two more vessels. The Guardian.; 
HELLER, C. & PEZZANI, L. 2015. Death by Rescue. Forensic Oceanography. 
1117. FRONTEX 2015b. Framework Contract Notice for Aerial Surveillance Services Assets and Expert 
Support. Warsaw, Poland: Frontex. 
1118. HELLER, C. & PEZZANI, L. 2015. Death by Rescue. Forensic Oceanography. 
	 328 
industrial imperatives by commentators,1119 industry actor interests were not prioritised 
in the procurement decisions. 
 
Procurement of ASS 
Four decision-making stages are considered for evidence of drivers in Frontex's 
procurement process.  First, the formal decision for procurement; second, the ASS 
specification; third, the format of the tendering process and contract; and fourth, the 
contractors chosen.  The procurement decision was driven by a need to meet member 
state strategic and cultural objectives, but the form and the nature of the ASS Contract 
was affected by Frontex's desire for a successful and efficient outcome.  Successful 
procurement would ensure the reputation and survival of the Agency in the pressurised 
environment described above.   
 
The policy decision for Frontex's procurement of aerial surveillance was in large part 
driven by the urgent macro context of the migrant crisis, but two bureaucratic aspects 
also influenced the formal decision for procurement.  First, the Commission was 
encouraging Frontex to spend its surplus budgets and second, Frontex did not go 
through the normal procurement and budgetary processes that ordinarily involved 
greater member state and Commission input.  Thus the decision-making took on a 
different character and was Agency focussed.   
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To consider the first aspect, in response to the EU and member state concerns expressed 
above, the budget of Frontex was increased from €97m in 2014, to €142m in 2015, and 
€254m in 2016.1120  Here there was a concern that, since the expansion of resources, 
Frontex had incurred carryovers in its budget from year to year.1121  Therefore there was 
an implication that Frontex was not using these resources to provide additional measures 
to monitor the EU's borders.  An observer also suggested that Frontex management were 
looking for projects in 2014 and 2015 to spend these surplus funds, and that the 
procurement of aerial surveillance capability was, in part, a result of this pressure.1122  
The Commission was concerned that Frontex's increasing budget was spent each year to 
fulfil its obligations to monitor EU borders.  The Commission may have encouraged this 
to justify the additional funds from member states but also to ensure that Frontex, under 
the Commission's auspices, retained the mandate for securing the EU borders and did 
not cede this responsibility to competing security agencies such as the EDA and its 
MARSUR operation.1123   
 
The pressure from the Commission provided a direct, bureaucratic, calculus motive for 
Frontex to take a decision to procure ASS capability.  Notably, the research does not 
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find evidence of Frontex looking to expand its role via the procurement.  If anything it 
had to be cajoled by the Commission to spend its budget and perform additional tasks.  
Reluctance on Frontex's part may be attributed to the fact that the Agency had been 
asked to reduce its headcount even in the face of increased resources.1124  The 2013 EU 
budgets had called for reduction in staff numbers in decentralised agencies, and 
therefore Frontex were under pressure to do more with a higher budget but with the 
same headcount.1125  The Head of Finance and Procurement Unit commented that 
increased financial resources had not translated into more human resources, rather it 
ensured a stable number rather than the planned reductions.1126  The evidence therefore 
indicates that there was influence for expansion in responsibilities from the Commission 
rather than Frontex, and that Frontex solved this via the leasing of aerial surveillance 
capability.  As referred to in Chapter Three, there are existing articles on the 
Commission's aspirations for an increased security role.1127  This procurement is a small 
manifestation of an EU agency performing a security role in its own right, rather than 
merely coordination of member state security activity.  
 
Regarding the second aspect, that Frontex usual budgeting and procurement routes were 
not followed, the study found that this decision reduced member state input into the 
decision-making process.  The 2015 migrant crisis escalated too quickly for member 
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states to provide either additional national contributions to Frontex operations, or 
provide member state direction via the usual bureaucratic routes of the PoW.  In this 
respect Frontex had no time to formally prepare and budget for the additional, 
supplementary surveillance capability needed.  There were no specific policy papers 
relating to the acquisition of ASS, as there were for the creation of the ECN.  Frontex 
management, with reference to the Frontex regulation for the procurement authorisation, 
therefore took the decision.  Here, the Director would have sent the letter to the RDU 
and Pooled Resources to initiate the specification process.1128   
 
Agency officials noted that, other than policy documents such as the Frontex Regulation 
and the PoW, member state representatives have little or no input into decision-making 
in procurement processes.1129  If these budgetary and PoW stages are not fulfilled, then 
the European Commission’s Court of Auditors largely confines member state input to 
retrospective analysis.  The lack of member state input also meant that any bureaucratic 
politics were avoided.  This aided the swift procurement process, although there is no 
evidence that the Agency specifically sought to avoid member state involvement. 
 
ASS specification 
Frontex had two alternatives for providing aerial surveillance capability.  First, it could 
directly procure the capability, and second it could award a grant to a member state to 
provide the assets required for border surveillance.1130  There were multiple incentives 
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for Frontex to contract directly for ASS in this context.  First, in 2015 member states 
were unable to provide the additional surveillance assets required to address the 
problem.  This was due to national requirements and personnel and staffing issues over 
the summer period when the migrant crisis was at its height.1131   Second, direct leasing 
of the capability was a more timely solution compared to awarding grants to member 
states to acquire additional assets.  Assets that were bought or leased by member states 
via Frontex grants entailed long lead times and high costs due to the bureaucratic 
politics and complexities.1132  Frontex had attempted to acquire a surveillance plane in 
2013 but had been unsuccessful with few responses to the tender.1133   
 
Despite Frontex's lack of experience and the potential inefficiencies associated with this 
inexperience, the Framework Contract represented the better solution for Frontex from a 
strategic and organisational perspective as it worked directly with contractors.  Given 
the direct nature of the procurement decision, Frontex had to justify its decision for 
procurement retrospectively to the European Court of Auditors.  Here, member state 
representatives were able to question Frontex about the procurement.1134  Formal records 
of this interaction are difficult to obtain, and the European Court of Auditors 2015 
Report makes no mention of this case.  However in 2016, a Special Report by the 
European Court of Auditors analysed, amongst other case studies, Frontex' costs of 
contracting of ASS versus the granting of financial aid to support similar member state 
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efforts.1135  The report supported the decision for procurement of the ASS and noted that 
the cost of services reduced significantly where this took place.  The reasons for these 
efficiencies are explored below as part of the procurement process analysis. 
 
Frontex management made the decision for ASS procurement in response to European 
perceptions of security threats and cultural expectations related to the migrant crisis, 
bureaucratic pressures from the EU to spend surplus funds, and a calculated decision 
that direct procurement was more efficient than awarding a member state grant.  Notably 
the decision for procurement met with the concerns for fulfilment of the member state 
security concerns, but it did not reflect their interests concerning equipment and 
capability.  Member states would prefer Frontex to award grants so that they get the 
financial benefit and control over the missions.1136  Here Frontex sidestepped this in the 
interests of more efficient procurement and an enhanced role.  Thus the decision for 
procurement broadly served member state macro security interests (i.e. monitoring the 
EU borders) but not their micro interests (for greater access to direct funding), where 
they would prefer greater control over the surveillance process and to receive the award 
of a grant to purchase their own surveillance services.1137  The decision for procurement 
was driven by Frontex's organisational concerns and objectives to respond to macro 
pressures, to ensure its survival as an organisation, and to avoid further critical 
commentary.  Next the section considers the ASS specification.  
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The decision-making at the specification stage also provides evidence of drivers of the 
procurement process.  As one expert commented, 'Procurement is an Art!'1138 and the 
subjective judgement behind the specification reveals the concerns of those involved.  It 
therefore has significance in reflecting the Agency's objectives and therefore drivers for 
the procurement.  For the 2015 Contract, the Pooled Resources unit was joined by RDU 
to write the formal Tender Documents, including the specification.  The alternative 
solutions for direct provision of ASS by Frontex were first, to buy and operate an 
aircraft (either manned or unmanned) or second, to lease an aircraft (either manned or 
unmanned).  Frontex had requested bids to purchase a manned aircraft in 2013, but due 
to lack of response this had been dropped.1139  Frontex has also been referred to in 
critical commentary about EU ambitions for unmanned aircraft.1140  These two aspects, 
along with the timing constraints (related to the migrant crisis), affected their choice for 
the flexible, leased, manned aircraft.  The detailed specification for the ASS Contract 
was then informed by internal informal and formal discussions as to the exact format of 
the aerial surveillance capability,1141 and also by external input from the Pilot project 
and an Industry Open Day, both held in 2014.  The Pilot project was run by the Pooled 
Resources and Joint Operations Unit1142 and entailed a feedback report from the 
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contractor, Diamond Executive Aviation.1143  The Agency also held an Industry Open 
Day for various private sector providers to present their aerial surveillance capability. 
 
The exact performance specification of the Frontex aerial surveillance requirements was 
difficult to find, as they were refined for each RfS.  The Tender Specification for the 
Aerial Surveillance indicates the scope and payload expected in the operations.1144  This 
details that payload of the aircraft should consist of sensors 'necessary to the purpose of 
the flight: I.e. Electro-optical, Infrared, Radar, GPS and AIS Receiver'.1145  However, 
the budgets involved would indicate that the capability of the sensors and the related 
datalinks were necessarily limited to a civil security specification that was not at the 
same sophistication of a military asset.1146 
 
As mentioned in the preceding section, industrial lobbying traditionally happens directly 
with the Commission or via member state sponsorship.1147  Within Frontex there is 
anecdotal evidence of direct lobbying1148 by industry, but where recent 'freedom of 
information' (FOI) requests have been granted regarding meetings with industry,1149 
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observers note that there has been limited corporate access to Frontex.1150  This study 
also finds limited input from industry over the specification of the aerial surveillance 
capability.  There is also no evidence of member state sponsored industry meetings at 
Frontex.  Frontex officials confirm this and assert that national sponsorship, often seen 
in defence contracts, is 'not imaginable' in the Frontex bureaucracy where the 
organisation is run along departmental lines rather than structured with member state 
allegiance.1151  Private sector actors also testify to the fact that Frontex does not 
demonstrate member state allegiance given that they all come from different parts of the 
EU.1152   
 
In the ASS procurement process, Frontex specified a 'fee for Service' Framework 
contract, effectively leasing a manned surveillance capability as required.  The 
specification focussed on Frontex's concerns, concentrating on aspects such as the 
sophistication of the equipment leased,1153 with the main objective of the procurement to 
achieve as much sophistication as possible with the least cost.1154  This Contract 
reflected Frontex's concern for a low cost, low risk and flexible service.  Here, 
contractors bid competitively to provide a surveillance 'Service'1155 each time there is an 
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RfS from Frontex.1156  The decision for this form of ASS was for both pragmatic and 
political reasons.  First, the urgency of the crisis required a rapid response, and this 
solution could be quickly implemented.  Second, Frontex had allocated relatively small 
budgets for ASS and the leasing was relatively inexpensive.  Third, this was the first 
time that they had made this type of procurement so there was a learning curve.  This 
provided a small-scale solution where each 'service' could be reviewed.   
 
Finally and fourth, Frontex was cautious about their reputation due to the level of 
scrutiny, with their reputation at stake if the procurement went wrong, and this small-
scale approach allowed for low level mistakes.  As mentioned above, Frontex is 
politically visible and accountable to other vociferous organisations.1157  This meant that 
if the procurement was unsuccessful they faced public censure from the European Court 
of Auditors, member states (who would be unhappy with the fact that Frontex was 
providing the role rather than giving grants to member states to provide the role) and 
other academics and journalists tracking the EU's use of private sector border 
																																																																		
1156. Ibid. p.6 
1157. Such as the Commission, member states and academic snd journalist observers: NIELSEN, N. 
2014. EU border surveillance system not helping to save lives. euobserver.; MUIŽNIEKS, N. 2014. 
Europe, Wake Up! New Europe.; HAYES, B. & VERMEULEN, M. 2012. Borderline: The EU's New 
Border Surveillance Initiatives: Assessing the Costs and Fundamental Rights Implications of EUROSUR 
and the" Smart Borders" Proposals: a Study by the Heinrich Böll Foundation, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung.; 
HAYES, B. 2009. NeoConOpticon, the EU Security Industrial Complex. Statewatch.; HAYES, B., 
JONES, C. & TOPFER, E. 2014. Eurodrones Inc. Amsterdam: Statewatch.; AKKERMAN, M. 2013. 
Selling Border Militarization as a Humanitarian Effort. Stop Wapenhandel.; AKKERMAN, M. 2016b. 
Border Wars, The Arms Dealers Profiting from Europe's Refugee Tragedy. Transnational Institute.; 
BIGO, D. & JEANDESBOZ, J. 2010. The EU and the European Security Industry, Questioning the 
'Public-Private Dialogue'. CEPS, IN:EX Policy Brief, No.5. 
	 338 
surveillance measures.1158  As a former member of the European Court of Auditors 
commented:  
In the Frontex rules and policies, they are bound to ensure full respect of 
fundamental rights, fundamental human rights.  In one instance........... we had 
faulted Greece in this context, because we found, that in the implementation of 
the budget of the Frontex budget, for that particular project.  The way that the 
immigrants were handled was breaching fundamental human rights, and this was 
picked up and reported upon, and remarked upon.1159   
 
First, to address the relatively low value of the contract.  Although one EU official 
observed that Frontex, as a bureaucracy, had relatively high budgets compared to other 
security bureaucracies such as NATO and the EDA,1160 the €10 million budget allocated 
for the contract was not large for the procurement of aerial surveillance assets.  Some 
discussion had taken place internally as to how much should be allocated.  As the head 
of the Procurement team observed, it is difficult to quantify 'sufficient' surveillance at 
any given context to meet the perceived threat or concern regarding illegal migration or 
migrant safety.1161  Second, the small amount allocated for the aerial surveillance may 
have reflected caution regarding this first time procurement by the Agency.  It meant 
that observers commented that the specification details and tendering evaluation initially 
																																																																		
1158. HAYES, B. 2009. NeoConOpticon, the EU Security Industrial Complex. Statewatch.; 
AKKERMAN, M. 2016b. Border Wars, The Arms Dealers Profiting from Europe's Refugee Tragedy. 
Transnational Institute. 
1159. Personal Interview with Louis Galea; EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 2014a. The External 
Borders Fund has fostered financial solidarity but requires better measurement of results and needs to 
provide further EU added value. Luxembourg. p.33 
1160. Personal Interview with Gregorio Ameyugo 
1161. Personal Interview with 003 
	 339 
seemed inexperienced.1162  Frontex staff also confirmed this.1163  Further, if one 
considers other contracts procured by Frontex,1164 this was a relatively large 
procurement for the Agency for an external service.  Evidence for the concern for 
flexibility and a learning process was found in the Tender Dossier that contains the 
general specification required, but additionally each 'Service' has a specific 'Description 
of Assignment' or specification related to the Service.  This allowed Frontex to refine 
further the required specification after feedback from other 'Services'.1165     
 
Tendering and Contract Outcomes 
The research also considered the tendering process and ASS Contract outcomes.  As 
noted, many have alleged that there are industrial influences on the policy-making 
processes of Agencies such as Frontex.1166  However, there is little evidence to suggest 
this in the outcomes relating to the ASS Contract.  Two aspects support this view and 
suggest that private sector interests were not prioritised, and therefore that industry's 
influence was limited.  First, the size of the contract and second, the nature of the 
'Framework' Contract.  The small size of the contract means that it precluded some of 
the larger security and defence actors from tendering, as they were unable to compete 
and provide services for this contract size given their overheads and the profit margins 
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that they require.1167  Frontex showed no concern to include these actors and indeed 
observers note that the inclusion of larger contractors was not a concern to the Agency 
or Commission.1168  Therefore this contract attracted smaller players, with lower cost 
bases, who were able to work with slim profit margins.   
 
Second, the format of the Framework Contract conferred power to Frontex.  This was a 
major reason for the cost efficiencies achieved by the Agency, and industrial partners of 
Frontex support this observation.1169  These contractors testify to the efficiency of the 
Framework Contracts, where the multiple contractors have to competitively bid for each 
RfS with very short lead times, rather than being awarded a set contract for a period of 
time.  Here competition is fierce, and the research gathered anecdotal evidence of small-
scale industrial espionage, where rival companies report each other to Frontex regarding 
any lack of fulfilment of the Service specification.1170  An important aspect of the 
efficiency of the process was that these smaller companies were both able and willing to 
operate on slim profit margins.  As in other contracts examined in this research, 
evidence was found of Industry cutting costs to win the Contract in part to claim the 
symbolic prestige of working with Frontex.  This would then be used for marketing 
purposes to gain future contracts.  Smaller companies do this perhaps to a greater extent 
than larger companies, who do not need validation for marketing purposes in the same 
way.   
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Thus the research finds that the contracts were awarded to companies that were able and 
willing to meet the exacting cost levels and specifications required by Frontex, 
successfully achieving efficiencies that are not often found in collaborative 
acquisition.1171  This was achieved in part due to the way that Frontex specified the 
contract, in part the way that the contract was drawn up as a Framework contract, and in 
part because Frontex was able to capitalise on the prestige associated with its status as 
an EU Agency. 
 
A final aspect of the procurement was the decision-making process for the specific 
private contractors chosen first for the Framework Contract, and subsequently those 
chosen pursuant to calls for 'Service'.  Once the ASS specification was decided, the 
Pooled Resources Unit sent the formal procurement request to the Procurement team.  
The Tender Dossier was then produced in a similar manner to the ECN contract 
analysed above.  It included Frontex's requirements for the Technical Proposals to be 
produced by the Tenderers, and also indicated the Technical Evaluation criteria used by 
Frontex.1172  The Dossier also included information regarding the Technical Evaluation 
of the specific calls for 'Service'.1173   
 
Having published the Tender Dossier, Frontex Pooled Resources Unit and RDU Team 
held an open day for the tenderers to ask general questions about the ASS Contract.1174  
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In this manner, all the potential contractors were aware of questions from rival 
companies and the answers provided by Frontex.  Even those questions asked at a later 
date via email were shared with all the Tenderers.  The procurement process then 
entailed the Frontex evaluation team1175 obtaining financial references of potential 
contractors, and evaluating the proposed ASS provision via strict criteria that were also 
shared with the companies.  These EU-wide bureaucratic practices allow for a 
transparent and fair choice of contractor by the EC.1176   
 
The initial tender stage of the Procurement described above elicited thirteen responses.  
These were narrowed down to six successful tenderers who entered the Framework 
Contract.  As with the ECN Contract, given the transparency of the process, the 
publication of the relevant documents, and the evaluation methods, it is difficult to see 
how any preference, outside of the strategic concerns of the procurement, would be able 
to influence the EC at this point.  Especially as contractors are incredibly competitive 
and the decisions often need to be defended as there are frequent appeals.  There was 
some anecdotal evidence of a preference for a given contractor being chosen, with a 
competing company being dismissed on a technicality.  But even here the rationale for 
choosing the particular contractor was one based on merit and a working relationship, 
rather than a preference driven by member state sponsorship or as the result of private 
sector lobbying activities.1177  Thus the decision for contractor reflects Frontex's 
strategic bureaucratic practices whose concerns for an efficient outcome are largely met.   
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A final, general aspect to reiterate concerning Frontex decision-making for the ASS 
Contract was the relative lack of bureaucratic politics.  There is little evidence of inter-
departmental or member state representative 'pulling and hauling' within the Agency in 
decisions relating to specification or choice of contractor.  Within Frontex departments, 
the homogenous nature and culture of the bureaucratic officials experienced during 
interviews indicates that most Frontex officials held a common interpretation of 
pressures upon the Agency.  Evidence of some interdepartmental 'pulling and hauling' 
was found at the specification stage where the RDU was brought in after the Pooled 
Resources Unit had specified the initial pilot contract with mixed results.1178  A general 
conclusion is of the positive effects of Frontex's organisational culture on the 
procurement process. 
 
This section considered drivers for Frontex's multilateral procurement of ASS.  In the 
macro context, the study found that original member state political support for a Frontex 
aerial surveillance solution was to combat illegal migration and transnational crime, as 
per the Frontex regulation.  However, there were also important, value based drivers for 
the procurement concerned with saving migrant lives and protecting their fundamental 
rights.  This was reflected in the Frontex regulation amendments and the discourse 
surrounding Frontex's role in the period preceding the procurement.1179   
 
In the micro context, bureaucratic pressure from the Commission for Frontex to spend 
its budgets and to realise its expanded responsibilities was another driver behind the 
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decision for procurement.  Within the procurement process, bureaucratic drivers were 
found to be Frontex-oriented, calculus motives.  Here Agency objectives were met and 
superseded member state and industry interests.  Despite reports claiming that industry 
influenced Frontex policy, the outcomes of this Contract suggest that Frontex prioritised 
its own interests above Industry considerations.  Thus the calculus driver for the 
procurement in the micro environment would seem to be Agency self interest and 
survival.   
 
Overall, a major influence on the procurement was the time pressure for providing ASS.  
This magnified two drivers, the member state humanitarian concerns, and Frontex's 
autonomy and universal culture for procurement.  In the macro context it magnified the 
cultural drivers, with the prevailing sense of urgency to save lives.  The study found that 
the calculus strategy was not a sufficient driver for the procurement in its macro context, 
as seen in the failed aerial surveillance capability procurement in 2013, and the critical 
literature also reflects this.  This meant that the magnified, cultural, driver was necessary 
for the procurement and for Frontex to gain momentum to justify the procurement 
decision via their regulation.  In the micro context, the study concludes that efficiencies 
were achieved through the strategic use of the Framework Contract, but also through the 
cultural coherence found in the procurement processes and the lack of bureaucratic 
politics.  The time pressures allowed for avoidance of bureaucratic procedure and set 
precedent for Frontex to rely on its regulation for action. 
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EU Commission / Frontex Conclusions 
This chapter has presented evidence of the drivers behind Frontex's procurement 
processes focussing on two contracts: from the Commission's policy formation, to the 
ECN procurement and the ASS procurement.  This concluding section applies the 
theoretical framework to the analysis and considers the balance of the drivers for the 
collaborative procurement.  It follows a similar format to those conclusions described in 
the NATO AGS case study in Chapter Four.  The first section provides analysis to 
ascertain the balance of calculus and cultural drivers at different stages in the 
procurement decision-making.  It uses Bennett's tests of causation.1180  The second 
section applies the broad theoretical framework of strategic choice, sociological 
institutionalism and organisation theory to the findings. 
 
Findings and Analysis regarding Drivers for Procurement 
The three stages of this Frontex case study: the Policy, the ECN Contract and the ASS 
Contract, are linked, and common drivers may be discerned throughout the decision-
making processes.  As in the NATO case study in Chapter Four, the research refers the 
data gathered from Bennett's tests1181 (for necessary and sufficient causation) to 
adjudicate between the different explanations for the acquisition for Frontex's 
surveillance capability.  Again, there is a combination of explanations for political will 
and organisation drivers for the policy and procurement for Frontex's surveillance 
capability.   
																																																																		
1180. Bennett's Tests for causation were outlined in Chapter 1 Methodology Section. P.61  Tests for 
causation are categorised as 'Doubly Decisive'; 'Smoking Gun'; passing the 'Hoop'; and 'Straw in the 
Wind'. BENNETT, A. 2010. Process tracing and causal inference. In: BRADY, H. & COLLIER, D. (eds.) 
Rethinking Social Inquiry. Rowman and Littlefield. 
1181. Ibid. See p.61 in Chapter One. 
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Strategic Choice (calculus) 
Strategic Rationale Driver 
The strategic rationale for border surveillance was apparent in the literature and policy 
statements relating to the Eurosur policy.  The policy would not have been instigated 
without this driver.  However member state reticence over Frontex's role meant that 
additional drivers were needed for agreement to the policy.  Data indicated that the 
surveillance function would not solve the migrant crisis, but addressed cultural concern 
for monitoring migrant behaviour and enables further safety and security measures to be 
taken.  Cultural aspects of surveillance are addressed below.  The strategic rationale 
driver for the border surveillance mission is deemed necessary but not sufficient as 
an explanation for the Eurosur and ASS procurement, and passes the hoop test.   
 
Member states were keen to avoid obligations to finance Eurosur, so the fact that the 
Commission provided funding solutions enabled agreement to the policy and ECN and 
ASS implementation. Further, the low level of costs achieved by Frontex via the 
'framework contract' also facilitated the procurement.  Thus the strategic rationale 
driver for cost efficiency can been seen as a 'smoking gun', sufficient for causation, 
but it is difficult to prove that the low cost of the solution drove the procurement.  
 
Industrial Imperative Driver 
Industrial imperative drivers may have been present at the policy stage of the 
procurement, as there was evidence of lobbying activity.  However, Frontex's concern 
for strict freedom from this influence during the procurement decision-making was 
evident in the data.  Staff were aware that the organisation was being scrutinised and 
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there had also been legal challenges to former procurement decisions.  This strengthened 
the concern for open and transparent accountability regarding the choice of contractor.  
Thus there is little evidence for this driver in the procurement outcomes, therefore 
it has been discounted and categorised as 'straw in the wind' according to Bennett's 
definitions. 
 
Technical Imperative Driver 
Similarly, allegations of technical imperatives in the literature were not discernible in 
the procurement outcomes.  Bureaucratic politics and the urgency of the situation 
prevented technical considerations being given priority at the specification stages.  The 
technical imperative driver has therefore also been discounted and categorised as 
'straw in the wind'. 
 
Organisation Theory 
Organisation Role Expansion Driver 
Data regarding the Commission's role expansion driver was in evidence at all stages of 
the process.  Role expansion objectives were found in the Commission's policy 
entrepreneurship and rivalry with other organisations (as indicated in the existing 
literature), and by the fact that the surveillance capability represented a new role for the 
organisation.  The Commission used cultural arguments for its calculus objectives, thus 
this driver reflects a combination of incentives.  Role expansion would seem to pass 
Bennett's hoop test (necessary but not sufficient, as the Commission needed the 
consent of member states at the policy stage).  However, without the existence and 
drive of the Commission the procurement would clearly not have taken place. 
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Sociological Institutionalism (Culture) 
Symbolic Drivers 
'Community of Values': The Western 'community of values' cultural driver was also 
present affecting behaviour and driving the process throughout the case study.  Here 
data showed that concern for migrant safety and fundamental rights allowed the Frontex 
and Eurosur Regulations to be passed; was used by the Commission in its justifications 
for the capability and mission; and used by Frontex bureaucracy when referring to the 
surveillance functionality.  Thus the research concludes that this explanation passes 
the hoop test, as necessary but not sufficient to drive the procurement.   
 
Civil military: Civil security aspects of the capability also enabled the Commission to 
claim that the functionality fitted the remit of its Schengen responsibilities rather than 
the military remit of the EDA or even NATO.  Thus the civil military strategic 
cultural explanation passes the smoking gun test as being sufficient but not 
necessary as a driver for the Commission to drive policy for Eurosur and the 
subsequent procurement. 
 
Multilateralism / solidarity:  Finally, solidarity exists in Frontex bureaucracy in that it 
denied any industrial imperative influence on the procurement process, but the 
procurement outcomes do not suggest that solidarity imperatives actually drove the 
procurement.  Thus multilateralism or solidarity would seem to pass the 'smoking 
gun' test, as a cultural driver sufficient to support the procurement but not 
necessary to explain it. 
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Symbolic prestige:  Symbolic prestige, linked to industrial aspiration to be associated 
with the Commission, was present and facilitated the efficient outcomes of the 
procurement but did not necessarily drive the procurement process.  Thus symbolic 
prestige would seem to pass the 'smoking gun' test, sufficient to support the 
procurement but not necessary to explain it. 
 
Findings and Analysis regarding the Theoretical Framework 
The paragraphs below consider Strategic Choice, Sociological Institutionalism and 
Organisation Theory explanations for the collaborative procurement processes at 
different stages in the decision-making chain. 
 
1) Explanations for the Eurosur Policy 
Strategic Choice Explanation: Strategic Rationale for the Mission and ASS 
requirements 
Member states had calculus security requirements to monitor EU borders for illegal 
transnational movements of the migrant crisis following the Syrian civil war and the 
breakdown of former control of migrant flows from Libya.  However data showed that 
member states were concerned to retain sovereignty over the border surveillance 
function where possible.  Further, the ECN and ASS contracts concerned border 
surveillance, but did not provide reaction capacity to solve the security threat.  Therefore 
this driver could not explain the procurement 
 
Sociological Institutionalist Explanation: Symbolic 'community of values' driver for the 
ASS requirements: Anecdotal evidence suggested that joint procurement of the 
surveillance capability was a way of salving the conscience of EU member states with 
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regards to the safety of migrants, thus answering the cultural driver of the Western 
'community of values'.  High levels of scrutiny of the Commission, with regards to this 
measure, also increased the pressure on organisation staff and affected the balance of 
drivers in the procurement.  This scrutiny was a major conduit for cultural influences on 
the procurement processes and increased the weight of this driver for the procurement.  
This drove the pace of procurement where Frontex staff were anxious to meet public 
expectations for the safety of migrants.  It facilitated procurement of both contracts and 
also increased the weight of EU commission role expansion objectives.  In this case, EU 
and Frontex realised their objectives by aligning their policy and discourse to Western 
'community of values' imperatives.   
 
2) Explanations for the Political support for Eurosur and Frontex surveillance 
operation 
Strategic Choice Explanation: Subduing member state concerns with compromises in 
the surveillance specification 
Political support for the process was partially gained by the Commission meeting 
member state concerns over sovereignty of action.  The concerns of member states 
regarding sovereignty over the performance of joint border surveillance solutions were a 
major constraint on Commission policy and procurement process for the ECN and ASS.  
These concerns were met in part by dumbing down the sophistication and investment 




Sociological Institutionalism Explanation: Gaining political support via alignment with 
symbolic drivers, Western 'community of values' and solidarity within the organisation 
culture.  
The research data indicated that the Eurosur and Frontex regulations reflected a concern 
for human rights aspects of border control.  The EU culture of NGO input, via bodies 
such as the LIBE Committee, ensured that the 'community of values' was embedded in 
policy and counterbalanced concerns for sovereignty over security actions.  Additional 
political support for the procurement occurred through the solidarity and multilateralism 
inherent in the Commission culture and reflected in the Eurosur and Frontex regulations.  
These established the necessity and legitimacy of Frontex to perform supporting 
functions for member states with the related procurement.     
 
3) Explanations for the Eurosur and ASS specification 
Strategic Choice Explanation: Technical imperatives were subdued due to member state 
concerns 
The rational objectives for the surveillance solution was one that met the concerns over 
sovereignty and intelligence sharing of member state representatives and their border 
agencies, also that Frontex provided a cost efficient, timely service.  Technical 
imperatives were of little weight in the specification of the ECN surveillance solutions.  
These were subdued where member state border agency had concerns over intelligence 
sharing so compromise solutions were offered for the surveillance solutions.  The ECN 
solution agreed to was therefore suboptimal regarding both technical and content 
aspects, the ASS solution was a low cost, leasing option rather than an agency owned 
capability.   
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Organisation Theory Explanation: Industrial and Technical imperatives subdued by 
role expansion, agency rivalry 
First, emphasis during the procurement processes was placed on gaining agreement at 
speed rather than focusing on a technically advanced solution.  The Commission felt 
additional urgency to provide a surveillance solution because of competition from other 
organisations providing similar surveillance solutions, such as EDA's MARSUR and 
DG Maritime's CISE.  The ASS contracts were technically of little value to Frontex 
being a 'fee for service' solution that required no proprietary technology.  However, 
levels of technical acceptability were relevant to the ASS mission specifications and this 
was achieved with great efficiency through the competitive nature of the Framework 
contract. 
 
Second, the evidence showed that high levels of organisation scrutiny strengthened 
Frontex's objectives for efficiency, this stemmed from an organisational survival driver, 
and aspiration for legitimacy.  Therefore staff were anxious to avoid the censure of a 
bias towards industry and any preferences led by member state objectives.  
 
Sociological Institutionalism Explanation: Symbolic drivers 
First, the supranational structures and inherent culture of solidarity (and the related 
multilateralism driver) within Frontex helped to subdue member state sponsorship of 
specific solutions.  This in turn reduced influence of the related technical and industrial 
imperative drivers in the procurement process.   
 
Second, the civil military nature of the solutions contributed to the acceptability of the 
solutions with the emphasis on the civil security aspects.  Research data showed that 
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non-military  and civil security functions were a priority for Frontex and the 
Commission under the Schengen arrangements.   The literature alleged that 
securitisation had influenced surveillance solutions.  However, while Frontex staff 
profile had a bias to former military and security staff, and former military actors were 
involved in the the Frontex contracts, little evidence was found that these military 
aspects drove the procurement policy or process.  
 
4) Explanations for Bureaucratic Processes and Contractual Negotiations 
Organisation Theory explanations:  Role expansion driver 
The Commission's ambition for role expansion in the field of security was present as a 
driver in the Frontex case study.  This was evident in the policy formation, the funding 
arrangements and the choice of contract format.  Commission officials controlled and 
drove Eurosur and Frontex policy.  This driver was amplified during the process due to 
the Commission's bureaucratic structure where the policy making meetings were 
controlled by the Commission and orchestrated by a charismatic EU official.   
 
The Commission's funding arrangements also facilitated the procurement.  The study 
showed that for both contracts, financing for the procurement was centrally secured by 
Commission approval (rather than directly from member states), thus facilitating the 
process.  Commission and Frontex actors had influence, and therefore their calculus 
objectives, for efficiency and the success of the procurement - eventually leading to role 
expansion, were prioritised in the process.  
 
Additionally, both contracts demonstrated the usefulness of the Framework form of 
contract in conferring negotiating power and cost efficiency to Frontex (rather than 
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industry).  Thus, the Commission ensured that the contract costs were not contentious 
and could not give rise to member state complaint.  
 
Sociological Institutionalism Explanation: 
There was evidence that industrial actors sacrificed profit motives to gain the symbolic 
prestige of working with Frontex.  This aspect enhanced the efficiencies of the two 
Frontex contracts and significantly contributed to their acceptability.      
   
In sum, and to answer the research question, evidence suggests that the calculus drivers 
and strategic choice explanations cannot fully account for the Frontex procurement 
outcomes.  Alignment with cultural, symbolic drivers helped to overcome political 
constraints and public concerns and contributed to the acceptable surveillance solution.  
Rational imperatives for heightened border security were not directly met by 
surveillance measures.  The scrutiny and criticism expressed in the 'securitisation of 
border control' literature imparted the Western 'community of values' culture, enhancing 
organisation objectives for efficiency and reputation.  This, along with Commission role 
expansion drivers, magnified the urgency for surveillance capabilities and encouraged 
the procurement processes.  Finally, data indicated that the supranational nature of the 
organisation meant that multilateralism and solidarity was manifested in a 'taken for 
granted' cultural rule within the organisation, pursuant to the Frontex regulation.  Thus 
the procurement was not viewed as a collaboration, but rather a Commission activity 
with all the solidarity that this represents. 
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The next concluding chapter presents the key findings of this thesis.  It notes their 
applicability beyond the remit of this study and the contribution that this study makes to 




The politics of collaborative procurement are imbued with rational and cultural logics.  
These logics exist in the wider context but are realised via social processes within 
multilateral bureaucracies.  The complexity of multinational procurement by NATO and 
the Commission requires a detailed observation of the balance of calculus and cultural 
drivers within bureaucracies to ascertain how they encourage successful collaborative 
procurement of a particular capability.  This thesis has challenged the basic assumption 
that rational and material political interests can explain collaborative procurement.  It 
asserts that cultural and organisational interests also generate and influence the 
political support needed for collaboration.  The thesis has provided original analysis of 
material and ideational drivers, linked to the wider security and multilateral organisation 
contexts.   
 
Existing scholarship on collaborative defence procurement tends to focus on the 
rational, economic aspects of procurement practices such as cost savings and industrial 
imperatives.  While previous studies noted the material (or calculus) objectives for 
collaborative procurement, few analysed the contribution that cultural (or ideational) 
drivers and bureaucratic practices might bring to the collaboration.  In contrast, 
commentary and scholarship concerning the securitisation of border surveillance and 
procurement of related capabilities, while including industrial interests, broaden the 
approach to include cultural aspects.  This literature derives from the Western 
'community of values' culture and focuses on human security and the fundamental rights 
of migrants.  This thesis has therefore attempted to bridge the gaps between 
	 357 
collaborative defence procurement scholarship and that concerned with the procurement 
and securitisation of multilateral border surveillance activities.   
 
The study used a theoretical framework that combines strategic choice theory, 
sociological institutionalism and organisation theory.  This provided a fresh approach 
and contribution to the subject of collaborative procurement.  Strategic choice offers 
realist explanations for procurement concerning self-interested objectives, such as 
national security or the material benefits of industry contracts.  Sociological 
institutionalism emphasises the importance of the Western security and organisational 
contexts.  It explains how socially constructed, cultural ideas and collective expectations 
in these environments can contribute to collegiate decision-making.  Organisation theory 
offers explanations of organisation decision-making dynamics and self-interested 
objectives such as role expansion.   
 
The theoretical framework supported explanations for specific drivers of the 
collaborative procurement process.  Here, self interested, calculus, strategic choice 
drivers included the strategic rationale for member state security and cost efficiency 
considerations; industrial imperatives for member state private sector benefits; and 
technical imperatives for member state industrial development.  Institutional, cultural, 
symbolic drivers included the Western 'community of values', which encourage an 
emphasis on the human rights of migrants; the civil military strategic culture, which 
prioritises functions such as border surveillance; the prestige associated with US RMA 
sophisticated surveillance assets; and for industry, the symbolic prestige of working with 
an international organisation.  Finally, organisation theory supported explanations of the 
organisation role expansion driver. 
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The thesis examined the current context of collaborative procurement (and the related 
surveillance requirements) within the Western security environment and the NATO and 
EU organisations.  It considered how these contexts affect joint policy for surveillance.  
It identified the presence of the drivers within these environments.  The study 
considered how factors such as political agendas, industrial economies, security crises, 
the global financial cycle, rivalries between organisations, scrutiny, bureaucratic 
practices, organisational culture and funding structures affect the balance of the drivers 
within NATO and EU procurement policy, practices and outcomes. 
 
Next the research used process tracing to recreate the procurement decision-making 
chains for the two case studies.  It referred to Bennett's tests for causation to assess the 
influence and balance of the drivers at different stages of the collaborative procurement 
process.  It drew conclusions regarding the combination of drivers that could fully 
explain collegiate decision-making during the multinational procurement of 
surveillance.  These are fully explained in the Key Findings below. 
 
Thus the thesis set out to answer the research question: is multilateral procurement of 
surveillance capability driven by culture or calculus?  The research has concluded that 
both calculus and cultural explanations were present in NATO and EU procurement 
processes.  Significantly it identified the presence of symbolic and role expansion 
drivers in the decision making processes.  This indicated that cultural explanations and 
organisational factors exhibited a greater influence than has been attributed to 
collaborative procurement dynamics in past research.  Where the EU had greater 
organisational control and a closer alignment with strategic cultures, the decision-
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making was efficient and timely.  On the other hand, NATO had less organisation 
control and was less aligned with strategic cultures.  Consequently, the decision-making 
was inefficient and dysfunctional. 
 
This chapter of conclusions now draws together the key findings of the research and 
indicates how they may be generalised for other collaborative procurement practices.  It 
identifies the study's contribution to academic literature but also notes its limitations.  
Finally, it indicates potential avenues for future research.  It argues for the application of 
the findings beyond the case studies and indicates how this novel approach could inform 
future joint acquisition practices. 
 
Key Findings 
The key findings of this study are important for their contribution to explaining 
successful collaborative procurement practices and their implications in future joint 
acquisitions.  In both case studies, the findings suggest that the strength of calculus and 
rational drivers (such as strategic rationale, technical imperative and industrial 
imperative) are insufficient to explain on their own what drives collaborative 
procurement.  Rather the findings suggest that additional organisation and cultural 
factors (role expansion and symbolic drivers) can help to explain the political support 
found for joint surveillance policy and its related acquisition.   
 
The two case studies are different and exhibit varying emphasis on the findings.  For 
NATO, political and multilateral, symbolic drivers were important, even though the 
bureaucratic structure significantly constrained these drivers.  For Frontex, the 
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'community of values' cultural driver was significant for the joint surveillance mission.  
For the EU Commission, the role expansion driver was an important factor for the 
procurement policy.  However, there are enough commonalities in the contexts to draw 
conclusions.  The fact that the analysis found commonalities despite the diversity of the 
case studies gives a depth to the conclusions that may find salience in other joint 
procurement programmes.  Preparation for future collaborative procurement policy for a 
specific capability may benefit from a focus on these aspects.   
 
Four sets of key findings are listed below, regarding calculus, cultural, and 
organisation aspects of collaborative procurement.  Then each finding is expanded 
and generalised to assess the implications for future procurement practices. 
  
• First, rational and calculus drivers were insufficient to explain the 
collaborative procurement outcomes. 
⁃ Industrial and technical imperative drivers were subdued by cost 
concerns, multilateralism, the Western 'community of values', and 
organisation survival or role expansion drivers  
 
• Second, additional ideational, symbolic drivers were needed to generate 
sufficient political support for the joint procurement.  These included: 
⁃ Alignment with Western 'community of values' missions for the 
surveillance made the procurement more politically acceptable; 
⁃ Surveillance solutions that were aligned with civil military 
specifications and justifications gained more political support; 
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• Third, NATO and EU bureaucracies affect the delivery and balance of 
drivers in the procurement process 
⁃ Scrutiny of the organisation affected societal, cultural expectations 
for the procurement policy and practices, this affected decision-
making efficiency; 
⁃ Role expansion and organisation survival drivers played a role in 
procurement policy and practices; 
⁃ Organisation culture that is aligned closely to the strategic cultures is 
more efficient in procurement policy and decision-making;  
⁃ Industry actors are incentivised to support the procurement process 
because of symbolic prestige associated with international 
organisation contracts; and 
 
• Fourth, Multilateralism and member state solidarity encouraged collegiate 
dynamics and political support for the procurement. 
  
Calculus Drivers behind the Collaborative Procurement 
Calculus, strategic rationale drivers for joint security missions were articulated in the 
discourse.  They were necessary to initiate the multilateral procurement in both case 
studies.  The implicit calculus drivers of industrial and technical imperatives were also 
present, as noted in the literature and primary data.  However when considering how the 
joint procurement policy and acquisition were agreed these explanations were not 
always relevant.   
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Calculus drivers for procurement, such as the strategic rationale of security issues, or 
industrial or technical imperatives are inherently driven by self-interest, and thus 
potentially divisive.  They are therefore often insufficient to achieve political support 
and to fully explain collaborative decision-making.  Both case studies had elements of 
'off-the-shelf' security solutions that considerably reduced industrial imperatives.  
Moreover, in the Frontex case study, the calculus driven reticence of member states 
regarding sovereignty over border surveillance activities constrained the specification of 
the ECN.   
 
Thus technical and industrial imperatives were not present in the EU procurement 
outcomes, and few technical imperatives were found in the AGS outcomes.  This is 
despite allegations in the literature that there would be.  Other drivers in the 
procurement process outweighed industrial imperatives in the Commission and Frontex, 
such as the reputation of the organisation and inherent solidarity in the bureaucratic 
culture as explored below.   
 
Calculus drivers alone could not therefore account for the final procurement outcomes.  
Additional symbolic and organisation role expansion drivers were needed to explain the 
collaboration and agreement to joint surveillance activity and procurement of the related 
capability.  This finding is important as much current analysis and effort focuses on this 
aspect of collaborative procurement.  Rational logics are essential to initiate and justify 
procurement policy, but they are insufficient to wholly encourage political and societal 
support for joint acquisition.  If this limitation is acknowledged in preparation for future 
collaborative procurement policy, then efforts may be spared in this direction and 
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efficiency increased where focus on alternative cultural drivers and organisational 
aspects may encourage successful collaboration and coherent decision making. 
 
Ideational drives to Generate Political Support 
The second set of key findings concerned cultural, symbolic drivers derived from 
institutional explanations.  These affected political and societal attitudes towards 
collaborative surveillance policy and procurement.  The presence or omission of these 
cultural aspects affected the levels of political support for joint acquisition.  Cultural, 
symbolic drivers are naturally cohesive and binding, and can be significant to achieve 
consensus in the process.  Shared ideas contribute to cohesive decision-making for each 
of the three aspects of collaborative procurement related to symbolic drivers outlined in 
the case study analysis above.  First, where societal, 'community of values' priorities 
regarding the surveillance mission are met; second, where cultural, multilateral aspects 
of political relationships are important for the procurement process; and third, where the 
form of the capability meets societal, civil military expectations for defence and security 
solutions.   
 
This finding is important in that ideational, symbolic aspects have not been stressed in 
past analyses of collaborative procurement and not necessarily considered or 
incorporated in current procurement practices.  It is useful to establish strategic cultures 
that are associated with the capability to be procured.  Acknowledgement of these in the 
discourse surrounding future procurement policy and process may ease the achievement 
of consensus by member states. 
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The key findings regarding the culture of 'community of values' missions are interlinked 
with findings regarding organisational role expansion and survival drivers in policy 
decisions.  Both the NATO and Frontex case studies demonstrated how the symbolic 
driver of the 'community of values' culture generated missions that related to the 
procurement activity.  NATO and the Commission articulated their missions in the 
context of this culture to justify acquisition of surveillance capability.  This finding, 
alongside the findings regarding urgency below, suggests that it is important to have the 
security missions, related to the capability in the procurement discourse, aligned to 
societal, security priorities.  This is useful for prioritisation in future procurement plans. 
 
The performance of 'community of values' missions was related to organisation 
reputation, relevance and future security role.  NATO adjusted its mission to be 
associated with civil military disaster relief and border control.  Frontex expanded its 
mission to perform the surveillance roles in the crisis situation.  The implications are 
that, where the procurement organisation has an interest in the role to be performed, 
there are additional motivations and focus on procurement decision-making.  Thus 
organisations, such as OCCAR, which have a core competence of procurement, do not 
necessarily have the same drive to agree policy and procurement agreement as where 
there is a role expansion driver.  In future procurement practices, it may make sense for 
member states to use the EU or NATO for procurement where they are going to perform 
the functions associated with the policy.    
 
A second cultural finding concerns a European societal and political preference for civil 
military surveillance solutions over purely military solutions.  This stems from a 
preference for soft power and civil security solutions where there are little direct 
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military threats.1182  The implications of this preference affect the political acceptability 
of proposed solutions and industry's approaches to providing those solutions.  It has 
meant that the defence industry is adapting former military solutions to dual use civil 
security assets.  Further, the Commission currently has no remit for a defence role.  Thus 
the Frontex case study demonstrated that the civil military nature of the surveillance 
solution fell within the Schengen Borders Code,1183 and societal expectation for the 
provision of security.  This legitimised the Frontex provision of the security solution.   
 
This is important for future procurement, where civil military solutions and capabilities 
are prioritised for acquisition.  This could be because they could gain joint political 
acceptance, and demand for these types of assets will increase.  Thus in the current 
European Defence Action plan,1184 the Commission security activities may find greater 
traction for future procurement (compared to those proposed by the EDA) where there is 
a strong organisational driver and the civil military solutions proposed fit with member 
state joint security solution preferences.  This will continue the EU joint security 




1182. PRESIDENT JUNCKER 2014. President Juncker's Political Guidelines. Strasbourg: European 
Parliament. 
1183. Schengen Borders Code: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:l14514 
Accessed April 2018 
1184. EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2016. COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS European 
Defence Action Plan; COM(2016) 950 final. Brussels. 
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Civil military surveillance capability may also be associated with the prestigious US 
RMA culture, however this is not included in these key findings.  The lack of technical 
imperatives in the Frontex case study suggests that prestige and sophistication of 
surveillance solution were not major factors in the procurement process.   This may have 
played a greater part in the NATO AGS Programme, where the US was key to the 
procurement. However, here, the driver of symbolic prestige was not considered 
dominant in the process. 
 
Moreover, the research showed that the civil security industry sector had different 
characteristics to the traditional defence sector. This necessitated a different approach by 
organisations as customers, where the organisations can exercise more power over the 
fragmented supplier base.  There are fewer Prime contractor arrangements and the 
procurement customers, as seen in the Frontex case study, therefore retain greater 
control.  However, this is unlikely to continue with the expansion of the defence sector 
into civil security functions.   
 
Symbolic Drivers to Generate Political Support - how they are delivered in NATO and 
the EU organisations. 
The third set of findings concerned how the cultural, symbolic drivers were put into 
operation in NATO and EU organisations.  This approach builds upon Scott's ideas of 
open/natural systems of organisations where they are driven by the need to survive but 
also embedded and constituted by the environments in which they operate.1185  Socially 
constructed ideas also have a bearing on decision-making and consensus for 
																																																																		
1185. FARRELL, T. 1996. Figuring out fighting organisations: The new organisational analysis in 
strategic studies. Journal of Strategic Studies, 19, 122-135. 
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collaboration and surveillance solutions.  Three aspects affected the balance of drivers 
for procurement: the level of scrutiny; the level of urgency felt within the organisation 
and alignment of organisation culture with strategic culture. 
 
The level of organisation scrutiny had a major effect on the balance of the drivers and 
their influence on collaborative procurement practices.  The measures by which NATO 
and the Commission are scrutinised and judged, reflect societal concerns.  This gives 
weight to certain drivers and the thesis has focussed on elements such as cost efficiency, 
the Western symbolic 'community of values' concern for human security, and civil 
military security solutions.  Societal concerns leant an ethical aspect to the security 
solutions where the member state agency and organisation responsibilities - and 
therefore reputation and organisational survival - were also linked to the crisis.  This 
increased the balance and influence of the Western 'community of values' driver.   
 
These levels of scrutiny affect the behaviour of decision-makers.  The higher the level of 
scrutiny, the more their behaviour is influenced to align with the expectations of 
efficiency or security solution.  This is because of the consequences for the 
organisation's reputation if the expectations are not met.  The high profile coverage of 
the migrant crisis in 2015 ensured political focus on this.  The Frontex Regulation 
expresses an objective for the safety of migrants and the process reflected a high level of 
sensitivity to the scrutiny of internal auditors and external critics.  The procurement 
decision-making exhibited few inefficient industrial or technical imperatives.  On the 
other hand, NATO is subject to less scrutiny, especially at the policy stage.  Therefore 
there are fewer repercussions regarding reputation and therefore decision-makers exhibit 
less sensitivity to aspects such as efficient decision-making or time keeping, and little 
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restraint regarding juste retour and industrial imperatives.  The nature and low profile of 
criticism of NATO procurement activity was a contributing factor to the delays and 
inefficiencies experienced in the AGS Programme.   
 
The level of pressure and urgency of the security context for which surveillance was 
needed also amplified or reduced certain drivers for procurement.  Urgency both 
represents and encourages coherence in security outlook and requirements.  Interested 
actors may use it to achieve their objectives.  Thus it enabled and strengthened the role 
expansion drivers of the Commission, where fulfilling the surveillance role was in line 
with member state objectives for an urgent response to the crisis.   
 
Urgency may reduce consideration of other drivers such as technical imperatives.  
Perceived urgency in a security issue, for example the migration crisis in 2015, 
encouraged collaboration and procurement processes where member states felt pressure 
to provide surveillance solutions and rescue missions, but were not concerned about 
acquiring highly sophisticated assets.  The high levels of media coverage of the migrant 
crisis increased the pressure of this driver within the security environment.  In the 
Frontex procurement, the urgency of the migrant crisis affected all stages of the 
procurement of the ECN and ASS contracts.   
 
At the inception of the NATO AGS Programme, the security context exhibited little 
urgency for the requirement.  This reduced incentives for timely processes and led to 
other drivers, such as juste retour, becoming the focus of the procurement.  An urgent 
driver will be amplified whether it is a rational or cultural driver and the pressure felt by 
those immediately involved demands action due to concern for the consequences, in this 
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case the deaths of migrants.  The level of subsequent judgement and accountability also 
enhances the pressure felt by organisation actors.   
 
The alignment of organisation cultures with strategic cultural imperatives eased the 
procurement process.   'Community of values' and civil military drivers are affected by 
the staff profiles and bureaucratic ethos of NATO and the EU.  Staff with a military 
background have a different approach to those with a civilian background.  For example, 
NATO has partially adapted its role to align with the softer, civil military culture 
through adjusting the articulation of its missions to include roles such as border 
surveillance and disaster relief.  NATO's bureaucratic culture is less aligned with 
'community of values' and civil military cultures, so these aspects fit less well with staff, 
organisation culture and processes.  Anecdotal data has indicated that the community of 
values and civil military arguments were used externally, rather than internally, with 
member state constituents to justify the procurement of the AGS Programme.  This 
weakens the driver.   
 
On the other hand, the Commission's activity is tied to the civil security sphere via the 
Schengen Code.  This means that civil military drivers are a natural fit and therefore 
strong.  The EU has greater input from NGO's regarding the symbolic 'community of 
values' and civil military expectations.  A focus on organisation culture affects delivery 
of these imperatives, and therefore staff behaviour and decision-making can aid 
approaches to future procurement processes.  Again, this has implications for future 
procurement with regards to the European Defence Action Plan.  It suggests that civil 
military procurement efforts may be more successful within the Commission's 
organisation culture and military procurement more successful via cooperation with 
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NATO and its military culture.  This is especially relevant where overlapping member 
states in both organisations are unlikely to support duplicate procurement programmes 
in both organisations. 
 
Thus urgency of the security context, scrutiny of organisations and organisational 
culture related to the 'community of values' driver and, to a lesser extent, civil military 
solutions, place an emphasis on human security capabilities as opposed to defence 
capabilities.  This humanitarian approach to security has implications for the types of 
assets that are prioritised when it comes to pooling and collaboration.  Assets that relate 
to disaster relief and other aspects of human security may be prioritised over kinetic 
assets.  If procurement strategies take into account this strategic culture other missions 
driven by 'community of values' may be applied to other assets such as strategic airlift or 
satellite assets.   
 
A final finding regarding organisation effects concerns industry actors who support the 
collaborative procurement because of the symbolic prestige associated with international 
organisation contracts.  This finding is important as it is not often referred to in analysis 
of collaborative procurement and it has real implications for the efficiency of the 
contract.  The symbolic prestige that is related to international organisations provides 
incentives for firms to work with them.  This confers power to organisations and often 
leads to enhanced cost efficiency in the implementation of the contract.  Here, firms 
accept low cost terms in return for the reflected legitimacy that they receive through 




Multilateralism and Collegiate dynamics in collaborative procurement 
A fourth significant finding concerns political relationships and symbolic, multilateral 
drivers within the procurement organisations of NATO and the EU.  Where these are 
emphasised, collegiate dynamics may follow and reduce bureaucratic politics.  The 
NATO AGS case study demonstrated that the inclusion of multilateral motivations for 
participation was a symbolic, cultural driver during the acquisition process.  The Frontex 
case study showed that the inherent solidarity in its bureaucratic culture subdued 
industrial imperatives.  The relationships involved in collaborative procurement provide 
additional obligations in the process.   
 
This finding is important as political support may not just come from societal origins, 
but also from the elite policy makers whom have political objectives related to grand 
strategy.  Thus there is a symbolic, collegiate obligation when commitment is made to 
an international programme that is not present in a national programme.  This can have 
future implications for the approach to a procurement policy.  A political strategy may 
be associated with the procurement, where political objectives of participating states 
may be noted as giving additional incentives for collaboration.  This may relate to how 
the capability that is being procured fits into a wider picture of security objectives.  For 
example, France only agreed to the AGS common costs where the capability was 
included in a bigger joint surveillance effort.   
 
A political procurement strategy may also relate to a broader obligation of burden 
sharing, where member states want to procure assets to contribute to a joint political 
effort, rather than because there is an immediate security requirement for them.  This 
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dimension may drive the essential political support that is needed for a procurement 
programme.  
 
The involvement of politicians in the detailed policy decision-making, such as CNAD 
debates, may complicate the process as it brings an added dimension.  There is a history 
of procurement organisation evolution where these have developed from functional, 
expert arrangements (with little policy-making powers) to political arrangements where 
elite decision-makers are involved with decision-making but inevitably bring with them 
many external considerations.1186  This was reflected to some extent in the case studies 
where the political processes of NATO meant that elite decision-makers were involved 
in the process, but also caused impediments to decision-making where member state 
objectives got in the way of procurement efficiency priorities.  In contrast, the EU focus 
on functional aspects of the capability and procurement involved few political 
exchanges between member states and thus led to a smoother process. 
 
In sum, the thesis established the presence of Western strategic, symbolic cultures that 
influence collaborative procurement decision-making.  The research identified three 
symbolic systems that could encourage the joint acquisition of surveillance: the Western 
'community of values' culture, civil military culture and the symbolism of political 
solidarity and multilateralism.   
 
Cultural, symbolic drivers may reduce the divisive self-interest of the calculus drivers 
and encourage coherent collaboration for joint security policy and procurement.  They 
																																																																		
1186. DEVORE, M. R. 2012. Organizing international armaments cooperation: institutional design and 
path dependencies in Europe. European Security, 21, 432-458. 
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are related to ideas and social behaviour that affect decision-making via a worldview or 
organisation environment.  They tend to encourage behaviour 'to conform to common 
objectives, forms and practices'.1187  As such, they are useful to explain collaborative 
procurement as they posit ideas to which member state representatives and other 
decision-makers may conform. If these ideas or similar frameworks can be worked into 
preparations for future procurement this should encourage a more cohesive and effective 
decision-making process.   
 
Limitations of this Study  
This study is limited in that the 'n' number of case studies is small, the case studies are 
very different from one another, and they are in a specific region, time period and 
security context.   
 
A small number of case studies always make generalisations difficult, if not impossible.  
There are few cases of multilateral collaborative procurement where the organisation is 
to perform the function, and this has limited the data available for research.  Moreover, 
the difference in case study profiles, where the organisations are sui generis, meant that 
the number of diverging variables within the organisations was high.  The study 
countered this by focussing on the commonalities of the organisation context and 
centring the research on the capability drivers.   
 
																																																																		
1187. EYRE, D. P. & SUCHMAN, M. C. 1996. Status, norms, and the proliferation of conventional 
weapons: An institutional theory approach. In: KATZENSTEIN, P. J. (ed.) The Culture of National 
Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. 
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The case studies of NATO and the EU also limited the enquiry to a Western context.  
Here, the lack of equivalent organisations in the different regions of the world makes 
application beyond a Western context difficult to contemplate, although the framework 
could be applied to a non-Western context to look for similar findings.  The security 
context of the migration crisis and its focus on border surveillance is also limited to a 
contemporary time period.  Collaborative procurement occurs in different security 
contexts, such as those related to expeditionary warfare, counter terrorism, cyber 
warfare, environmental risks or regional defence.  The cultural drivers identified in this 
research may not therefore always be helpful in these other contexts.   
 
Also, the research considered the procurement of a specific capability: surveillance.  
This limited the cultural parameters that are applicable to this function.  This research is 
relevant to a contemporary security context and to surveillance capabilities, so the 
specific conclusions may not be applicable to a different time period or to different 
assets.  Further research would be needed on these aspects.   
 
Despite these limitations, the research has pointed to the commonalities of the case 
studies, namely in the procurement of surveillance capability, the reflection of strategic 
cultures and the multilateral, organisational context.   
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
The theoretical framework used in this thesis may be adapted for a broader or deeper 
consideration of how procurement of certain capabilities are affected and encouraged by 
strategic cultures.  The study used organisational theory to operationalise a cultural 
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agenda, which may be helpful in other research projects.  This approach may be adapted 
and generalised, as indicated above and applied to procurement of other capabilities and 
by other types of organisations.  Additionally, future research may want to test the 
findings via different, qualitative methodologies. 
 
First, the thesis generates a toolbox through which future avenues of research may be 
explored and cultural drivers identified for generating political support.  Capability 
requirements can be aligned to strategic culture at the different levels of decision-
making, from grand strategy to procurement policy to procurement process decision-
making.   
 
Second, organisation aspects can be acknowledged and applied, especially where NATO 
and the EU continue with their procurement programmes, so the organisational context 
is a constant.  This awareness of organisation factors, such as bureaucratic structure and 
organisational culture can be built into procurement decision-making and enhance the 
efficiency of the process.  Moreover, emphasis on symbolic multilateralism and 
solidarity can help to rationalise decisions for certain programmes.   
 
Future research may use this toolbox to address different capabilities within different 
security contexts and cultures.  The approach may be employed in different security 
contexts such as expeditionary warfare, counter terrorism, cyber warfare, environmental 
risks or regional defence.  It may also address other types of security capabilities 
ranging from flight refuelling, data analysis infrastructure, crisis coordination centres or 
missile defence systems.  Where these assets are related to different strategic cultures, 
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the culture can be identified and utilised to generate political willingness and enhance 
better procurement decision-making.   
 
There is also additional research within the frame of reference used by this study.  For 
example, the strategic cultures and political identities identified here, Western 
'community of values' and civil military solutions, are applicable for collaborative 
procurement of other capabilities such as assets used for maritime and land border 
patrols.  Analysis of the procurement of programmes such as Air Command and Control 
systems (ACCs) by NATO may benefit from the approach used in this study, given that 
it is owned and operated by NATO and entails surveillance and management of regional 
airspace.1188   
 
Additional analysis of capabilities such as AWACs may also identify further 
commonalities with this research, especially given the current efforts to renew this 
capability.1189  Multilateral imperatives associated with NATO and the EU may also be 
compared to other organisations such as OCCAR, or in different contexts such as the 
Franco British Treaty.1190   
 
Finally, the research methodology was qualitative, this generated sufficient data for 
analysis, but meant that the methods of analysis were different to those measurements 
																																																																		
1188. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8203.htm Accessed October 2017 
1189. https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_48904.htm Accessed October 2017 
1190. MAULNY, J.-P. 2012. The Franco-British Treaty, The European Union's 'Pooling and sharing' and 
NATO's 'Smart Defence'; How can the different initiatives in terms of pooling capabilities be coordinated. 
Paris: IRIS. 
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used in qualitative methodology.  Future studies may want to adopt different 
methodologies to further test the findings. 
 
Closing Remarks 
This thesis has studied the social processes behind collaborative procurement and 
attempted to address the gaps in existing scholarship regarding cultural and organisation 
effects on the process.  It sought to unpack organisation processes to explain how the 
macro (security) and micro (organisation) environments affect the balance of drivers for 
collaborative procurement.  It aimed to demonstrate how symbolic, strategic cultures 
encourage the political support required for collaboration.  It attempted to clarify and 
define these influences and link them to evidence found in this academic research. 
 
The limitations of this study notwithstanding, this research makes an important 
contribution to the literature of collaborative procurement.  Its focus on the symbolic, 
strategic cultures, organisational aspects and the specific capability procured, widens 
and deepens our understanding of the frame of reference that surrounds joint acquisition 
by multilateral organisations.  It suggests an innovative way of approaching 
procurement that can be applied to different capabilities and so enable continuation of 
the research agenda beyond this thesis.   
 
The study highlights the links between the two case studies and offers substantial data to 
support the arguments.  It considers existing studies on joint procurement, builds upon 
these, and generates new data to support a fresh approach to the subject.  It contributes 
valuable interview data and analyses primary sources such as speeches and policy 
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documents to substantiate the conclusions of the research, thus providing a useful 
addition to the toolbox used by politicians, diplomats, industry and organisation staff 
when trying to gain consensus for much needed collaborative procurement activity.   
 
The research provides insights into the formation and implementation of joint 
acquisition policy.  It highlights previous omissions in the literature and contributes to 
the understanding of past approaches that can be applied to future practices.  Political 
considerations of multilateralism and specific strategic cultures are taken, alongside the 
rational premise, for future projects and aid the generation of political support for 
collaborative procurement.  This in turn enhances efficiency of future procurement 





Member State Security Strategy Documents1191 
France:1192 The French White Paper on Defence and National Security mentions 
surveillance many times, both in the context of space surveillance and marine 
surveillance.  France's Mediterranean shoreline clearly affects its national 
considerations.  Terrorism gains 18 mentions, and trafficking in various guises gets 18 
mentions and seems to be synonymous with cross border crime.  There is an emphasis 
on the need for pre-emption and a strategy of 'knowledge and anticipation' and which 
infers that some sort of monitoring is needed.1193  Migration is referred to in passing but 
the main threat is identified as human trafficking.  France indicates that Frontex is part 
of the solution.1194  The mention of failed states may infer that expeditionary, military 
action could be needed. 
 
United States:1195 The United States publishes both a 'National Military Strategy' 
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff1196 and a 'National Security Strategy' approved by the 
																																																																		
1191. These documents relate to the period, 2003 - 2015, that is relevant to the case studies discussed in 
Chapter 4 and 5. 
1192. THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE 2013. French White Paper, Defence and National Security. 
1193. Ibid. p.68 
1194. Ibid. p.103 
1195. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 2015. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America. 
In: OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ed.). Washington.; THE WHITE HOUSE 2015. 
United States National Security Strategy. Washington. 
1196. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 2015. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America. 
In: OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ed.). Washington. 
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President.1197  This section considers the political strategy that guides policy decisions 
for the acquisition of surveillance equipment.  While the US Military Strategy 
specifically mentions aerial surveillance as part of the solution to counter terrorism 
operations,1198 this is an opinion that is led by military organisations, rather than the 
politicians.  The US is affected by terrorism concerns after 9/11, so although the 
physically proximate concerns of Europe do not directly affect the States, it has an 
interest in monitoring the security situation on the borders of the 'West'.  The US has 
been accused of using NATO to further its military industrial concerns and this will be 
further examined in the specific case studies below.1199   
 
Germany:1200 The German Security White Paper of 20061201 mentions the threat of 
terrorism over 19 times in the document, cross border crime over 6 times and human 
trafficking over 3 times.  The document articulates the need for surveillance to perform 
situational reconnaissance tasks1202 over four times, mainly in a military context.  
Surveillance is not mentioned as a solution to the transborder crime or terrorism.  The 
Defence Policy paper of 2011 is a shorter paper but also underlines the changing nature 
of threats to terrorism and organised crime, as well as international threats to 
infrastructure and cyber crime.  As expected in a defence paper, the importance of 
																																																																		
1197. THE WHITE HOUSE 2015. United States National Security Strategy. Washington. 
1198. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 2015. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America. 
In: OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ed.). Washington. p.10 
1199. SPEAR, J. 1997. Bigger NATO, Bigger Sales. The World Today, 53, 272-274. 
1200. GERMAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 2006. German White Paper 2006 on German 
Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr. 
1201. Ibid. 
1202. Ibid. p.43 
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international efforts via NATO is also underlined.  There are inferences to Homeland 
Security with the emphasis on the national defence.  
 
Spain:1203 The Spanish National Security Strategy was published in 2013.1204  Its 
emphasis regarding transnational threats can be seen in the significance given to 
terrorism and organised crimes, both get over 30 mentions.  Surveillance has a low 
profile and is referred to with regards to migration and cybercrime.  Migration is 
perceived as less of a threat than Organised Crime and Terrorism. Private sector 
involvement in security solutions is described with regard to maritime security and the 
management of migratory flows. 
 
Italy:  Italy has not published a national security strategy but it has various defence and 
security papers, and these may be viewed in the whole.  As with other countries in 
Europe, terrorism and organised crime are perceived as major strategic threats. 
Clandestine immigration is also included as a threat.  The solution to these threats is 
identified as includes cooperative initiatives with the EU and the US.1205  
 
Greece:  This paragraph refers to an academic article which comments on various 
defence papers, expenditure and internal security papers.1206  The analyst notes that 
security in Greece is no longer measured as a pure military concern and therefore any 
																																																																		
1203. SPANISH PRESIDENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT 2013. The National Security Strategy, 
Sharing a Common Project. Spain. 
1204. Ibid. 
1205. DI CAMILLO, F. & MARTA, L. 2009. National Security Strategies: the Italian case. Documentos 
de Trabajo (Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos), 1. p.13 
1206. DOKOS, T. 2007. Greek Security Policy in the 21st Century. ELIAMEP Policy Paper No.9. 
Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy. 
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security strategy involves internal ministries and the security sector.1207  Terrorism is 
mentioned as the highest priority with  organised crime and illegal migration.  
Surveillance is mentioned in a military context for joint operational planning between 
the Navy and Airforce.  The paper describes contributions made by the Greeks for the 
NATO's Operation Enduring Freedom and STANAVFORMED now SNMG2 (Standing 
NATO Maritime Group 2) 
 
Bulgaria: Bulgaria's security strategy is presented in the context of its membership with 
the EU and NATO.  It does not identify any direct military threats but sees the potential 
for conflict and crisis situations at a distance, direct threats include the asymmetric 
threats of terrorism, organised crime, human trafficking, smuggling and then cyber 
crime, failed states overspill and energy security.1208 
 
Roumania:  Roumanian security strategy is very much presented as integral to its 
integration in the EU and NATO.1209  As emphasised in the document: 'it is not the fear 
of threats but the wish to secure stability and build a better future which motivates 
Romania's options for European and Euro-Atlantic integration'.  Its emphasis is on 
regional instability, although terrorism, organised crime and trafficking come third on 
the list of international risks.  NATO is integral in its national defence strategy with 
NATO integration and goals being number one in the national defence policy 
objectives.1210 
																																																																		
1207. Ibid. p.6 
1208. BULGARIAN DURZHAVEN VESTNIK 2011. National Security Stategy of Bulgaria. National 
Assembly Decision No 19/8.032011. 
1209. MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE 2014. Romania's National Security Strategy. 
1210. Ibid. section 5. 
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EU Security Strategy 20031211 - 20151212 The EU Security Strategy of 2003 identified 
five major threats that are reflected to greater or lesser extent in the security strategies 
above.  They are terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states 
and organised crime.1213  Since then, the security environment has evolved and a new 
strategy is due to be published in 2016.  An initial statement does not go into any detail 
but indicates the 2015/16 report's emphasis on a global and complex environment.1214  It 
emphasises migration concerns and a headline policy solution for the Common Defence 
and Security Policy (CDSP) as a 'joined-up' approach.  This is not elaborated at this 
stage. 
 
European Security Research Advisory Board (ESRAB) Report 2006:1215  While national 
and EU security strategies are notable for their articulation of threats and the general 
nature of the proposed solutions, the ESRAB report is written by academics, and 
military and private sector practitioners.  The document is important as evidence of a 
narrative for what is being recommended for security solution policy. It focuses on 
'Mission Area Analysis' and considers border security, protection against terrorism and 
organised crime, critical infrastructure protection, and restoring security in case of a 
crisis.  Situational awareness and some sort of surveillance is deemed appropriate for 
																																																																		
1211. EU 2003. A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy. Brussels. 
1212. EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2015a. The European Agenda on Security. Strasbourg. 
1213. EU 2003. A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy. Brussels. 
1214. EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2015a. The European Agenda on Security. Strasbourg. 
1215. ESRAB is a board appointed by the EU commission.  While it is not an official policy document for 
the EU Commission it is a useful, practical document to monitor the EU security concerns, albeit with an 
security sector agenda: ESRAB 2006. Meeting the Challenge: The European Security Research Agenda. 
European Security Research Advisory Board Report. Luxembourg. 
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many of these mission areas, but specifically border security and restoring security in a 
crisis indicates the need for aerial ISR. 
 
NATO Strategic Concept 1999 and 2010: 
The 1999 Strategic Concept was written before 9/11 and the major influx of migrants.  
The emphases of the threats include the risks of political instability, ethnic conflict 
(relating to the Balkans) and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.  The 2010 
Strategic Concept specifically refers to terrorism but also the reference to instability:
 'Instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance 
security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and trans-national illegal activities 
such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people' 
 
Recent sources of the West's1216 preoccupation with certain threats can be found in the 
latest Eurobarometer and Transatlantic Trend surveys and reflect public attitudes as 
opposed to political elites. 
 
Special Eurobarometer 432:1217  This survey was carried out on behalf of the Directorate 
General for Migration and Home Affairs in March 2015. While most people identified 
threats to security within the EU such as financial crises, poverty and corruption, they 
also felt a rising insecurity from external factors.  This included terrorism, organised 
crime and irregular migration.  There was a marked increase to the threat of terrorism, 
with over 68% of respondents expecting this threat to increase.  However, when asked 
																																																																		
1216. Here West refers to Europe and NATO member states such as the US and Canada. 
1217. EUROBAROMETER 2015. European's Attitudes Towards Security. Brussels: Directorate-General 
for Migration and Home Affairs. (28,082 respondents interviewed face to face in their mother tongue) 
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about the response to these threats, only 32% of respondents consider that EU 
institutions and agencies should play an important role. 
 
Transatlantic Trends 2014:1218  This survey focussed on the perceived impact of 
immigration, and in the security section focussed on cooperative security.  While the 
report did not focus on a general definition of threats, on both sides of the Atlantic, 
issues of mobility, migration, and integration connect with foreign, security, economic, 
and social policy.  The West still consider that NATO is essential as an institution and 




1218. GERMAN MARSHALL FUND 2014. Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2014. 
http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/Trends_2014_complete.pdf 
accessed February 2016. (1000 people in 13 countries US, Turkey, Russia, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Spain and the UK, computer assisted telephone interviews) 
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NATO Interview Schedule 
Robert Bell:    Former Diplomat – speaking a private capacity 
    (Brussels, 18th November 2016) 
Ludwig Decamps:  Current Director for Armament and Aerospace 
Capabilities, Defence Investment Division, NATO HQ 
    (Brussels, January 2017) 
Jim Edge:   Current General Manager of NAGSMA 2013 - date 
    (Brussels, 18th October 2016) 
Rick Froh:   Former Deputy ASG Defence Investment Division, 
NATO HQ 
    (Brussels, 18th November 2016, and 11th January 2017) 
Vice Admiral Malcom Fages: Deputy Chairman of the NATO Military  
    Committee 2000 - 2003 
    (Phone Interview, 3rd August 2016) 
Clarence Juhl:   Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Representative 
Europe, Deputy Defense Adviser US Mission NATO 
Brussels Belgium 1996 - 2007 
    (Phone Interview, 4th November 2016) 
007:    NAGSMA official 
    (Brussels, 11th January 2017) 
009:    Diplomat – speaking in a private capacity 
    (Brussels, 11th January 2017) 
011:     Former Military Procurement Expert – speaking in a 
private capacity (Shrivenham, 23rd June 2016) 
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Lord George Robertson: Former NATO Secretary General 1999 - 2003 
    (House of Lords, 15th November 2016) 
Col. Volker Samanns:  (Dusseldorf, 25th January 2017) 
Brooks Tigner:   EU/NATO Affairs Correspondant IHS Janes Defence 
Weekly 
    (Brussels, 10th January 2017) 
002 :    Industry expert - speaking in a private capacity 
    (London, 3rd August 2016) 
Erling Wang:    Former Chairman of NAGSMO July 2012 - July 2016; 
Assistant Secretary General MOD Norway 2010 - 2014; 
Chairman of NATO Military Committee       and NATO Civil Budget Committee 2007 - 2010; Deputy National       Armaments Director, Norway 2005 - 2007 
    (Oslo, 20th October 2016) 
Otfried Wohlleben:  Procurement Expert - speaking in a private capacity 
    (Dusseldorf, 25th January 2017) 
John Young:    Politician - speaking in a private capacity 
    (Phone Interview, 1st September 2016) 
Bob Zeiser:   Programme Director, Northrop Grumman 1992 – to date 
Matt Copija:   Programme Manager, Northrop Grumman 1995 – to date 
    (Joint phone interview, 3rd May 2017 and 12th July 2017) 
001    Industry Expert - speaking in a private capacity 





EU Interview Schedule 
Gregorio Ameyugo:  Procurement Expert - speaking in a private capacity 
    (Warsaw, 16th September 2016) 
Peter Bondar:   Industry Expert - speaking in a private capacity 
    (London, 3rd August 2016 and 20th July 2017) 
Alexander Dalli:  Former Pooled Resources Official, Frontex 
    (Malta, January 2016) 
005    Procurement Expert - speaking in a private capacity 
    (Warsaw, 14th September 2016 and 22nd September 2017) 
Louis Galea:   Former Member of the European Court of Auditors 
    (Malta, 2nd May 2017)Ivan Inchovsky   Pooled Resources Unit, Frontex 
    (Warsaw, 14th September 2016) 
003    Procurement Expert - speaking in a private capacity 
    (Warsaw, 22nd June 2016) 
004    Procurement Expert - speaking in a private capacity 
    (Warsaw, 22nd June 2016) 
Francois Laruelle:  Hd ICT Unit, Frontex 
    (Warsaw, 22nd June 2016) 
Luis Manuel Cueste:  Manager GMV Eurosur Maintenance Contract 
    (Warsaw, 22nd June 2016) 
006    speaking in a private capacity  
    (Brussels 4th April 2016 , 2nd January 2017) 
008    speaking in a private capacity   
    (Phone interview 22nd September 2016) 
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Darek Saunders:  Head of Analytics, Frontex 
    (Warsaw, 14th September 2016) 
Brooks Tigner:   EU/NATO Affairs Correspondant IHS Janes Defence Weekly 
    (Brussels 10th January 2017) 
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summary of your review of the possible risks involved in your research, as well as to 
provide basic research records (as above in Record Keeping) and to describe the process 
by which participants agreed to participate in your research.  
 
Remember that if you have any questions about the ethical conduct of your research at 
any point, you should contact your supervisor, the Research Ethics office, or a member 
of your Department’s Research Ethics Panel for advice.  
Feedback: 
As KCL is currently trialling the Minimal Risk Process, you may be selected to provide 
feedback on the Minimal Risk guidance, form and process. You can also provide 
feedback on the process by emailing rec@kcl.ac.uk .  
 
We wish you every success with this work. 
With best wishes, 
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